People v. A.M.

322 Cal.Rptr.3d 50

IN RE A.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.A.M., Defendant and Appellant.

2d Juv. No. B329999

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6.

Filed May 31, 2024

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing June 18, 2024

Superior Court County of Ventura, Ferdinand Inumerable, Judge (Super. Ct. No. 2009024052) (Ventura County)

Latham & Watkins, Nima H. Mohebbi, Sebastien Wadier, Max A. Shapiro, Erica Pena, Tatum P. Rosenfeld, Mikaela W. Gilbert-Lurie and Melissa Arbus Sherry for Defendant and Appellant.

Jonathan Grossman, Steven Torres and Mi Kim for Pacific Juvenile Defender Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BALTODANO, J.

[1, 2] When a court vacates a sentence, the judgment in that case becomes nonfinal for purposes of retroactively applying ameliorative laws. (People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161-162, 293 Cal.Rptr.3d 623, 509 P.3d 975 (Padilla); see In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 (Estrada).) Applying that principle here, we conclude that a judgment becomes nonfinal when a minor defendant sentenced as an adult prior to the electorate’s passage of Proposition 57 (Prop. 57) subsequently has their sentence conditionally reversed on habeas corpus. Such a defendant is entitled to the benefit of ameliorative laws enacted since the imposition of their original sentence. Here, that includes Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1391) which amended Prop. 57 to prohibit the transfer of 14- and 15-year-olds to adult criminal court, and Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), which amended various provisions of Penal Code¹ section 186.22.

In 2013, A.M. was tried as an adult for murdering a rival gang member when he was 14 years old. A jury convicted him of first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)), and found true allegations that he personally used a deadly weapon and committed his crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). It also found true a gang-murder special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). The trial court sentenced him to 26 years to life in state prison.

Eight years later, the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment and ordered the juvenile court to conduct a transfer hearing pursuant to Prop. 57. The juvenile court conducted the hearing, granted the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, and reinstated the judgment.

In his opening brief, A.M. contended his case should not have been transferred because he was 14 years old when he committed his crime. After briefing was complete, we asked the parties to discuss whether Assembly Bill 333 applies to this case. In response to our request, A.M. contended Assembly Bill 333 requires striking the gang-murder special circum- stance.² We agree with both of A.M.’s contentions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The murder of S.S.

A.M. was born in 1994 to a single mother and absentee father. His stepfather abused him emotionally and physically, beginning when he was five or six years old. When A.M. was eight, he began taking psychotropic medications to treat his mental health disorders. Despite these challenges, A.M. was regarded as a "sweet" and "loving" child.

That began to change when A.M. turned 10. He ran away from home and was exposed to gang culture. When he was 12, he joined a local gang. He eventually came to view the gang as his surrogate family, and started to commit petty offenses for them.

In April 2009, A.M. (age 14) and two fellow gang members went to a party. Sixteen-year-old S.S., a rival gang member, was also at the party. As the youngest member of his gang, A.M. believed he had a duty to physically confront S.S. But he left without doing so.

A.M. then went to a second party. S.S. was already there. The two began to exchange blows. The fight escalated, and A.M. stabbed S.S. multiple times. A.M. then ran away and called his mother to pick him up from the side of a road. S.S. died from his wounds.

The district attorney charged A.M. as an adult with the murder of S.S. At trial, a gang expert testified that younger gang members like A.M. would do "all they can to bolster their reputation[s]." The expert further testified that a murder like the one A.M. committed would "benefit the gang … because it’s instilling that fear and intimidation" and earning him "status and respect." The prosecutor relied on this testimony in his closing argument, suggesting that the "fear" created by A.M.’s offense would "increase [his alleged gang’s] reputation" and "earn [it] more respect." The jury was not instructed that it needed to find a benefit to A.M.’s alleged gang that was anything more than reputational to render true findings on the gang allegation and gang-murder special circumstance allegation. It was told that the predicate offenses allegedly establishing the gang’s pattern of criminal activity "need not be gang related."

The jury convicted A.M. of first degree murder, found true allegations that he used a deadly weapon and committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and found true the gang-murder special circumstance allegation. The trial court struck the gang enhancement and sentenced A.M. to 25 years to life on the murder³ plus one year for the use of a deadly weapon. It also ordered him to register as a gang offender. (See § 186.30.)

We affirmed the judgment on appeal. Our Supreme Court denied review on October 12, 2016. A.M. did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, and the matter became final on January 10, 2017. (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990 [judgment becomes final when time to file petition for writ of certiorari has elapsed]; U.S. Supreme Ct. Rules, rule 13 [petition for writ of certiorari must be filed within 90 days of entry of judgment in state court of last resort].)

Prop. 57 and its amendments

On November 8, 2016, the electorate passed Prop. 57, which took effect the next day. (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 304, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22 (Lara).) As adopted, Prop. 57 prohibited trying a minor as an adult without " ‘a judicial determination … that [they were] unfit to be dealt with under juvenile court law.’ " (Lara, at p. 305, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22.) It allowed prosecutors to request the transfer of only two categories of minors to criminal court: 16- and 17-year-olds alleged to have committed felonies, and 14- and 15-year-olds alleged to have committed specified serious or violent felonies. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 4.2.) Transfer requests would be granted " ‘only after a juvenile court judge conduct[ed] a transfer hearing to consider … factors such as the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, [and] prior delinquent history, and whether the minor [could] be rehabilitated.’ " (Lara, at p. 305, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3) [listing transfer factors].)

The Legislature later enacted several statutes to amend and implement Prop. 57’s provisions. For example, effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1391 bars a juvenile court from transferring a 14- or 15-year-old to adult criminal court, regardless of the crime they allegedly committed.⁴ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1); see also O.G. v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82, 87, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d 406, 481 P.3d 648 (O.G.) [Sen. Bill 1391 was a permissible amendment to Prop. 57].) Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 624 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 624) permits a minor to challenge a transfer decision on direct appeal. (Stats. 2021, ch. 195, § 1; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 801.) And effective January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2361) requires that transfer decisions be supported by clear and convincing evidence. (Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)

Proceedings below

In 2021, A.M. moved this court to recall the remittitur in his underlying case, contending he was entitled to relief under Prop. 57 and its amendments, including Senate Bill 1391. The Attorney General conceded that Prop. 57 applied to A.M.’s case. We declined to recall the remittitur, however, and instead elected to treat A.M.’s motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We issued an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, for the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to demonstrate "why relief should not be granted on the ground that [A.M.] is entitled to a [transfer] hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (a)."

After a hearing on the order to show cause, the superior court conditionally reversed A.M.’s conviction and sentence and referred the matter to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing. A.M. argued that Senate Bill 1391 deprived the juvenile court of "any residual authority" to trans- fer his case to criminal court because he was 14 when he murdered S.S. The juvenile court declined to apply Senate Bill 1391, stating that doing so would be "contrary to what was specifically ordered" in the order to show cause. It also believed A.M.’s case was "final" and "should be treated as a continuing writ of habeas corpus for the sole purpose of conducting a transfer hearing."

A.M. petitioned this court for a writ of mandate, requesting that we direct the juvenile court to apply Senate Bill 1391 and deny the district attorney’s motion to transfer his case to criminal court. We denied the...