People v. Lynch

323 Cal.Rptr.3d 675

552 P.3d 877

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Deandre LYNCH, Defendant and Appellant.

S274942

Supreme Court of California.

August 1, 2024

Third Appellate District, C094174, Sacramento County Superior Court, 20FE009532, Geoffrey A. Goodman, Judge

Jacquelyn Larson, Auburn, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Joy A. Maulitz, San Francisco, under appoint- ment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Molly O’Neal, Public Defender (Santa Clara), David Epps, Alternate Public Defender, Brian Matthews, Deputy Alternate Public Defender, Ellen McDonnell, Public Defender (Contra Costa), and Gilbert Rivera, Deputy Public Defender, for California Public Defenders Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill, Catherine Chatman, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Erin Doering, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

[1, 2] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, "provides that those ‘accused’ of a ‘crime’ have the right to a trial ‘by an impartial jury.’ This right, in conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each element of a crime be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt." (Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99, 104, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (Alleyne), quoting U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; accord, Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 476,120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (Apprendi).) In the context of California’s determinate sentencing scheme, Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (Cunningham) held that, "under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence." (Id. at p. 281, 127 S.Ct. 856.) "Inhering in that guarantee is an assurance that a guilty verdict will issue only from a unanimous jury." (Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. —, —, 144 S.Ct. 1840, 1849, — L.Ed.2d — (Erlinger); accord, Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) 590 U.S. 83, 90, 92–93, 140 S.Ct.’ 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (Ramos).)

Effective January 1, 2022, Penal Code¹ section 1170, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 1170(b)) was amended to prohibit imposition of an upper term sentence unless aggravating circumstances justify that term and the facts underlying any such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, "have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial." (§ 1170(b)(2), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Allegations of prior convictions may be tried by the court alone and proven by certified records of conviction. (Id., subd. (b)(3).) The Courts of Appeal have uniformly held, and the parties here agree, that this amendment applies retroactively to defendants like Lynch whose judgments were not final on direct appeal at the time the statute took effect. We granted review to decide when a remand for resentencing is required under the new law. We hold that a court reviewing a case where the former version of section 1170(b) was employed must apply the Chapman standard of review. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (Chapman).) Accordingly, in a case where the judgment is not yet final, a sentence imposed under former section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute. (§ 1170(b)(2), (3).) Throughout this opinion, any discussion of jury findings refers to factual findings made beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, similar to the situation in People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390, 171 Cal. Rptr.3d 421, 324 P.3d 245 (Gutierrez), the 2022 amendment to section 1170(b)(1) and (2) altered the scope of the trial court’s discretion. As a result, for sentences imposed under the former law the record must clearly indicate that the court would have found an upper term justified had it been aware of its more limited discretion. We reverse the Court of Appeal judgment, disapprove contrary Court of Appeal holdings, and remand for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant, Deandre Lynch, is Jasmine Doe’s former boyfriend and the father of her child. Over the course of several months, Lynch physically abused Jasmine daily. At trial, Jasmine vaguely described the details of some assaults and testified that she had no recollection of others.

Jasmine’s brother, Joseph C., testified about statements Jasmine had made recounting Lynch’s abuse. On one occasion, she called Joseph crying and out of breath. She said that Lynch had punched her in the face, thrown her to the ground, and beaten her with a metal rod. A few weeks later, Jasmine called Joseph again and tearfully reported that Lynch had kicked her and hit her with an extension cord. Joseph saw looped and straight-line bruises on her arms, shoulder, and back consistent with a metal rod and an extension cord.

On May 24, 2020, Joseph arrived at Jasmine’s home and heard banging and screaming. Going inside, he saw his sister lying on the floor with her hands raised in defense. Lynch stood over her with his arm drawn back as if to hit her. Joseph intervened and took his sister outside.

A deputy sheriff dispatched to investigate saw multiple bruises on Jasmine’s body. Jasmine told the deputy that Lynch had hit her with a small wooden table until a leg broke off, then continued to beat her with the detached leg. She also said that he had previously hit her with an extension cord and a metal broom. Jasmine’s injuries were consistent with her report. Searching the home, the deputy saw a wooden table with a missing leg, a power cord, and a broom and mop with metal handles. As time went by, Jasmine became less forthcoming to the deputy about the details of the assaults and less willing to assist in the prosecution.

A jury convicted Lynch of three counts of domestic violence resulting in a traumatic condition. (§ 273.5, subd. (a).) It hung on one count of assault with a deadly weapon against Joseph C. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).)² It acquitted Lynch on a second count of assault with a deadly weapon against Jasmine but convicted him of simple assault (§ 240) as a lesser offense. Following a jury waiver, the court found Lynch had suffered a prior conviction for assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, and a prior conviction for domestic violence, which increased the sentencing triad for his current domestic violence convictions (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1)).

The probation report listed prior felony convictions for assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)); two counts of obstructing a law enforcement officer (§ 69); two counts of domestic violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a)); unlawful possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378); failure to appear (§ 1320, subd. (b)); unlawful transportation/sale of cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)); and unlawful delivery of cocaine (Oregon) (Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.880). It also listed six misdemeanor convictions, including one count of obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)).

The report also noted potentially applicable aggravating circumstances set out in California Rules of Court, rule 4.421. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel challenged three of these aggravating circumstances, arguing that Lynch’s actions did not rise to the level of a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; that the victim was not particularly vulnerable; and that Lynch was not a serious danger to society. Counsel did not object to any of the information about Lynch’s criminal history in the certified records or the probation report.

In April 2021, the court ordered a prison sentence of 15 years 4 months, imposing the upper term of five years for the first domestic violence conviction, and consecutive terms of one year four months for the remaining two counts. The total was doubled under the Three Strikes law.³ The court cited eight circumstances in aggravation to support imposing the upper term sentence for the principal count: (1) the crimes involved a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness because Lynch had struck the victim with a table leg, an extension cord, and a broomstick (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); (2) the victim was particularly vulnerable (id., rule 4.421(a)(3)); (3) Lynch used a weapon when committing the crimes (id., rule 4.421(a)(2)); (4) his conduct and prior record indicate a serious danger to society (id., rule 4.421(b)(1)); (5) his prior convictions are numerous (id., rule 4.421(b)(2)); (6) he had served prior prison terms (id., rule 4.421(b)(3)); (7) he was on parole at the time he committed the crimes (id., rule 4.421(b)(4)); and (8) his prior performance on parole was unsatisfactory (id., rule 4.421(b)(5)). The court found no circumstances in mitigation.

Approximately two months after sentencing, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), amending section 1170(b), was signed into law. On appeal, Lynch argued that he was entitled to reversal of his sentence and a remand because the jury did not find any of the facts on which the court relied to support the upper term sentence.

A divided Court of Appeal affirmed the upper term sentence. The Attorney General conceded that the 2022 amendment to section 1170(b)(1), (2), and (3) applied retroactively to...