People v. Lane

231 N.E.3d 117

2023 IL 128269

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Reginald LANE, Appellant.

(Docket No. 128269)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed October 19, 2023

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Carl B. Boyd, Judge, presiding.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Douglas R. Hoff, Deputy Defender, and Talon K. Nouri, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, Sarah A. Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General, and Katherine M. Doersch, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The Cook County circuit court found Reginald Lane guilty of murder and intentional homicide of an unborn child and held that section 5-8-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2006)), which applies to multiple murders, mandated a sentence of life in prison for the crimes. The appellate court affirmed. 2022 IL App (1st) 182672, ¶ 48, 456 Ill.Dec. 682, 193 N.E.3d 922. We hold that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Code does not apply because the trial court found Lane guilty of only one murder. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 June Thurston agreed to take care of her sister Jwonda Thurston’s three children for the evening of March 23, 2007, so that Jwonda could spend some time with her friend, Natasha Johnson. Jwonda’s boyfriend, Lane, drove her and her children to June’s apartment, but they argued, and Jwonda did not meet Johnson as planned. When Johnson called Jwonda, she heard Lane yelling at her. Then Johnson went to June’s apartment.

¶ 4 Johnson left June’s apartment about an hour later. She found Officer Mark Kozeluh nearby and told him about the domestic disturbance. Kozeluh and three other officers went to June’s apartment. Jwonda and Lane started to leave by the back door. A gun in Lane’s hand discharged, killing Jwonda. Jwonda was pregnant. Her fetus died with her.

¶ 5 Prosecutors charged Lane with first degree murder and intentional homicide of an unborn child. 720 ILCS 5/9-1, 9-1.2 (West 2006). At the bench trial in 2018, Lane testified that, when he saw police while he and Jwonda were leaving by the back door, he took his gun out of his pocket to try to toss it away but the gun discharged accidentally.

¶ 6 June and Johnson testified that Lane had the gun in his hand as he yelled at Jwonda, telling her she must not leave with Johnson that evening. Both June and Johnson also testified that Lane threatened to kill Jwonda. The trial court found Lane guilty of first degree murder and intentional homicide of an unborn child.

¶ 7 The trial court held that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections mandated a sentence of natural life in prison because Lane had murdered more than one victim. Lane filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, arguing the court found him guilty of only one murder. The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 8 On appeal, Lane challenged only the sentence. The appellate court held that the sentencing provision for intentional homicide of an unborn child made it count as murder. 2022 IL App (1st) 182672, ¶ 44, 456 Ill.Dec. 682, 193 N.E.3d 922. The court further held that Lane waived his argument that Thurston’s fetus did not meet the statutory definition of "victim." See 730 ILCS 5/5-1-22 (West 2006). We granted Lane leave to appeal from the appellate court’s judgment.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

[1] ¶ 10 Lane argues on appeal that the murder of a pregnant woman resulting in the death of her unborn fetus does not qualify as the murder of more than one victim within the meaning of section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Code. As the case presents only a question of statutory interpretation, we review de novo the trial court’s ruling. People v. Jackson, 2011 IL 110615, ¶ 12, 353 Ill.Dec. 353, 955 N.E.2d 1164.

[2–4] ¶ 11 This court has frequently restated the basic principles of statutory interpretation. When we interpret statutes, we strive to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Gillespie Community Unit School District No. 7 v. Wight & Co., 2014 IL 115330, ¶ 31, 378 Ill.Dec. 438, 4 N.E.8d 37. We look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute (Beggs v. Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 52, 410 Ill.Dec. 902, 72 N.E.3d 288), read in light of the subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it (Van Dyke v. White, 2019 IL 121452, ¶ 46, 433 Ill.Dec. 153, 131 N.E.3d 511). "No part of a statute should be rendered meaningless or superfluous. *** Courts must construe statutes relating to the same subject matter with reference to one another so as to give effect to the provisions of each, if reasonable." Id.

