People v. Martin

229 N.E.3d 882

2023 IL App (1st) 220252

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinos, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Jonathan MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-22-0252

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FIRST DIVISION.

Filed October 16, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 18 CR 60203, Honorable Timothy J. Joyce, Judge Presiding.

Sharone R. Mitchell, Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Katherine Polak, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique Abraham, Erin K. Slattery, and Kimberly C. Reeve, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the Cook County circuit court committed the 53-year-old defendant, Jonathan Martin, to the custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS) pursuant to section 104-25(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Code) (725 ILCS 5/104-25(g) (West 2018)) for a period of seven years, not to exceed August 28, 2025. On appeal, the defendant challenges the length of his commitment. He asserts that under the 2009 amendments to section 104-25(g) of the Criminal Code, section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Corrections Code) (hereinafter the truth in sentencing statute) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2018)) applies to determining the length of a civil commitment for a defendant previously found unfit to stand trial and "not not guilty" of the crime charged. He therefore asserts that he was entitled to serve only 85% of his seven-year commitment term. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On June 14, 2018, the defendant, who has a history of mental illness, was arrested and subsequently charged with five counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1), (4), (c), (d)(1), (f)(1) (West 2018)) for throwing a brick at the 71-year-old victim, Virginia Brennan, and striking her in the back.

¶ 4 On August 28, 2018, the circuit court held a fitness hearing to determine the defendant’s fitness to stand trial. At that hearing, the State offered the stipulated testimony of a licensed clinical psychologist, Dr. Erick Neu. If called to testify, Dr. Neu would have stated that, based on his evaluation, the defendant was disorganized, delusional, paranoid, and unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him. It was Dr. Neu’s opinion, however, that the defendant could be restored to fitness within one year. Based on this stipulation, the circuit court found the defendant unfit to stand trial and remanded him to the custody of DHS for treatment for the statutory period of one year pursuant to section 104-16 of the Criminal Code (725 ILCS 5/104-16 (West 2018)).

¶ 5 On September 5, 2019, the circuit court held a discharge hearing (id. § 104-25(a)). At that hearing, the parties stipulated that, if called to testify, the defendant’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Timothy Olenek, would state that the defendant suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and that despite his compliance with psychotropic medications and treatment, he remains unfit to stand trial and is unlikely to attain fitness.

¶ 6 The victim, Virginia, next testified that on June 14, 2018, she was driving her car with her husband in the passenger seat in the alley between North Lowell and Kostner Avenues. Virginia stopped her car at the crosswalk located at the mouth of the alley because she noticed the defendant standing on the sidewalk. When Virginia motioned the defendant to cross, he just stood there angrily talking to himself. When Virginia and her husband continued to motion to the defendant, urging him to cross the sidewalk, he "gave [them] the finger" and then threw a brick at the windshield of their car, shattering the glass. As Virginia’s husband called the police, Virginia exited the car and followed the defendant, asking him why he had thrown the brick at them. As Virginia followed the defendant, another woman driving along the street yelled at the defendant: "[H]ey buddy, drop the brick." The defendant continued down the street, but when the woman’s vehicle stopped at the next light, he threw the brick at the trunk of her car. The brick bounced back, and when Virginia, who was still following the defendant, saw the defendant pick it up again and turn toward her, she started running because she "knew" she was in danger. As she ran, the defendant threw the brick at her, hitting her back. Virginia nearly fell in the middle of the street but crawled to the parkway, where several parkgoers approached to help. She was subsequently transported by ambulance to Swedish Covenant Hospital, where she was treated for a fracture of the L4 vertebrae.

¶ 7 Based on this evidence, the circuit court found the defendant "not not guilty" of aggravated battery pursuant to section 104-25(d) of the Criminal Code (id. § 104-25(d)). The court further found that the defendant continued to remain unfit to stand trial and that there was no substantial probability that he would regain fitness within the statutory period of one year. The court therefore ordered that the defendant undergo an extended-term treatment (of 15 months) until December 5, 2020. See id. § 104-25(d)(1).

