People v. Molnar

2021 IL App (2d) 190289

170 N.E.3d 616

446 Ill.Dec. 447

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Samantha L. MOLNAR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-19-0289

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Opinion filed April 20, 2021

James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Kerry Goettsch, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Joseph H. McMahon, State's Attorney, of St. Charles (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Lynn M. Harrington, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Samantha L. Molnar, appeals her conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled substance ( 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2018)). She contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress a pill bottle containing alprazolam (Xanax) because police seized the bottle without a warrant. However, the court found that the warrantless seizure was valid under the plain-view doctrine because the bottle's incriminating nature was immediately apparent. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was arrested on May 20, 2018, and was later indicted on three counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance: cocaine (count I), amphetamine (count II), and alprazolam (count III). Relying on People v. Humphrey , 361 Ill. App. 3d 947, 296 Ill.Dec. 795, 836 N.E.2d 210 (2005) —a case involving application of the plain-view doctrine—defendant moved to suppress evidence.

¶ 4 The trial court heard the motion on December 20, 2018. Patrol officer Nicholas Mondek testified that, on May 20, 2018, he responded to a call involving two vehicles stopped by police in relation to a call about a possible altercation. Mondek approached and spoke to defendant, who was in the front passenger seat of one of the vehicles. Mondek testified that his body camera recorded the interaction with defendant. The bodycam video was played for the court.

¶ 5 In the video, Mondek stepped up to the vehicle and asked defendant if he could talk with her "real quick." Defendant stepped out of the vehicle without being asked. After she did so, Mondek, who was flashing a light into the front passenger area, asked defendant, "What's with the pills right there?" Defendant responded that it was her Xanax. Without being asked, defendant reached into the car and took out what appeared to be a pill bottle. The bottle had no label. She held the bottle up, stating that her sister had just died. Mondek reached his hand out and asked, "Can I see the pills?" Defendant responded, "Yeah," and handed him the bottle. Mondek shone his flashlight into the bottle, revealing that it contained pills and a plastic baggie. He then asked defendant, "Why do you have your pills in a pill bottle with no—?" Mondek's voice trailed off as he pointed to the bottle, apparently indicating the lack of a label. Defendant said that she brought the Xanax from her house and that her husband did not know that she took Xanax. Mondek asked defendant if she had a prescription for the pills, and she said, "No, I got them from somebody." Another officer arrived and also asked defendant if she had a prescription for the pills, and she said that she did not. She said that she did not know what was in the baggie inside the bottle.

¶ 6 After the video was played, Mondek testified that it was an accurate portrayal of his interaction with defendant. Mondek testified that, when defendant stepped out of the vehicle to speak with Mondek, he saw a pill bottle on the front passenger seat. Mondek could tell from where he was standing that the bottle was unlabeled and that it contained pills and "a plastic baggie or something." When Mondek questioned defendant about the pills, she immediately said that they were "my Xanax." Mondek testified that he had previous experience with Xanax and knew that it was a controlled substance. When he asked to see the pills, he already believed that they were illegal, although defendant had not yet told him that she did not have a prescription for them. Examination of the bottle showed that it contained different types of pills, including Xanax, and also two plastic baggies with residue in them. Defendant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance. She was charged based on the pills and the residue in one of the plastic bags, which tested positive for cocaine.

¶ 7 The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court agreed with the State that—based on (1) defendant's admission that the bottle contained Xanax, (2) Mondek's knowledge that Xanax is a controlled substance, and (3) Mondek's observation, from his standpoint outside the car, that the bottle had no prescription label—Mondek immediately had probable cause to seize the bottle. The court distinguished those circumstances from Humphrey . There, an officer testified that he did not know that the pills were contraband when he seized them or that a crime had been committed. See Humphrey , 361 Ill. App. 3d at 950-51, 296 Ill.Dec. 795, 836 N.E.2d 210.

¶ 8 On the day of trial, the State dismissed count II (amphetamine). The case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial on counts I (cocaine) and III (alprazolam). The court found defendant guilty on count III but not guilty on count I. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and she was sentenced to probation. She appeals.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Relying on Humphrey , defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress. She contends that Mondek lacked probable cause to seize the bottle because he did not know if she had a prescription. The State argues that the seizure was legal because defendant consented to Mondek's request to see the pill bottle or, in the alternative, that the plain-view doctrine applied to the seizure. We assume, without deciding, that Mondek seized the pills from defendant, and we hold that the warrantless seizure was justified under the plain-view doctrine.

¶ 11 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we uphold factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Jones , 215 Ill. 2d 261, 268, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541 (2005). However, we review de novo the ultimate legal question of whether the suppression of evidence is warranted.

People v. Luedemann , 222 Ill. 2d 530, 542-43, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006) (citing Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ).

¶ 12 Generally, a search and seizure is reasonable under the fourth amendment only if the government first obtains a warrant issued after a finding of probable cause. Illinois v. McArthur , 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001). "Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers is such that a reasonably prudent person would believe that the suspect is committing or has committed a crime." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Garvin , 219 Ill. 2d 104, 126, 301 Ill.Dec. 423, 847 N.E.2d 82 (2006). However, the plain-view doctrine authorizes the warrantless seizure of an illegal item visible to a police officer whose access to the item has some prior justification under the fourth amendment and who has probable cause to suspect the item is connected to criminal activity. Illinois v. Andreas , 463 U.S. 765, 771, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983). An officer may seize property that is in plain view if three requirements are met: (1) the officer is lawfully located in the place where he observed the object; (2) the object is in plain view; and (3) the object's incriminating nature is immediately apparent. People v. Garcia , 2012 IL App (1st) 102940, ¶ 4, 365 Ill.Dec. 344, 978 N.E.2d 366.

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant does not dispute that the bottle was in plain view or that Mondek was lawfully located by the vehicle when he viewed it. The only issue is the third requirement. Defendant contends that the incriminating nature of the bottle of pills was not apparent until after Mondek seized it, because only then did defendant admit that she lacked a prescription for the pills.

¶ 14 " ‘Plain view’ requires probable cause to permit a seizure." Jones , 215 Ill. 2d at 272, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541. If the officer lacks probable cause to believe that the object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object, i.e. , if the object's incriminating nature is not immediately apparent, its seizure is not justified under the plain-view doctrine. Jones , 215 Ill. 2d at 272, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541 (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S. 366, 374-75, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) ). The "immediately apparent" or "probable cause" element requires sufficient evidence to justify the reasonable belief that the defendant has committed or is committing a crime. Jones , 215 Ill. 2d at 273-74, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541 ; Humphrey , 361 Ill. App. 3d at 951, 296 Ill.Dec. 795, 836 N.E.2d 210.

¶ 15 Probable cause is "not a high bar." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) District of Columbia v. Wesby , ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018). "It exists if, from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, the items or events at issue create a reasonable probability that defendant committed or is committing a crime." People v. Lee , 2018 IL App (3d) 160100, ¶ 4, 425 Ill.Dec. 708, 115 N.E.3d 263 (citing Wesby , ––– U.S. at –––– n.2, 138 S. Ct. at 584 n.2 ). Thus, while a mere hunch is insufficient to support a seizure, "a police officer views the facts ‘through the lens of his police experience and expertise’ and ‘may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists.’ " People v. Petty , 2017 IL App ...