¶ 12 A. Sentencing for Multiple Murders and Intentional Homicide of an Unborn Child

¶ 13 We begin our analysis by examining section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Code, which the circuit court invoked to sentence Lane. At the time of his sentencing, section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) provided that "the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment when the death penalty is not imposed if the defendant, *** at the time of the commission of the murder, had attained the age of 17 or more and *** is found guilty of murdering more than one victim." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2006). The other statute we must construe, section 9-1.2(d) of the Criminal Code of 1961, provided:

"(d) Penalty. The sentence for intentional homicide of an unborn child shall be the same as for first degree murder, except that:

(1) the death penalty may not be imposed;

(2) if the person committed the offense while armed with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(3) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(4) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court." 720 ILCS 5/9-1.2(d) (West 2006).

¶ 14 The appellate court held that the sentencing provision for intentional homicide of an unborn child (id. § 9-1.2(d) ("The sentence for intentional homicide of an unborn child shall be the same as for first degree murder, except that: (1) the death penalty may not be imposed[.]")) "shows the legislature’s intent to treat intentional homicide of an unborn child as another form of first degree murder." 2022 IL App (1st) 182672, ¶ 44, 456 Ill.Dec. 682, 193 N.E.3d 922. The State conceded that intentional homicide of an unborn child is not murder and, by doing so, abandoned the appellate court’s holding at oral argument. We find the State’s concession accords with Illinois law. In People v. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d 317, 363-64, 111 Ill.Dec. 546, 512 N.E.2d 1183 (1987), this court interpreted a feticide statute that provided "[t]he sentence for feticide shall be the same as for murder, except that the death penalty may not be imposed." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, ¶ 9-1.1(d). The Shum court held, "taking the life of a fetus is not murder." Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 364, 111 Ill.Dec. 546, 512 N.E.2d 1183. The State now concedes the trial court found Lane guilty of only one murder.

¶ 15 Although section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) on its face does not apply to this case because the court found Lane guilty of only one murder, the State contends that section 9-1.2(d), the sentencing provision for intentional homicide of an unborn child, effectively amends section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) and makes a life sentence mandatory for all defendants found guilty of one murder and one intentional homicide of an unborn child.

¶ 16 The appellate court here noted that in several cases the circuit court did not interpret section 9-1.2 as mandating life sentences for defendants found guilty of murdering a pregnant woman and committing intentional homicide of an unborn child. In People v. Campos, 227 Ill. App. 3d 434, 438, 169 Ill.Dec. 598, 592 N.E.2d 85 (1992), the circuit court sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 35 years’ imprisonment for first degree murder and intentional homicide of an unborn child. Similarly, in People v. Tijerina, 381 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1025, 320 Ill.Dec. 21, 886 N.E.2d 1090 (2008), and People v. Alvarado, 2012 IL App (1st) 103784-U, ¶ 18, 2013 WL 1737023, where defendants were convicted of first degree murder and intentional homicide of an unborn child, the courts sentenced the defendants to consecutive terms of 60 and 40 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 17 In the case on which the circuit court relied, People v. Kuchan, 219 Ill.. App. 3d 739, 746-47, 162 Ill.Dec. 240, 579 N.E.2d 1054 (1991), the trial court sentenced Kuchan to life in prison under section 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-3.2(b)(2)), explicitly finding the sentence justified by Kuchan’s brutal and heinous murder of the pregnant victim. The court sentenced Kuchan to a concurrent term of 40 years in prison for the intentional homicide of an unborn child. Kuchan, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 742, 162 Ill. Dec. 240, 579 N.E.2d 1054. If the circuit court here interpreted section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) correctly, the statute mandated a sentence of life in prison for the intentional homicide of an unborn child. The circuit court’s decision here conflicts with Kuchan, the authority on which it purported to rely.

¶ 18 Prior to the appellate court’s decision in this case,...