People v. Lindsey

1

2024 IL App (4th) 230093-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DeANGELO MARTEZ LINDSEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-23-0093

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fourth District

February 27, 2024

This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County No. 09CF618 Honorable Katherine S. Gorman, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lannerd and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

ZENOFF, JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: Defendant's 30-year prison sentence for first degree murder was affirmed where (1) the trial court acted within its discretion by denying defendant's request for funds for an expert and (2) the sentence was not excessive.

¶ 2 In 2010, a Peoria County jury found defendant, DeAngelo Martez Lindsey, guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2008)) in connection with a shooting that occurred when defendant was 17 years old. Defendant originally received a sentence of 52 years in prison. In 2021, defendant filed a postconviction petition, seeking to be resentenced based, in part, on changes in the law regarding sentencing juvenile offenders. The State conceded the need for resentencing. In 2022, the trial court resentenced defendant to 30 years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the court erroneously denied his motion for funds to hire an expert and (2) the sentence is excessive. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A. Defendant's Conviction and Original Sentence

¶ 5 The 2013 opinion arising from defendant's direct appeal contains a thorough summary of the trial evidence. People v. Lindsey, 2013 IL App (3d) 100625, ¶¶ 6-29. For purposes of this appeal, it will suffice to say that on May 27, 2009, Anil Dhingra was fatally shot at a gas station in Peoria during an attempted armed robbery committed by defendant (age 17) and Ali Evans (age 20). The gas station lacked surveillance cameras, and there were no witnesses to the shooting. Thus, the State could not prove definitively whether it was defendant or Evans who fired the gun repeatedly at Dhingra. Nevertheless, some circumstantial evidence suggested that defendant may have been the shooter. Specifically, a witness saw two males run out of the gas station after the shooting, and only one of them had a gun in his hand. Although this witness was unable to identify the person with the gun, she identified Evans as the person who did not have the gun. Additionally, the police found the murder weapon at defendant's sister's home, and defendant's fingerprint was on it. Defendant testified in his own defense. Although he acknowledged being at the scene of the shooting, he denied participating in murdering or attempting to rob Dhingra.

¶ 6 At defendant's trial in April 2010, the prosecutor argued that defendant was guilty of first degree murder under an accountability theory, even if he did not personally fire the gun. The jury found defendant guilty. The trial court Judge James Shadid presiding, sentenced defendant to 52 years in prison. On direct appeal, the appellate court held inter alia, that defendant's sentence was not excessive. Lindsey, 2013 IL App (3d) 100625 ¶¶ 53-59.

¶ 7 B. Separate Proceedings Relating to Evans

¶ 8 Evans was tried separately for first degree murder, convicted, and sentenced to 58 years in prison. The appellate court reversed Evans's conviction and remanded for a new trial based on an evidentiary error. People v. Evans, 2012 IL App (3d) 100737-U, ¶ 25. Evans was tried again, convicted, and resentenced to 58 years in prison. The appellate court reversed Evans's conviction and remanded for a third trial based on a different evidentiary error. People v. Evans, 2016 IL App (3d) 140120, ¶¶ 24, 59, 62. Evans then pleaded guilty to aggravated battery with a firearm, and he was sentenced to 28 years in prison.

¶ 9 C. Defendant Requests a New Sentencing Hearing

¶ 10 Meanwhile, in 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012), that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). In 2016, the Illinois legislature responded to Miller by enacting section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016)), which contains additional mitigating factors a trial court must consider when sentencing someone for an offense committed as a juvenile. In November 2021, defendant filed a postconviction petition requesting to be resentenced. In May 2022, the State conceded that defendant's 52-year sentence violated the eighth amendment because the trial court had failed to make specific factual findings as required by People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655. (During the pendency of this appeal, our supreme court overruled Holman in People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42). In June 2022, the trial court granted defendant's postconviction petition and ordered defendant to be resentenced.

¶ 11 D. Defendant's Request for Funds to Hire an Expert for Resentencing

¶ 12 On August 9, 2022, defendant filed a motion requesting funds to hire an expert for the forthcoming resentencing hearing pursuant to section 113-3(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/113-3(d) (West 2022)). Defendant argued that "to properly develop all of the information required for the court to consider" under the additional statutory sentencing factors relating to juvenile offenders (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022)), "the defense is in need of the services of an expert in psychology to review the defendant's history and circumstances and to prepare a report for the court regarding the same." Defendant indicated that his attorney had consulted with Dr. Oluwatamilore Odimayo, who charged $200 per hour. According to defendant's motion, Dr. Odimayo's rate was equivalent to or significantly less than other experts defense counsel consulted. Defendant requested the trial court to make available approximately $3000 for the defense to retain Dr. Odimayo to evaluate defendant.

¶ 13 Defendant presented this motion to the trial court on August 19, 2022. The prosecutor objected to the motion on that bases that (1) section 113-3(d) of the Code references "capital cases" (725 ILCS 5/113-3(d) (West 2022)), and this is not a capital case and (2) defendant had not shown the need for an expert. Defense counsel responded that although she could make arguments at the sentencing hearing by "applying general principles of adolescent development," she was "certainly not an expert in that." Thus, defense counsel proposed that it was reasonable to have a psychologist evaluate defendant and to "be able to offer an opinion as to those things." With respect to the county paying for an expert, defense counsel contended that $3000 was "a drop in the bucket" because defendant faced a very lengthy prison sentence.

¶ 14 The trial court questioned defense counsel about the need for an expert:

"Okay. Well, what would [the expert] add specifically to your client? Because, I mean, you can get into [defendant's] background, you can get into the factors that apply to youth. We've all read all the studies. What really additionally will [the expert] add? I get it, [defendant] was 17. And I've done a few of these post conviction hearings on this specific issue, including resentencing someone, and I don't-I don't really know what [the expert] will add specifically."

Defense counsel responded:

"Your Honor, I think it's hard to say until, you know, an evaluation is done, but I think specifically looking at the unique situation of my client's childhood, which may have contributed to his impetuosity, I think specifically knowing what I know about my client it would be, you know, he had a traumatic childhood, which I know can affect, you know, frontal lobe development. So looking at the specifics of his childhood and the home life that he lived at the time, which may have led him to make decisions that he made back in 2009."

The court continued to doubt the need for an expert:

"All of those things-it has been the Court's experience that every adolescent that acts out in the inappropriate way that your client and the other individuals that find themselves incarcerated for a long time-it has been my experience that all of them have had a home life where none of us would wish that upon our worst enemy.

And so again, I don't-and I understand that most certainly I would consider your individual client in-in assessing the mitigation factors, but I just don't know what specifically would be contributed by this person at the County's expense. So if you would like to present me with any additional information, I will allow that. But at first blush, I don't know what specifically he'll add, other than the general-generalities that all of us already are acquainted with."

The court proposed continuing the matter for a few weeks, giving defense counsel time to submit what she would like before then. The court asked defense counsel whether that would give her enough time. Counsel responded, "That should be fine, Judge."

¶ 15 The trial court addressed this issue again on September 9, 2022. The court asked defense counsel whether there was anything she would like to add. Defense counsel responded, "No. No, Your Honor." The prosecutor again objected to the defense hiring an expert at the county's expense:

"Well, I guess just to sum up our position, Judge, is that those factors are already codified and the reasons why are already codified as part of the-I guess the legislative

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