People v. Layman

1

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOEL EDWARD LAYMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 365280

Court of Appeals of Michigan

September 30, 2024

UNPUBLISHED

Livingston Circuit Court LC No. 2022-027221-FH

Before: RICK, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his convictions of assaulting, resisting or obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), and trespass, MCL 750.552. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court's questioning of a witness and its overall handling of defendant, who was representing himself during this one-day jury trial, constituted plain error that affected defendant's substantial rights. Because the transcript does not reveal any errors by the trial court, and simply reflects the court's attempts to control and direct the proceedings, we affirm.

I. JUDICIAL BIAS

In addressing this issue, we recognize the strong legal presumption that a trial court acts without bias, and that a party challenging a ruling on the basis of bias has a high hurdle to overcome. The Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly acknowledged this strong presumption of judicial impartiality. See, e.g., Cain v Dep't of Corrections, 451 Mich. 470, 497; 548 N.W.2d 210 (1996) ("the party who challenges a judge on the basis of bias or prejudice must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality"); People v Jackson, 292 Mich.App. 583, 598; 808 N.W.2d 541 (2011) ("A defendant claiming judicial bias must overcome 'a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.' ") (Citation omitted.) As the Supreme Court noted on this point some time ago:

The difficulty is that we live in an imperfect world. We therefore judge the actions and responses of a trial court in the light of the situation with which he is confronted. He stands in our eyes garbed with every presumption of fairness, and integrity, and heavy indeed is the burden assumed in this court by the litigant who would impeach the presumption so amply justified through the years. [Mahlen Land Corp v Kurtz, 355 Mich. 340, 350-351; 94 N.W.2d 888 (1959).]

In recognition of this presumption, it has long been the case that judicial rulings alone almost never provide a valid basis for finding judicial bias or partiality, Cain, 451 Mich. at 496, particularly in the absence of any evidence of "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible[,]" In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich.App. 656, 680; 765 N.W.2d 44 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Importantly, a trial judge's remarks that "are critical of or hostile to counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not establish disqualifying bias." In re MKK, 286 Mich.App. 546, 567; 781 N.W.2d 132 (2009).^[1]

Initially, it is critical to emphasize that there is no suggestion or evidence that the trial court's questions demonstrated "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible[,]" In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich.App. at 680 (quotation marks and citation omitted), or that the trial court's remarks were "critical of or hostile to counsel, the parties, or their cases, In re MKK, 286 Mich.App. at 567, and even that conduct does not ordinarily establish disqualifying bias. In other words, we are not reviewing a case where it is suggested that the trial court acted with an improper temper, badgered the defense, or took other actions to preclude defendant from properly presenting his case. Instead, each instance defendant has raised relates to the trial court asking questions of witnesses during trial.

The dissent chides us for invoking this presumption, arguing that it has no place in the fair trial or due process analysis, or under People v Stevens, 498 Mich. 162; 869 N.W.2d 233 (2015), and that our citation to civil cases employing that standard have no place in this criminal matter. However, just this year the Supreme Court utilized this presumption when addressing a defendant's due process argument that the judge's ex parte communications with the prosecutor during trial denied him a fair trial. And it did so citing some of the same civil cases we cite here. See People v Loew, ___ Mich. ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 164133); slip op at 20, citing in part Cain, 451 Mich. at 498, and Mitchell v Mitchell, 296 Mich.App. 513, 523; 823 N.W.2d 153 (2012).^[2] We also note that our Court has continued to rely on this presumption when addressing the Stevens factors, with our dissenting colleague joining three of those decisions this year. See, e.g., People v Washington, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 22, 2024 (Docket Nos. 362231, 362233, and 362234), p 13-14; People v Frinkle, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 1, 2024 (Docket No. 359649), p 9-13; and People v Hawkins, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 23, 2024 (Docket No. 364000), p 4-6.

We do recognize that neither Stevens nor People v Swilley, 504 Mich. 350, 373; 934 N.W.2d 771 (2019), mention the presumption in the course of their analyses, while other courts have. In any event, use of the presumption is not dispositive here, as even if this presumption has no place in this analysis, our conclusion below, made through consideration of the Stevens factors, would remain the same.

The Stevens Court set forth a nonexhaustive list of factors for reviewing courts to consider in evaluating claims of judicial bias:

In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the reviewing court should inquire into a variety of factors, including but not limited to, the nature of the trial judge's conduct, the tone and demeanor of the judge, the scope of the judicial conduct in the context of the length and complexity of the trial and issues therein, the extent to which the judge's conduct was directed at one side more than the other, and the presence of any curative instructions, either at the time of an inappropriate occurrence or at the end of trial. [People v Stevens, 498 Mich. at 164.]

Because this list is nonexhaustive, "[r]eviewing courts may consider additional factors if they are relevant to the determination of partiality in a particular case." Id. at 172. We do not "evaluate errors standing alone, but rather consider the cumulative effect of the errors." Id. at 171-172.^[3]

Before embarking on an analysis of the Stevens factors individually, we first address defendant's specific challenges to the trial court's questions, as those arguments touch on several of the Stevens factors.

Defendant first argues that the trial court's questioning of Sergeant Sell (the arresting officer) elicited testimony that was favorable to the prosecution. MRE 614 governs the calling and interrogation of witnesses by the trial court:

(a) Calling by Court. The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called.

(b) Interrogation by Court. The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.

(c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is not present.

Under MRE 614, a trial judge is permitted to question witnesses, but that questioning should be to help clarify testimony. Swilley, 504 Mich. at 372. "Therefore, it is appropriate for a judge to question witnesses to produce fuller and more exact testimony or elicit additional relevant information." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, a trial judge may intervene to "expedite matters, prevent unnecessary waste of time, or clear up an obscurity." Id.

One aspect of defendant's challenge is when the prosecution recalled Sergeant Sell as a witness and the trial court asked Sergeant Sell, after cross-examination ended, questions regarding (1) whether an individual with only one handcuff on could be considered a "dangerous situation," (2) whether Sergeant Sell brought charges against defendant, and (3) the exact parameters of when and how defendant resisted arrest. These lines of questions did not evidence judicial bias resulting in an unfair trial.

With respect to the questions regarding a suspect with only one hand cuffed, the record reflects that this was an attempt by the trial court to clarify what officers have to deal with when making an arrest. This issue arose because, prior to the prosecution's recalling of Sergeant Sell, Deputy Joel Ash, a responding deputy, testified about the danger of individuals resisting arrest. While Deputy Ash could not recall how defendant resisted at the time of his arrest, he did testify that an individual resisting arrest could cause the situation to "deteriorate quickly" and that officers should quickly handcuff individuals as a result. Defendant did not object to Deputy Ash's testimony, and he did not cross-examine Deputy Ash regarding the possible dangers during an arrest. It is not error for a court to attempt a follow-up point of clarification. Unfortunately, that question was essentially on an irrelevant point, as no evidence showed that defendant had only one hand cuffed at any point in time. In any event, in light of the irrelevancy of the question, and given the trial court's later instruction that its statements and comments were not to be considered by the jury, the question and subsequent answer could not have had any real impact on the jury. See People v Ericksen, 288 Mich.App. 192, 199-200; 793 N.W.2d 120 (2010).

With respect to the trial court asking Sergeant Sell if he brought criminal charges against defendant, Sergeant Sell explained that he did not. The trial court's question addressed ...