People v. Kuehner

2022 IL App (4th) 200325

221 N.E.3d 469

468 Ill.Dec. 641

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Danny KUEHNER, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-20-0325

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Filed March 30, 2022

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Kieran M. Wiberg, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Daniel K. Wright, State's Attorney, of Springfield (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Luke McNeill, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In October 2005, defendant, Danny Kuehner, entered an open plea of guilty to attempted first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1(a)(1) (West 2004)) and home invasion (id. § 12-11(a)(2)). Defendant was 17 years old when he committed these offenses. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 35 years in prison. This court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. People v. Kuehner , No. 4-07-0426, 379 Ill.App.3d 1091, 354 Ill.Dec. 279, 957 N.E.2d 595 (2008) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ).

¶ 2 In May 2009, defendant pro se filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) ( 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2008)). After advancing the petition to the second stage, the trial court granted appointed counsel's motion to withdraw and the State's motion to dismiss. This court affirmed on appeal. People v. Kuehner , 2014 IL App (4th) 120901, ¶ 95, 380 Ill.Dec. 606, 8 N.E.3d 1148. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that counsel's motion to withdraw was inadequate because it failed to address each of defendant's pro se claims. People v. Kuehner , 2015 IL 117695, ¶ 27, 392 Ill.Dec. 347, 32 N.E.3d 655.

¶ 3 On remand, in May 2018, defendant filed an amended petition for postconviction relief. The trial court dismissed defendant's amended postconviction petition after a second-stage hearing, and this court affirmed. People v. Kuehner , 2020 IL App (4th) 180771-U, ¶ 122, 2020 WL 1862338.

¶ 4 In October 2019, defendant pro se filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, asserting (1) his guilty plea was induced by the threat of an unconstitutional life sentence and (2) his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ) and the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ). In June 2020, the trial court denied defendant's motion because he failed to establish cause and prejudice.

¶ 5 Defendant appeals, arguing that his petition adequately demonstrated cause and prejudice to assert in a successive petition that (1) his guilty plea was induced by the threat of an unconstitutional life sentence and (2) his 35-year prison sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause and the eighth amendment.

¶ 6 We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment.

¶ 7 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 8 A. The Initial Charges

¶ 9 In June 2005, the State charged defendant with attempted first degree murder (count I) ( 720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1(a)(1) (West 2004)), home invasion (count II) (id. § 12-11(a)(2)), residential burglary (count III) (id. § 19-3(a)), robbery of a senior citizen (count IV) (id. § 18-1(a)), aggravated battery of a senior citizen (count V) (id. § 12-4.6(a)), and criminal damage to property (count VI) (id. § 21-1(1)(a)). The charges alleged that defendant, or someone for whom he was legally responsible, broke into the home of Margaret Geldrich and stole jewelry from her residence. The charges also alleged that she was beaten and suffered broken bones and a dislocated shoulder. The State later filed counts VII through XI, which repeated counts I through V, but also alleged that defendant was eligible for extended-term sentencing because Geldrich was over 60 years old at the time of the offenses and they were accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2), (b)(4)(ii) (West 2004).

¶ 10 B. The Guilty Plea Hearing

¶ 11 In October 2005, defendant tendered a guilty plea to attempted first degree murder (count VII) and home invasion (count VIII). In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining counts and a separate charge of armed robbery in another case. There was no agreement as to sentence. The trial court admonished defendant that the penalty for each count was from 6 to 60 years in prison, mandatorily consecutive, to be served at 85%. The court explained that defendant would receive a sentence between 12 and 120 years. The defendant stated that he understood.

¶ 12 Before accepting the plea, the court inquired into defendant's age, education, and mental status. Defendant answered that he was 17 years old, had finished eighth grade, and was hospitalized for depression (with thoughts of self-harm) the day he was arrested. Defendant stated that his depression was under control, that he was taking medication for his depression, and that neither his depression nor his medication affected his ability to understand his guilty plea. Defendant's counsel stated that (1) he had spoken to defendant several times at length, (2) he never had any problems communicating with defendant, and (3) defendant's responses were always appropriate. The court admonished defendant regarding the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, and defendant stated he understood.

