People v. Madrid

494 P.3d 624

2021 COA 70

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Theodore Israel MADRID, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 17CA2058

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division II.

Announced May 27, 2021

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Erin K. Grundy, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Lynn Noesner, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE BROWN

¶ 1 The People charged Theodore Israel Madrid with one count of first degree murder and two counts of child abuse resulting in death in connection with the death of his then girlfriend's two-year-old son. The primary disputes at trial centered on the cause of the child's injuries and Madrid's mental state — Madrid argued that the child's death was a tragic accident. After a nine-day trial, the jury convicted Madrid as charged. The district court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole for murder and to concurrent sentences on the child abuse counts.

¶ 2 Madrid appealed his conviction, contending, as relevant here, that the district court erroneously denied his objection under Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), to the prosecution's peremptory strike of an African-American¹ prospective juror. People v. Madrid , 2017 WL 123669 (Colo. App. No. 13CA0298, Jan. 12, 2017) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e) ). A division of this court concluded that the district court erred when it determined that Madrid failed to make a prima facie showing that the peremptory strike was based on race. Thus, it reversed and remanded to the district court to complete the Batson analysis.

¶ 3 Following remand, the district court conducted further proceedings and concluded that there had been no Batson violation.

¶ 4 Madrid appeals again, contending that the district court erred by, among other things, accepting on remand new race-neutral explanations for the strike that the prosecutor had not articulated during the Batson challenge at trial. We conclude that, where the prosecution articulates its race-neutral reasons for striking a potential juror during the Batson proceedings at trial, the district court cannot consider or base its ruling on new justifications offered on remand. Consequently, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 5 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to the defendant that the state will not discriminate based on race in the selection of a jury. U.S. Const. amend. XIV ; Colo. Const. art. II, §§ 16, 25 ; Batson , 476 U.S. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Valdez v. People , 966 P.2d 587, 589 (Colo. 1998). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the exclusion of citizens from jury service based on race "constitutes a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure." Batson , 476 U.S. at 85, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see also People v. Rodriguez , 2015 CO 55, ¶ 9, 351 P.3d 423. The exercise of even a single peremptory challenge on the basis of race violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Foster v. Chatman , 578 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016) ; Snyder v. Louisiana , 552 U.S. 472, 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008).

¶ 6 Every defendant, no matter the nature of the crime they are accused of having committed, has the "right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria." Batson , 476 U.S. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 1712. "Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try" but "touch[es] the entire community." Id. at 87, 106 S.Ct. 1712. It undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Id. And it "shamefully belittles minority jurors who report to serve their civic duty only to be turned away on account of their race." State v. Sassen Van Elsloo , 191 Wash.2d 798, 425 P.3d 807, 844 (2018) (McCloud, J., concurring) (plurality opinion) (quoting State v. Saintcalle , 178 Wash.2d 34, 309 P.3d 326, 332 (2013) (plurality opinion)); see also Batson , 476 U.S. at 87, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Fields , 732 P.2d at 1151. A person's race is simply unrelated to their fitness to serve as a juror. Batson , 476 U.S. at 87, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Valdez , 966 P.2d at 589.

¶ 7 Batson outlines a three-step process for evaluating claims of racial discrimination in jury selection under the Equal Protection Clause. 476 U.S. at 93-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution excluded a potential juror because of race. Valdez , 966 P.2d at 590. This standard is "easily satisfied." Craig v. Carlson , 161 P.3d 648, 655 (Colo. 2007). "As long as the totality of the circumstances raises an inference of racial motivation, the defendant has satisfied his step-one burden." Rodriguez , ¶ 10 ; see also Valdez , 966 P.2d at 590 ("The prima facie standard is not a high one ....").

¶ 8 Second, if the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strike. Valdez , 966 P.2d at 590. Again, this burden is not high. "[T]he prosecution need not provide an explanation that is persuasive or even plausible, so long as the reason is facially race-neutral." Id.

¶ 9 Third, if the prosecution tenders a race-neutral explanation, the trial court must allow the defendant an opportunity to rebut the explanation "by showing, for example, that it is pretext." Id. Then the trial court must determine the merits of the Batson challenge — "[t]he question is whether the court can find by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more potential jurors were excluded because of race." Id. The critical question at this stage is the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's justification for the peremptory strike. Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I) , 537 U.S. 322, 338, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). But the burden of persuasion remains on the defendant who alleges discrimination in jury selection. Valdez , 966 P.2d at 589.

¶ 10 On appeal, each step of the Batson analysis is subject to a separate standard of review. Valdez , 966 P.2d at 590. We review de novo whether the defendant established a legally sufficient prima facie case that a juror was excluded based on race — though we defer to the trial court's underlying factual findings (e.g., credibility determinations or whether the juror was a member of a cognizable racial group). Id. at 591 ; see also Rodriguez , ¶ 13. Similarly, at step two, the facial validity of the prosecutor's justification "is a question of law warranting de novo review." Valdez , 966 P.2d at 590. However, the trial court's final determination as to the existence of racial discrimination is an issue of fact that we review for clear error. Rodriguez , ¶ 13 ; see also Snyder , 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203 ("On appeal, a trial court's ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous."); Batson , 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ("Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration [at step three] largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.").

¶ 11 When a trial court erroneously denies a Batson challenge, the remedy is to reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. See Flowers v. Mississippi , 588 U.S. ––––, ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2251, 204 L.Ed.2d 638 (2019) ; People v. Ojeda , 2019 COA 137M, ¶ 35, ––– P.3d –––– (cert. granted Aug. 17, 2020).

II. Background

A. Madrid's Batson Challenge at Trial

¶ 12 Before jury selection, prospective jurors filled out questionnaires to give the parties basic information about themselves. Prospective Juror T indicated on his questionnaire that he was sixty-eight years old, was married with children, was a retired customer service specialist, had experience in security, enjoyed gardening, and watched television.

¶ 13 After the district court excused six jurors for cause and one for undue hardship, it called seven new prospective jurors into the jury box for questioning, including Prospective Juror T. The court gave each side approximately five minutes to question the seven new prospective jurors.

¶ 14 During that limited time, the following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and Prospective Juror T:

[Prosecutor]: So, [Prospective Juror T], any issues that you had with anything that either of us had said or anything that the court has said as far as the instructions of law?

[Prospective Juror T]: No, not yet.

[Prosecutor]: Not yet. Okay.

Any concerns about having to look at – potentially having to look at autopsy pictures in the case?

[Prospective Juror T]: No.

[Prosecutor]: No? Okay.

Anything you want to tell us?

[Prospective Juror T]: No.

[Prosecutor]: Do you have a good joke?

[Prospective Juror T]: I'm the joke.

This was the entirety of the prosecutor's questioning of Prospective Juror T.

¶ 15 Shortly thereafter, the prosecution used its ninth peremptory strike to excuse Prospective Juror T from the jury. Madrid's attorney raised a Batson objection, arguing,

Judge, at this time we're raising an equal protection challenge and a Batson challenge in regards to [Prospective Juror T]. [He] was one of the last people on the jury. According to his questionnaire, he's fact neutral. He was asked a few questions by both parties and he gave very short answers and seemed to be unbiased. I don't see any other reason why he would be dismissed at this time.

¶ 16 Without awaiting a ruling from the district court as to whether Madrid had made a prima facie showing that Prospective Juror T had been removed from the jury on the basis of race, the prosecutor responded with her race-neutral reasons for striking him:

Judge, first of all, he's being replaced by another African-American

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