People v. Matias

2022 NY Slip Op 03332

The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jose Matias, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal No. 15963, Ind. No. 1832/92, No. 2020-03839

Supreme Court of New York, First Department

May 19, 2022

Janet E. Sabel, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Natalie Rea of counsel), for appellant.

Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (John T. Komondorea of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Kapnick, J.P., Webber, Mendez, Pitt, Higgitt, JJ.

Order Supreme Court, Bronx County (Steven L. Barrett, J.), entered August 21, 2020, which denied defendant's CPL 440.20 motion to set aside his sentence, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant's discretionary sentence of 50 years to life, imposed for a double murder he committed at the age of 16, was not unconstitutional. The motion court (68 Misc.3d 352 [Sup Ct Bronx County 2020]), in a thorough decision, properly declined to set aside the sentence or grant any other relief.

Defendant was 16 years old when he fired multiple shots at the unarmed victims, two brothers aged 17 and 21, killing them. The court imposed the maximum sentence of 25 years to life on each murder count, to run consecutively. Defendant moved to vacate his sentence, arguing that this was a de facto sentence of life without parole, and therefore required a new sentencing hearing for the court to consider his "youth and its attendant characteristics" (Miller v Alabama 567 U.S. 460, 467 [2012]).

In the first place, Miller does not apply to New York's discretionary statutory scheme. "In a case involving an individual who was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide, a State's discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient" (Jones v Mississippi, __US__, 141 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 [2021]). Defendant was sentenced under a statute that gave the court discretion to sentence him to a minimum term of between 15 and 25 years, and to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. Unlike the situation where life without parole is mandatory, the sentencing court was not precluded from considering defendant's age and the attendant circumstances. Likewise, this Court, which declined to reduce defendant's sentence (235 A.D.2d 298 [1st Dept 1997], lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1038 [1997]) also had the opportunity to consider these factors.

Furthermore defendant was not sentenced to life imprisonment with no actual or practical eligibility for parole. But for his conviction of a new crime while incarcerated, defendant's first parole hearing would have been at age 66.

In any event, in imposing sentence in 1994, the court gave an individualized sentence that considered defendant's particular circumstances. The court was aware of defendant's age, and counsel...