People v. Kotlinski

1

2024 IL App (4th) 230526

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN M. KOTLINSKI, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4-23-0526

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fourth District

June 11, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County No. 23DT224 Honorable Philip J. Nicolosi, Judge Presiding.

Attorneys for Appellant: J. Hanley, State's Attorney, of Rockford (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and James Ryan Williams, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

Attorneys for Appellee: No brief filed for appellee.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Steigmann concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

DeARMOND JUSTICE

¶ 1 The State appeals from the grant of defendant Steven M. Kotlinski's petition under section 2-118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2022)) to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license (see 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2022)). The trial court entered what it described as a "Madden order" (see People v. Madden, 273 Ill.App.3d 114, 652 N.E.2d 480 (1995)). The State appeals, contending the theory behind such an order is incorrect. We agree, and we thus reverse the order.

¶ 2 The issue underlying this appeal is whether, under section 2-118.1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 (West 2022)), confirmation of a summary suspension by the Secretary of State (Secretary) is a prerequisite for the recission of a suspension. Under the rule in Madden, the "suspension may not be rescinded until it has been confirmed" by the Secretary. Madden, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 116. But the hearing on a petition to rescind the suspensions must be held within 30 days of the petition's filing (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2022)), unless the delay in the hearing is attributable to the petitioner (e.g., Madden, 273 Ill.App.3d at 115-16). The Madden court held that a delay resulting from the Secretary's slow confirmation of the suspension was attributable to the State. Madden, 273 Ill.App.3d at 116. It concluded, because this delay made the hearing untimely, the trial court could not adjudicate the petition on the merits and instead was required to rescind the suspension based on the failure to hold a timely hearing. Madden, 273 Ill.App.3d at 116. Madden also stated, "A suspension may not be rescinded until it has been confirmed." Madden, 273 Ill.App.3d at 116. Thus, in essence, a "Madden order" is an order requiring recission of a summary suspension when a delay in confirmation of the suspension precludes a timely hearing on the recission petition.

¶ 3 Here, the State argues Madden was incorrect in holding a trial court cannot rescind a suspension until the Secretary confirms it. We agree. Section 2-118.1 provides complete directions for a trial court's review of a statutory summary suspension entered under section 11501.1. It does not make the Secretary's confirmation of a suspension a precondition for adjudication of a recission petition. We thus reverse the entry of the "Madden order" and remand the cause for an adjudication on the merits.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On April 21, 2023, a Rockford, Illinois, police officer cited defendant on a count of driving under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicating compounds (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2022)) and a lesser traffic offense. The arresting officer's factual summary stated defendant had been driving a vehicle that rear-ended another vehicle. The officer noted defendant's breath smelled strongly of alcohol, and he displayed other symptoms of alcohol intoxication. Defendant refused to submit to breath testing for alcohol. The arresting officer issued the statutorily required "Warning to Motorist" (see 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(d), (f) (West 2022)) advising defendant, because he had refused breath testing, his driver's license would be summarily suspended.

¶ 6 On April 27, 2023, defendant filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension of his license. The trial court set a hearing date of May 15, 2023, on the petition, which was continued to May 25, 2023.

¶ 7 On May 23, 2023, the Secretary sent a notice to the Winnebago County circuit clerk, stating that because of a flaw in the officer's sworn report-apparently a legibility problem with the citation number-the Secretary could not "suspend/revoke this driver." The same document contained a "Notice to Police Department," which stated: "Please provide the requested information on an AMENDED Sworn Report and resubmit to this office, court and driver. The AMENDED Sworn Report must contain an updated notice date (the date the amended notice was mailed to or personally delivered to the driver!)." (Emphases in original.)

¶ 8 The trial court then continued the matter until May 26, 2023, and then May 30, 2023. The latter continuance order noted May 30, 2023, was the "30th day." At the May 30, 2023, hearing, the parties agreed the Secretary had not confirmed the summary suspension of defendant's license. They further agreed the hearing was the last day to have a hearing on the merits.

