People v. Leggions

890 N.E.2d 700

382 Ill.App.3d 1129

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Phillip L. LEGGIONS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4-07-0187.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

June 13, 2008.

Presiding Justice APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

In November 2006, the State charged defendant, Phillip L. Leggions, with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2006)). In December 2006, he filed a motion for suppression of evidence on the grounds that the police lacked probable cause or reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize him. At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted the motion. The court found that the police lacked probable cause to arrest defendant and that two people exiting one vehicle and entering another — even in a high-crime area — did not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so as to justify an investigatory stop.

The State appeals, arguing the police had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, for the area was known for narcotics trafficking, and when people got out of their own vehicle and into another vehicle, it often meant they were buying and selling narcotics. We conclude that a finding of reasonable suspicion in these circumstances would subject too many innocent travelers to arbitrary detention — and with little more, in the way of justification, than their presence in a high-crime neighborhood. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Michael Gannon was a patrol sergeant with the Decatur police department, and he testified that on October 23, 2006, he organized a surveillance of the 1100 and 1200 blocks of East Leafland Avenue. During the first six months of 2006, there had been 12 shooting incidents in those blocks, where gangs, drugs, and murder were rampant. The house at 1128 East Leafland Avenue was a hangout of the Leafland Street Boys' Gang. Gannon personally had "been involved in four weapons seizures from people either coming to or leaving that residence two months prior to this incident," and he also "personally [had] been involved in numerous [drug] transactions at that location."

Gannon testified that at 2:30 p.m. on October 23, 2006, he took a position two to three blocks away from 1128 East Leafland Avenue. He had an unobstructed view of the house. Within 15 minutes, he saw a green GMC Yukon sport utility vehicle park almost directly in front of the house. Within two minutes, a smaller, dark vehicle pulled up behind the Yukon, and two black men got out of that vehicle and into the Yukon. Gannon believed a drug deal was "going down" because in his "12 years of observing numerous drug transactions," "individuals [met] at a location, exit[ed] their vehicle, g[o]t in another vehicle, complete[d] a transaction[,] and then le[ft]." On this occasion, Gannon did not see any drugs or guns from his vantage point two or three blocks away, nor did he see anything change hands. About five minutes after the two men entered the Yukon, Gannon radioed the other police officers on the scene to move in and investigate, and a squad car pulled in front of the Yukon. Six to eight officers, pistols drawn, ordered everyone in the Yukon to show their hands.

Because the side windows of the Yukon were tinted, the officers opened its doors to make sure no one was pointing a firearm at them. The passengers raised their hands, but defendant, in the driver's seat, put his hands down toward his feet. A Decatur police officer, Chad Shull, ordered everyone out of the Yukon. He then saw, in plain view, a brown piece of paper in the middle of the driver's-side floorboard, between the driver's seat and the brake pedal, and on top of the brown paper, a white substance that looked like crack cocaine. The substance field-tested positive. The police arrested defendant for unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2006)).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing a circuit court's ruling on a motion for suppression of evidence, we uphold the court's factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Gherna, 203 Ill.2d 165, 175, 271 Ill.Dec. 245, 784 N.E.2d 799, 805 (2003). If we accept the court's findings of fact, we decide de novo whether those facts require a suppression of evidence. Gherna, 203 Ill.2d at 175, 271 Ill. Dec. 245, 784 N.E.2d at 805. The parties do not dispute the facts in this case; they dispute the legal effect of those facts. Our standard of review is de novo.

