People v. Macias

Page 659

66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659

16 Cal.4th 739, 941 P.2d 838, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6869,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,062

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jesus Sandoval MACIAS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S055400.

Supreme Court of California.

Aug. 26, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 12, 1997.

Charles R. Khoury, Jr., and Howard C. Cohen, Wilton, for Appellant.

Daniel E. Lundgren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General Keith I. Motley, Esteban Hernandez, and Janelle Marie Boustany, Deputy Attorney General, San Diego, for Respondent.

CHIN, Justice.

We decide here whether the prosecution may impeach a minor defendant at a criminal trial with the inconsistent statements he made to a probation officer who was evaluating him in preparation for a juvenile court fitness hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision c) (section 707(c)). ¹ We have ruled that a minor's statements made during a fitness evaluation may not be used as substantive evidence of guilt against the minor at a subsequent criminal trial. (Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 810, 210 Cal.Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789 (Ramona R.).) But Ramona R. specifically reserved the question whether the prosecution could use those same statements to impeach the minor. (Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 807, fn. 2, 210 Cal.Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789.)

The Court of Appeal reversed defendant's conviction, holding that the prosecution improperly used statements defendant made to his probation officer in anticipation of a juvenile court fitness hearing (in which he was statutorily presumed unfit for juvenile court adjudication) to impeach him at his subsequent trial. The court relied on dictum from a subsequent case observing generally that Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d 802, 210 Cal.Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789, involved legislatively compelled statements that under the federal Constitution could not be used against a minor defendant "for any purpose." (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 317, 243 Cal.Rptr. 369, 748 P.2d 307 (May ), citing New Jersey v. Portash (1979) 440 U.S. 450, 458-459, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 1296-1297, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (Portash ); see also People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 69, 260 Cal.Rptr. 273, 775 P.2d 1042 (Markham ).) The Court of Appeal concluded it was "duty-bound to follow May 's unequivocal guidance unless and until the Supreme Court revisits the issue and determines to abandon its dicta and state a different rule." We conclude May 's dictum is not controlling here.

First, in contrast to the present case, May neither addressed the impeachment issue nor observed that Ramona R. specifically left it open. The Court of Appeal was not bound, therefore, by stare decisis principles to follow the May dictum. (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 783, pp. 753-755; id. (1996 supp.) Appeal, § 783, p. 236, and cases cited.)

Second, although we confirm Ramona R's rule of substantive use immunity because it encourages minors to provide probation officers with truthful statements and protects them from prosecutors who may take unfair advantage of their statements as substantive evidence of guilt (Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 809-810, 210 Cal.Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789), we do not agree with the Court of Appeal that Ramona R 's holding should extend to impeachment of inconsistent testimony a minor defendant volunteers during his adult criminal trial. Ramona R. based its substantive use immunity on the theory that the fitness evaluation review forced the minor to choose between the " ' "trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt," ' " which our state Constitution does not permit. (Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 809-810, 210 Cal.Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789.) By contrast, our state Constitution does not protect defendants from impeachment when their voluntary trial testimony is inconsistent with their immunized statements. (Cf. People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 892, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024 (Coleman ) [inconsistent statements during probation revocation hearing may be used to impeach probationer at criminal trial].) In addition, Ramona R. intended use immunity to encourage minors to make candid statements and to prevent prosecutors from taking unfair advantage of a minor's admission or silence by using it substantively against the minor at a subsequent trial. (Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 806, 810, fn. 3, 210 Cal.Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789.) We do not serve the same purposes by precluding impeachment of a minor who voluntarily testifies falsely at trial. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeal judgment barring the use of defendant's statements for impeachment purposes. ²

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 1992, defendant and Alfredo Flores smuggled a group of persons from Mexico in a stolen Chevrolet Suburban. They picked up the passengers next to the freeway near San Ysidro, a town close to the international border. Defendant drove the van, and Flores sat in the front seat next to him. The passengers lay across the van's floor.