¶ 9 The State said, notwithstanding the lack of confirmation, it was answering "ready" for a hearing on the merits of the recission petition. It noted judicial redistricting had changed what precedent was binding in Winnebago County. It argued the trial court was no longer bound by the Second District decision in People v. Moreland, 2011 IL App (2d) 100699, 955 N.E.2d 1218. Moreland notionally agreed with Madden but expanded upon it, stating, "[W]ithout a confirmation of the suspension, there is not a suspension for the trial court to rescind." (Emphasis added.) Moreland, 2011 IL App (2d) 100699, ¶ 9.

¶ 10 The State contended the trial court should adopt the rule in the First District's decision in People v. Guillermo, 2016 IL App (1st) 151799, 54 N.E.3d 974, which rejected the principle stated in Madden and Moreland. Citing the Second District's decision in People v. Eidel, 319 Ill.App.3d 496, 503 (2001), Guillermo held, "[A] summary suspension automatically takes effect 46 days after the officer serves the motorist with notice that his or her license is to be suspended." Guillermo, 2016 IL App (1st) 151799, ¶¶ 16-17. Thus, the "absence of a confirmation of suspension is of no import, as it had no impact on the court's ability to grant effectual relief," so the Guillermo court could not accept the defendant's contention the petition was "not ripe for adjudication." Guillermo, 2016 IL App (1st) 151799, ¶¶ 15-16. The State asked the court here to accept this reasoning.

¶ 11 Defendant argued the trial court should continue to follow Madden. However, his argument was closer to the Moreland court's conclusion that a summary suspension could not become effective without the Secretary's confirmation (Moreland, 2011 IL App (2d) 100699, ¶ 9). He contended a suspension was only "hypothetical" until it was confirmed:

"The [c]ourt, in Guillermo, [relied on the self-executing nature of the summary suspension] in reasoning that the confirmation of the summary suspension is not needed for the matter to be r[ipe] and to proceed to hearing. I take issue with that line of reasoning because a document[, i.e., the notice to the motorist] is just a piece of paper, you can, you can call it self-executing all you want, but there needs to be work done in the [Secretary's office], essentially, it's the [Secretary] that processes the suspension.

So if nothing has been processed, i.e., confirmed, regardless of the selfexecuting nature of the document, there's nothing-there's no suspension and it has to be processed, and for there to be a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension, there must be a suspension, not some hypothetical self-executing document. Because we, we've seen it time and time before where something happens down in Springfield, something doesn't get processed, this-perhaps the defendant, not in this case, but, hypothetically, the defendant should be suspended and yet he gets pulled over and the officer runs his *** license, and nothing shows up. So the document isn't what suspends the license; it's someone in Springfield processing the document is what triggers the suspension.

So until it is confirmed, it is only hypothetically self-executing because it must be executed and confirmed."

¶ 12 Defendant argued the order required under Madden and Moreland could be entered the same day. He suggested the effect of such an order would be "that the suspension, if it is confirmed at some later date, [would] be rescinded."

¶ 13 The trial court entered an order in defendant's favor. It read as follows:

"Parties appear for [statutory summary suspension] hearing on [the] 30th day [since the recession petition's filing]. State answers ready for hearing citing [Guillermo]. [Defendant] asks for Madden Ruling. After arguments by parties, court grants Madden order over State's objection because there is no confirmation [of the suspension] on file by [Secretary]."

¶ 14 This appeal followed.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, the State notes the Fourth District has not addressed whether confirmation of a summary suspension is a prerequisite for recission. It asks us to adopt the rule in Guillermo as the better reasoned position. Defendant has not filed a response. We hold Guillermo reached the proper result when it allowed trial courts to hold recission hearings before confirmation of the suspension by the Secretary. We thus reverse the grant of recission based on the Madden rule and remand the cause for a hearing on the merits.

¶ 17 Madden categorically states a statutory summary suspension cannot be rescinded unless it is confirmed. Madden, 273 Ill.App.3d at 116. Moreland goes further,...