People v. Madriz

1

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAUL TORRES MADRIZ, Defendant and Appellant.

H048158

California Court of Appeals, Sixth District

March 30, 2023

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1776997)

BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Raul Torres Madriz was convicted by jury of two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187)^[1] and one count of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, 189). The jury found true a multiple murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and an allegation as to each count that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).

The trial court imposed two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the murders, a consecutive term of seven years to life for the attempted premeditated murder, and consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement associated with each of the murders and attempted murder. The court also ordered defendant to pay various amounts, including $21,445.86 in victim restitution.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his Batson/Wheeler motion, which contested the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove four prospective jurors who defendant argued were "Hispanic."^[2] (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).) Second, defendant argues that remand is required to allow the trial court an opportunity to exercise its purportedly new discretion to strike the firearm enhancements and impose a lesser enhancement. (See § 12022.53.) Third, defendant contends that the court erred by imposing a sentence of seven years to life for the attempted premeditated murder count, rather than a straight life sentence.

For reasons that we will explain, we will modify the sentence on the attempted premeditated murder count to life with the possibility of parole, correct clerical error in the written victim restitution order, and affirm the judgment as modified.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Trial

In view of the issues that defendant raises on appeal, which arise out of voir dire and sentencing, we provide only a brief summary of the evidence at trial.

On the evening of January 5, 2017, the three victims were sitting together at a table in a restaurant. Defendant got up from another table and started shooting the victims. Defendant exited the restaurant and got into the passenger's side of a car. As the car drove away, defendant told the driver that he had shot people at the restaurant. When the driver asked why, defendant responded that they had thrown rocks at his vehicle at some point in time.

Two of the shooting victims, Daniel Maldonado and Hugo Sanchez, died at the scene. The third victim, who was shot in the stomach, was transported to a medical center for treatment.

Defendant was arrested on November 3, 2017. He denied to the police that he was involved in a murder.

B. The Charges, Verdicts, and Sentencing

Defendant was charged by amended information with two counts of murder (§ 187) and one count of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, 189). The amended information also alleged a multiple murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and that as to each count, defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) &(d)).

In October 2019, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. The jury also found true the special circumstance allegation (see § 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and the firearm discharge allegation (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).

In March 2020, the trial court imposed two consecutive terms of LWOP for the murders, a consecutive term of seven years to life for the attempted premeditated murder, and consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement associated with each of the murders and attempted murder. The court also ordered defendant to pay various amounts, including victim restitution of $21,445.86.^[3]

III. DISCUSSION

A. Batson/Wheeler Motion

During voir dire, defendant made a Batson/Wheeler motion, contesting the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove four prospective jurors who defendant contended were Hispanic. The trial court found that only two of the four prospective jurors at issue were Hispanic and that as to those two prospective jurors, there was no prima facie showing of discrimination. To the extent it was wrong regarding who was Hispanic, the court further determined that the prosecutor provided "neutral reasons that did not involve . . . discrimination or bias" in challenging each of the four prospective jurors at issue.

On appeal, defendant contends that the prospective juror from Argentina, H.W., and the prospective juror from Portugal, V.P., were Hispanic, and that a prima facie case of discrimination has been shown by the prosecutor's removal of these two prospective jurors, along with E.R. and V.M. who are also Hispanic. Defendant alternatively argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had not met his burden to show purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Attorney General contends that substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that H.W. and V.P. did not fall within the class of Hispanics, and therefore the court properly determined that defendant had not shown a prima facie case of discrimination. The Attorney General also argues that substantial evidence supports the court's further determination that defendant failed to show purposeful discrimination.

1. Proceedings Below

a. Prospective Juror E.R.

E.R. worked as a maintenance technician for a corporate housing company. He lived with a friend, who was also in the maintenance field. E.R. had lived at his current residence in Cupertino for about a year, and prior to that he lived in Sunnyvale for about three years. E.R. had never been to court, did not know anyone in the justice system, and indicated that he could be fair to both sides in the case.

E.R. was a Spanish speaker. Defense counsel explained that defendant would be using a Spanish language interpreter during the trial. E.R. indicated that it would not cause him to have any concerns, but that he would wonder "where [defendant] comes from" and "[w]hy doesn't he know the language."

In response to questions from the prosecutor, E.R. indicated that he would have "[n]o problem" following the law as instructed by the judge in the case. On a 10-point scale with 10 being a "great" listener, E.R. rated himself as an eight.

b. Prospective Juror V.M.

V.M. provided building maintenance for residential dwellings. He lived with his wife and teenage daughter and had lived at his current residence for more than 20 years. V.M. had been in court "a few times," including for child support, custody, and for "being accused of battery charges." Regarding the latter case, V.M. was "treated pretty good because [he] had [his] own personal attorney," and the case was ultimately dismissed.

V.M. stated that he had "been wanting to purchase a handgun" for the protection of himself and his family. Three years prior, his daughter and wife had encountered an individual on the road who pointed a gun at them, claiming the wife had cut him off. V.M. further stated, "And just recently with all these - you know - nonsense that you have on TV about these shooters, I keep saying I want to get one, but my daughter is totally against it." V.M. indicated that his wife was also against it, so he "[had not] done anything." He stated that he had "strong beliefs on weapons because of what [his] daughter and wife went through." When the trial court expressed that it must have been "horrifying, especially as [V.M. was not] there to protect them," V.M. responded affirmatively and stated, "My blood pressure went through the roof. I wanted to get in my car and look for this clown." When asked by the trial court whether he would be able to set aside the prior incident and focus on what was occurring in the courtroom, V.M. stated that he could not "predict the outcome of [his] decision" because he had not heard anything. He further stated, "But being as fair as possible -- that's the only thing I can do -- is be fair as possible."

In response to a question by defense counsel regarding V.M.'s personal feelings about guns, V.M. stated that he would get a gun to protect his family, "[b]ut going with [his] daughter and [his] wife, no, [he would] not get it." When asked to explain his response that he was "leaning one way" about the case, V.M. stated, "Again, I haven't heard the case; so of course, that has to be said. My concerns are: Was it legal? Was it purchased legally? Was it a stolen weapon? Was it this? Was it this? Was it that? [¶] Again, I can't predict the case; so I need information. Overall, then, yes, the question was asked, being fair. I will have to hear the case to be fair. [¶] . . . [¶] To make a positive decision at the end." When asked whether he was "leaning towards [the] prosecution," V.M. responded, "I lean nowhere. Like I said, there is no decision-making here. I haven't heard anything and I can't predict."

In response to defense counsel's question, V.M. initially indicated that he would assume a police officer is credible when the officer testifies. However, he then indicated that he would not tend to believe a police officer over another witness if there was conflicting testimony about whether a light was red or green. When he was subsequently asked to explain why ...