¶ 8 On June 7, 2021, upon the State’s motion, the circuit court held a civil commitment hearing (id. § 104-25(g)(2)), at which two expert psychiatrists testified regarding the defendant’s mental state. Dr. Timothy Olenek, who treated the defendant from 2018 to 2020, first opined that the defendant remained unfit to stand trial and in all probability was not likely to become fit and that he constituted a threat to public safety. Dr. Olenek reiterated that the defendant was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and explained that this was a chronic mental illness, which includes mood swings, psychotic episodes, and disorganized and delusional thinking. Dr. Olenek stated that prior to his current admission for treatment, between 1993 and 2014, the defendant had been previously admitted to DHS nine times. Dr. Olenek acknowledged that, during his current treatment at DHS, the defendant has exhibited no aggression and has been compliant with medication. He stated, however, that the defendant refuses to partake in any group therapy and to acknowledge that he suffers from a mental illness. In fact, the defendant "still remains very paranoid" and thinks that he was the victim of the crime. Based on the defendant’s lack of community support, Dr. Olenek opined that, if the defendant was released and stopped taking his anti-psychotic medication, he would relapse.

¶ 9 The defendant’s current treating psychiatrist, Dr. Syed Hussain, testified consistently with Dr. Olenek. He opined that the defendant remained unfit to stand trial and was unlikely to attain fitness because he does not understand either the charges against him or the seriousness of the crime and the injuries that he caused the victim. Dr. Hussain further opined that if the defendant were to be released and to stop taking his antipsychotic medication he would "most certainly" relapse because he lacks any community support. According to Dr. Hussain, the defendant poses a serious danger to the public at large and to any individuals with whom he comes into contact because he is unaware of his mental illness and because the risk of relapse is "extremely high."

¶ 10 After hearing this evidence, the circuit court found that the defendant continued to remain unfit to stand trial. The court further found that the defendant remained a danger to himself and others and a serious threat to public safety. The court therefore ordered that pursuant to section 104-25(g)(2) of the Criminal Code (id.) the defendant be involuntarily civilly committed to the custody of DHS for the maximum permitted term of seven years from the date of the original finding of unfitness.

¶ 11 On July 1, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider, asking the circuit court to modify the length of his involuntary commitment. In his motion, the defendant conceded that he was subject to the maximum term of commitment of seven years based on the fact that he was charged with aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1), (4), (c), (d)(1), (f)(1) (West 2018)), which is a Class 2 felony, normally punishable by three to seven years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2018)). The defendant nonetheless argued that he was entitled to good time credit served. He claimed that, had he been convicted in a criminal proceeding and sentenced to seven years, that sentence would have been served at 85% pursuant to the truth in sentencing statute (id. § 3-6-3) such that his maximum sentence would have been 2172 days. The defendant therefore requested that his commitment term be modified and that he be released from DHS custody no later than August 8, 2024.

¶ 12 On February 22, 2022, the circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider, finding that the truth in sentencing statute (id.) applies only to criminal defendants and not to involuntarily civilly committed patients, like the defendant. The defendant now appeals.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

[1] ¶ 14 On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it found that the truth in sentencing statute (id.) does not apply to civilly committed defendants like himself. The defendant asserts that when the legislature amended section 104-25(g)(4) of the Criminal Code (see Pub. Act 95-1052, § 85 (eff. July 1, 2009) (amending 725 ILCS 104-25(g)(4))) to include a reference to article 4.5 of chapter V of the Corrections Code (730 ILCS 5/ch. V, art. 4.5 (West 2018)) it intended for the truth in sentencing statute (id. § 3-6-3) to apply to civil commitment proceedings. He therefore asserts that the maximum term to which he should have been involuntarily committed to DHS was 85% of the maximum seven-year sentence to which he...