People v. McMillan

2023 NY Slip Op 03620

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. SHAMERE MCMILLAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

No. 444 KA 22-00632

Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department

June 30, 2023

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (THOMAS M. LEITH OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (GARY T KELDER OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CURRAN, MONTOUR, AND OGDEN JJ.

Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Stephen J Dougherty, J.), rendered December 7, 2021. The judgment convicted defendant upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.16 [1]). During a routine inspection of defendant's residence, a parole officer observed a knife on defendant's person and a holster in his bedroom. The parole officer then conducted a search of the residence during which he observed drug paraphernalia and what appeared to be the handle of a handgun. He informed the police, and police officers searched the residence pursuant to a search warrant. We affirm.

As an initial matter, defendant correctly contends and the People correctly concede that defendant did not validly waive his right to appeal. County Court "conflated the appeal waiver with the rights automatically waived by the guilty plea... and thus the record fails to establish that defendant understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty" (People v Murray, 197 A.D.3d 1017, 1017 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1147 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Jones, 211 A.D.3d 1489, 1490 [4th Dept 2022]; People v Rodriguez, 199 A.D.3d 1458, 1458 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1164 [2022]). The court also "mischaracterized the nature of the right that defendant was being asked to cede, portraying the waiver as an absolute bar to defendant taking an appeal, and there was no clarification that appellate review remained available for certain issues" (Murray, 197 A.D.3d at 1017 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 564-566 [2019], cert denied - U.S. -, 140 S.Ct. 2634 [2020]; Jones, 211 A.D.3d at 1490). The written waiver signed by defendant at sentencing did not "cure the ambiguit[ies] in the... court's colloquy...; rather, the written waiver[]... repeated many of the errors in County Court's colloqu[y] and, in any event, the court failed to confirm that [defendant]... understood the contents of the written waiver[]" (Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 566 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Bisono, 36 N.Y.3d 1013, 1017-1018 [2020]; People v Anderson, 210 A.D.3d 1464, 1464-1465 [4th Dept 2022]).

Defendant contends that the court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of his residence by his parole officer. We reject that contention. "[A] parolee's constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when his [residence] is searched, without a search warrant, by his parole officer if the latter's conduct is rationally and reasonably related to the performance of his duty as a parole officer" (People v Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 179 [1977]; see People v Sapp, 147 A.D.3d 1532, 1533 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1086 [2017]; People v Escalera, 121 A.D.3d 1519, 1520 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 1083 [2014]). We conclude that the parole officer's testimony established that the home that was searched was defendant's residence and, to the extent that defendant challenges the parole officer's testimony, we "afford deference to the court's determination that the testimony [of the parole officer] was credible" (People v Sapp, 147 A.D.3d 1532, 1533 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1086 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]). We further conclude that the record supports the court's determination that the search of the residence in question was "rationally and reasonably related to the performance of the parole officer's duty and was therefore lawful" (People v Johnson, 94 A.D.3d 1529, 1532 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 974 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Furthermore, the parole officer testified that, upon entering the residence, he observed a knife clipped to defendant's clothes, in violation of defendant's conditions of parole, and that, upon entering defendant's bedroom, he observed an empty holster. At that point, the parole officer's search of the bedroom and another room was rationally and reasonably related to the parole officer's duty to detect and to prevent additional parole violations (see People v Derby, 172 A.D.3d 1908, 1909 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 1068 [2019]; People v Reed, 150 A.D.3d 1655, 1655-1656 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1132 [2017]; see generally People v Goss, 143 A.D.3d 1279, 1280 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1145 [2017]; Escalera, 121 A.D.3d at 1520).

Defendant...