B. Initially, Was the Seizure of Defendant an Investigatory Stop or Was It an Arrest?

The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const., amend. IV. Likewise, under our state constitution, "[t]he people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers[,] and other possessions against unreasonable searches[][and] seizures." Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6. We interpret article I, section 6, in "limited lockstep" with the fourth amendment. People v. Caballes, 221 Ill.2d 282, 313, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d 26, 44 (2006) (reaffirming the "limited lockstep" doctrine). "Under this approach, [Illinois courts] will `look first to the federal constitution, and only if federal law provides no relief [will they] turn to the state constitution to determine whether a specific criterion — for example, unique state history or state experience — justifies departure from federal precedent.'" Caballes, 221 Ill.2d at 309, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d at 42-43, quoting L. Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 93, 104 (2000). Neither of the parties argues for a departure from federal precedent on the ground that article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution requires a different outcome than the fourth amendment. Therefore, we interpret the quoted provisions from the two constitutions as having the same meaning and effect.

In his motion for suppression of evidence, defendant claims the "seizure" of his "person" by the police was "unreasonable." See U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6. The threshold question is whether a seizure occurred. People v. Jones, 190 Ill.App.3d 416, 421, 137 Ill.Dec. 317, 545 N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (1989). A seizure occurs when, by physical force or a show of authority, a police officer limits a citizen's liberty. Jones, 190 Ill.App.3d at 421, 137 Ill.Dec. 317, 545 N.E.2d at 1334. More plainly, a police officer "seizes" a person when he or she accosts that person and denies that person the freedom to walk away. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 903 (1968). Obviously, by pulling their squad car in front of defendant's vehicle, pointing their pistols at him, commanding him to raise his hands and come out of the vehicle, and when he did come out (or they pulled him out), handcuffing him, the police limited his liberty and, therefore, seized him.

The next question is whether the "seizure" was "unreasonable" (U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6); for "what the [c]onstitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures" (Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1680 (1960)). To answer that question, we must determine what kind of seizure it initially was. Case law recognizes two types of seizures of the person: an investigatory stop and an arrest. People v. Murray, 137 Ill.2d 382, 387, 148 Ill.Dec. 7, 560 N.E.2d 309, 311 (1990). To be reasonable, an arrest requires probable cause, whereas an investigatory stop requires reasonable suspicion. People v. Montgomery, 332 Ill.App.3d 817, 820-21, 265 Ill.Dec. 863, 773 N.E.2d 225, 228 (2002). The former standard is more stringent than the latter. People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill.2d 231, 255, 278 Ill.Dec. 244, 798 N.E.2d 91, 106 (2003). "Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 171, 4 L.Ed.2d 134, 138 (1959). "Reasonable suspicion exists when `articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, * * * warrant a reasonably prudent officer' to investigate further [for criminal activity]." Lampitok, 207 Ill.2d at 255, 278 Ill.Dec. 244, 798 N.E.2d at 106, quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1098, 108 L.Ed.2d 276, 286 (1990). Though less than probable cause, reasonable suspicion is more than a hunch on the officer's part; it is an objective standard: the officer's subjective belief that he or she has an adequate cause for suspicion will not suffice. Lampitok, 207 Ill.2d at 255, 278 Ill.Dec. 244, 798 N.E.2d at 106-07.

An arrest requires a stronger justification than an investigatory stop because an arrest is a lengthier seizure of the person. People v. Waddell, 190 Ill.App.3d 914, 926, 138 Ill.Dec. 13, 546 N.E.2d 1068, 1075 (1989). An investigatory stop (often called a "Terry stop" after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)) is a short detention of the person — a detention lasting no longer than is necessary to perform a brief investigation. People v. Hess, 314 Ill.App.3d 306, 310, 247 Ill.Dec. 619, 732 N.E.2d 674, 677 (2000); 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (West 2006). A detention for a period longer than is necessary to perform a brief investigation is considered to be an arrest. People v. Hardy, 142 Ill.App.3d 108, 114, 96 Ill.Dec. 447, 491 N.E.2d 493, 498 (1986); People v. Roberts, 96 Ill.App.3d 930, 933-34, 52 Ill.Dec. 473, 422 N.E.2d 154, 156-57 (1981). "[During] a lawful traffic stop, the police may, as a matter of course, order the driver and the passengers out of the vehicle...