People v. Main

1

2024 IL App (2d) 230061-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL S. MAIN, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 2-23-0061

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Second District

May 1, 2024

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. No. 16-CF-2309 Honorable James K. Booras, Judge, Presiding.

SCHOSTOK JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Birkett concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

SCHOSTOK JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: (1) The trial court was not required to sua sponte recuse itself from the defendant's trial or posttrial proceedings; (2) trial court conducted a sufficient inquiry into the defendant's sixth and seventh Krankel motions; and (3) one of the defendant's convictions from criminal sexual assault must be vacated for violating the one-act, one-crime rule.

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, the defendant, Michael Main, was convicted of 6 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40 (a)(1) (West 2016)) and 11 counts of criminal sexual assault (id. § 5/11-1.20(a)(3)). The circuit court of Lake County sentenced him to a total of 120 years' imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in not sua sponte recusing itself from the trial; (2) the trial court erred in not sua sponte recusing itself from the posttrial proceedings; (3) the trial court erred in not conducting an inquiry into his sixth and seventh Krankel motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and (4) the evidence was insufficient to convict him on one of the counts of the indictment. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On September 21, 2016, the defendant was charged by indictment with 6 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40 (a)(1) (West 2016)) and 11 counts of criminal sexual assault (id. § 5/11-1.20(a)(3)). All the charges alleged that the defendant committed various acts of criminal sexual assault against his daughter, who was between 9 and 15 years old when the alleged assaults occurred, between April 4, 2010, and July 26, 2016.

¶ 5 On November 7, 2016, attorney Jed Stone entered his appearance as the defendant's counsel.

¶ 6 On October 15, 2019, Stone filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. That motion alleged that an unspecified "inescapable and irreversible conflict" had arisen between Stone and the defendant, and all efforts to resolve the conflict had failed.

¶ 7 On October 16, 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing on Stone's motion. Stone indicated that the conflict between himself and the defendant had become apparent "over the past several months" and involved the defendant's "right to testify, what he would say if he testified what defenses should be proffered, and whether this case should go to trial." After the State objected, the following colloquy ensued:

"MR. STONE: I will be happy to explain in more detail if the Court needs me to, but I would like to do that in chambers and ex parte.

THE COURT: I need to hear from the defendant first, and then I can accommodate that if that's something embarrassing or something to that effect.

MR. STONE: I don't think it's embarrassing, I think it involves a confidence given to me by my client -

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STONE:-- that creates a conflict that I don't want to share with the people who are in the written pleading."

¶ 8 The trial court then asked the defendant about Stone's request. The defendant objected to Stone's motion, stating that he had paid Stone $30,000 and that he expected Stone to "handle this case to completion." The defendant said that he was unaware of any conflict between himself and Stone. He also indicated that he would be unable to afford another attorney after having paid Stone's retainer.

¶ 9 In response, Stone stated:

"This case is about a child who will come to court and say that her dad had a sexual relationship with her for many years while she was about nine until she was about fifteen. If that child is believed, then all of the chipping around the edges to this case won't make any difference. If that child is disbelieved, [the defendant] will win his freedom. I've evaluated the case, evaluated the evidence, offered the defendant my advice. He has rejected that advice. I don't know what else to do.

I owe a duty of candor to the Court as well as keeping my client's secrets. Those may come in conflict if there is a trial.

[The defendant] has a right to testify. If he testifies, I cannot put him on if he says what I think he is going to say. The law prohibits that. Justice Rehnquist has recommended in situations like that I simply introduce him to a jury and sit down and let him tell his story. I think this is a recipe of disaster. I am deeply concerned about a man who describes himself as a good father, is taking a course of conduct that is self-destructive and destructive of children, and I don't want to be any part of it."

¶ 10 The trial court thereafter recessed the case and announced he would "see counsel in chambers, and examine what Mr. Stone has to say in camera and review it in camera[.]" The defendant asked to attend the in camera meeting, but the trial court refused, stating that he would give the defendant an "opportunity to respond *** if need be."

¶ 11 On October 17, 2019, the trial court and Stone summarized the in-chambers meeting:

"MR. STONE: We had a meeting in chambers yesterday off the record. I told the Court there and I will spread of record today that this motion did not come lightly, came after a great deal of thought; and after consultation with two respected criminal defense ethics persons, one Professor Richard Kling, and the other former director commissioner of the Attorney Registration Disciplinary Commission, Mary Robinson, who herself was a criminal lawyer and Appellate Defender.

After consulting with both of them, I came to the conclusion that I had to ethically file this motion. I am asking the Court to enter an order permitting me to withdraw as [the defendant's] counsel.

THE COURT: Mr. Stone related, maybe not in great detail, the nature of the conflict and in view of the fact that there are ethical considerations here and I do recognize them and they are present, they are vivid so to speak, I have no other choice but to permit Mr. Stone to withdraw."

¶ 12 The defendant objected to Stone withdrawing, again complaining that Stone was only willing to refund a small portion of his retainer and had not told him about an alleged conflict until recently. The trial court told the defendant:

"Mr. Stone was trying to get you in colloquial terms a deal; and when he saw that this matter is going to trial and when you told him you will take the stand he *** found himself in a great conflict. That's what he related to me."

¶ 13 Less than a month later, the trial court appointed the Public Defender to represent the defendant.

¶ 14 On June 8, 2022, the defendant filed a pro se motion seeking a hearing pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (1984). The defendant alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. After conducting an inquiry, the trial court declined to appoint new counsel.

¶ 15 Between July 18, 2022, and July 21, 2022, the trial court conducted a jury trial on the 17 charges against the defendant. The victim testified that she was born in 2001. The defendant sexually assaulted her over a 5-year-period, beginning when she was 10 years old. (Although the indictment alleged that the assaults began when she was 9 years old, the victim testified that it was when she was 10). At the close of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of all the charges.

¶ 16 On August 19, 2022, the defendant filed a post-trial motion alleging that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act. The defendant also raised other claims of ineffective assistance, but asserted those claims required that he have access to the record and transcripts. On that same day, defense counsel also filed a motion for a new trial.

¶ 17 On October 11, 2022, the trial court conducted an inquiry into the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance. The defendant argued exclusively that his speedy trial issue was viable and should be raised by new counsel. Defense counsel responded that there was no viable argument under the Speedy Trial Act. The trial court declined to appoint new counsel.

¶ 18 On October 18, 2022, defense counsel filed a supplemental motion for a new trial. That motion raised an additional claim that the trial court had violated the defendant's right to counsel of choice when he granted Stone's motion to withdraw based on Stone's off-record representations during the in-chambers meeting.

¶ 19 On October 20, 2022, the defendant filed two more pro se motions, labeled "Krankel #4 Motion in Support of Krankel #3 Motion to Dismiss" and "Krankel #5." The "Krankel #4 Motion" asserted, among other things, that the trial court denied him due process by holding an in-chambers meeting with Stone outside of his presence. The defendant alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise that claim in her motion for a new trial. In the "Krankel #5" motion, the defendant alleged that the trial court did not conduct proper inquiries into his previous motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 20 On October 26, 2022, the defendant filed a "Supplemental Motion Alleging Ineffectiveness of Counsel," asserting that Stone rendered ineffective assistance by failing to consult with him before...