When defendant stopped at a gas station, he and Flores noticed that immigration officials were following them. Defendant drove off, bypassing the Temecula border patrol checkpoint. Witnesses at various points in the Suburban's path testified that the driver proceeded erratically, quickly passing stopped cars and detouring around a construction area.

A border patrol agent followed the Suburban into a shopping center at Rancho California and Ynez, and then west on Rancho California. The Suburban drove over a center median into the eastbound lanes of traffic on the wrong side of the road, proceeded up a sloping sidewalk, and then made a U-turn before driving into the eastbound lanes of traffic and through a red light at an intersection.

The high-speed chase continued through the streets of Temecula. It ended in tragedy when the Suburban sped into a blind intersection near Temecula Valley High School and collided with an Acura sedan, killing two young passengers and the adult driver in the sedan and one passenger inside the Suburban. It then overturned and slid forward, striking two young pedestrians in the crosswalk and killing them.

A petition filed in juvenile court alleged that defendant, who was 16 years old at the time of the collision, committed 6 murders (Pen.Code, § 187) and operated a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license (Veh.Code, § 12500, subd. (a)). The prosecution sought to have him tried as an adult, and a hearing was held to determine if he was fit to be tried as a minor. (§ 707, subds. (b)(1), (c).) In preparation for the hearing, Riverside County Probation Officer Alex Candelaria prepared a report on defendant's behavioral patterns and social history. In preparing this report, Candelaria interviewed defendant in Spanish in the company of his defense attorney. Defendant told Candelaria that he had a cousin in Pomona and an aunt in Ontario. He also said his brother taught him how to drive an automatic transmission vehicle three months before he came to the United States. He explained that a man named Morro smuggled him into the United States the night before the fatal collision, and that Flores forced him to drive the Suburban.

Defendant also told Candelaria that he said to Flores he wanted to stop the car, but Flores cursed at him, reached over with his foot, and placed it on top of defendant's foot on the accelerator. Flores and defendant struggled for control of the steering wheel. Because Flores's foot was on top of defendant's foot, defendant could not stop the car, and the crash occurred. Defendant did not tell the probation officer that Flores had threatened to kill him.

After reviewing the probation officer's social study report on defendant's amenability to the care, treatment, and other programs available to defendants tried as minors, the court concluded defendant should be tried as an adult. (§ 707(c).)

Defendant's testimony during his criminal trial contradicted many statements he made to Probation Officer Candelaria. For example, he stated that he was born in Mexico City and that a man named Sergio smuggled him into the United States when he was 15 years old, about 9 months before the collision. He testified that he learned to drive a standard transmission vehicle in Mexico City when he was 11 years old. He said he had no friends or family in the United States. He stated that he joined Flores following his former employer's arrest. He also said that he had worked for Flores as a servant and messenger for six months before the incident, but had nothing to do with the smuggling operations. He said he feared Flores, who threatened him with death, and he believed that, had he stopped the Suburban during the fatal chase, Flores would have killed him. He wanted to stop, but Flores directed him to "go faster." Defendant said he followed Flores's orders because he feared for his life.

During cross-examination at his criminal trial, defendant claimed that he lied to the probation officer during his prehearing interview. Probation Officer Candelaria then impeached defendant on rebuttal by repeating his interview statements that were inconsistent with his trial testimony. The jury found defendant guilty of driving without a valid license and of six counts of second degree murder. ³

II. BACKGROUND

Juvenile court jurisdiction attaches to any minor under the age of 18 who "violates any law of this state." (§ 602.) The prosecution may move to have minors 14 years of age or older tried as adults. (§ 707, subds. (a), (c) [applicable to minors 16 and older]; see § 707, subd. (d) [applicable to minors between 14 and 16].) On the prosecution's motion made before jeopardy attaches, the court "shall cause the probation officer to investigate and submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the minor being considered for a...