¶ 13 As a factual basis for the plea, the State informed the trial court that, on the morning of June 3, 2005, a relative of the victim found the 98-year-old Geldrich "in a pool of blood, unconscious." The State continued as follows:

"A police investigation began at that time. Mrs. Geldarich [sic ] was taken to the hospital. She had extensive injuries.

She had fractures on both sides of her face, she had a fracture on her arm, dislocation of her shoulder, and a substantial amount of bleeding from her head and her face. There was even blood spattered on the stove from where her face had been stomped while she was on the ground.

She was treated for a significant period of time, was eventually able to regain consciousness and was eventually interviewed."

¶ 14 Later that day, the police were investigating an armed robbery of a cab driver. While the cab driver was speaking with the police, the cab driver recognized one of his assailants in a truck that drove by. The police stopped the truck and found Brandon Lloyd driving and defendant hiding in the back. The cab driver identified defendant and Lloyd as the two men who robbed him at knifepoint. The police found jewelry belonging to Geldrich inside of the truck.

¶ 15 Upon interviewing defendant and Lloyd, the police learned of the involvement of a third individual—a juvenile named C.H. Lloyd claimed that it was C.H.’s idea that defendant and Lloyd enter Geldrich's home. When the police questioned C.H., he claimed he went home (which was one house away) after defendant and Lloyd broke Geldrich's window with a hammer and entered her home. C.H. also told the police that about 35 minutes later, defendant "came back" and told C.H. that Geldrich was screaming inside of the home.

¶ 16 When questioned by the police, C.H. and defendant both claimed that Lloyd was the one who attacked Geldrich, while Lloyd claimed that defendant was the one who beat Geldrich. At this point in the factual basis, the prosecutor stated, "however, under the common design rule and the accountability rule, the actual identity of the particular beater is not important for purposes of the plea, at least for the guilt/innocence phase." The prosecutor then finished the factual basis by informing the trial court that Geldrich told the police there were two people inside of her home and she had to pretend to be dead in order to make the beating stop.

¶ 17 Defense counsel stipulated that the State would present this evidence if the case went to trial. The court then accepted defendant's guilty plea, finding it to be knowingly and voluntarily made. Defense counsel requested the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI).

¶ 18 Defendant's sentencing hearing was thereafter continued several times by agreement to allow defendant to "create some mitigation" for himself by testifying against C.H. and Lloyd at their respective trials.

¶ 19 C. Postplea Proceedings

¶ 20 1. Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

¶ 21 In November 2006, the parties convened for defendant's sentencing hearing. Defendant pro se tendered to the court a handwritten motion (1) to withdraw his guilty plea and (2) for a new attorney. Defendant alleged that his plea was coerced by his attorney, John Sharp. He claimed his attorney told him if he did not plead guilty, the plea offer would be given to Lloyd and Lloyd would testify falsely against defendant. The court granted defendant's motion for new counsel. Defendant later retained new counsel, Sean Liles.

¶ 22 Liles filed an amended motion to withdraw guilty plea that repeated the allegations in defendant's pro se motion and additionally alleged that (1) plea counsel told defendant he would receive between 12 and 20 years, (2) at the time of defendant's guilty plea, he had been taking his depression medication for only one month and its effects were unknown to him, and (3) plea counsel did not investigate defendant's mental condition at the time of his plea or at the time of the offense.

¶ 23 In February 2007, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant testified that Sharp told him he would receive between 12 and 20 years’ imprisonment if he pled guilty. Sharp testified that defendant understood he was facing 12 to 120 years but Sharp informed defendant he would "try to get him between 12 and 20 years" due to defendant's age, lack of adult convictions, and willingness to cooperate.

¶ 24 Relevant to this appeal, the State offered a copy of defendant's testimony at C.H.’s...