People v. Monroy-Martinez

1

2024 IL App (1st) 221684-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTIAN MONROY-MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-22-1684

Court of Appeals of Illinois, First District, Third Division

August 14, 2024

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 17 CR 7693 Honorable Alfredo Maldonado, Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

VAN TINE JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: We vacate defendant's conviction and sentence for aggravated kidnapping as charged in count I because that count was nol-prossed and not reinstated. We remand for resentencing on aggravated kidnapping as charged in count II with directions to impose a sentence in compliance with the statutory maximum for aggregate consecutive sentences because defendant's offenses all occurred within a single course of conduct. We affirm defendant's sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault.

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Christian Monroy-Martinez was found guilty of two counts of aggravated kidnapping and 12 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (ACSA). After merging the counts, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years in prison on one count of aggravated kidnapping and 16 years each on six counts of ACSA for a total of 121 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) finding him guilty of and sentencing him on an aggravated kidnapping count the State nol-prossed, (2) imposing a total sentence that exceeds the maximum allowable because his acts constituted a single course of conduct, and (3) imposing an excessive and disproportionate sentence.^[1] We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with instructions.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Because this appeal involves only sentencing issues, we set out only the facts germane to our analysis and necessary to understand the background of this case.

¶ 5 A. Charging and Jury Trial

¶ 6 Defendant was initially charged with 62 counts of aggravated kidnapping, ACSA, armed robbery, aggravated battery, and aggravated unlawful restraint premised on his violent sexual assault of C.E. on May 27, 2016.^[2] Relevant here count I alleged that defendant committed aggravated kidnapping when he "knowingly and secretly confined C.E against her will" and sexually assaulted her (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(3) (West 2016)). Count II alleged that defendant committed aggravated kidnapping when he "knowingly by force or threat of imminent force carried C.E. from one place to another with intent to secretly confine C.E.," and sexually assaulted her (id). The State nol-prossed count I prior to defendant's first trial.

¶ 7 Eight counts of ACSA were premised on commission of criminal sexual assault and causing bodily harm (id. § 11-1.30(a)(2)). Another eight counts of ACSA were premised on commission of criminal sexual assault while armed with a firearm (id. § 11-1.30(a)(8)).

¶ 8 Defendant was tried before a jury and was found guilty. Following a hearing regarding trial counsel's effectiveness pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (1984), the court granted defendant's motion for a new trial.

¶ 9 B. Bench Trial

¶ 10 The second trial was a bench trial. The State proceeded on aggravated kidnapping counts I and II, 12 counts of ACSA, and one count of armed robbery. The State amended the ACSA counts to remove allegations that defendant was armed with a firearm in violation of section 11-1.30(a)(8) and replaced them with allegations that defendant "displayed, threatened to use, or used a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, to wit: bludgeon," in violation of section 11-1.30(a)(1) (id. § 11-1.30(a)(1)). The ACSA counts alleged defendant committed the following acts of sexual penetration: contact between (1) his penis and C.E.'s anus (counts X and L); (2) his penis and C.E.'s vagina (counts XI and LI); (3) his penis and C.E.'s vagina, "an act separate [f]rom the acts set forth in the other counts" (counts XII and LII); (4) his penis and C.E.'s mouth (counts XIV and LIV); (5) his penis and C.E.'s mouth, "an act separate from the acts set forth in the other counts" (counts XV and LV); and (6) his mouth and C.E.'s vagina (counts XVII and LVII).

¶ 11 The State's evidence established that C.E. was waiting at a bus stop at the intersection of West Fullerton Avenue and North Lavergne Avenue at approximately 8 p.m. on May 27, 2016. Defendant, while driving a vehicle, approached the bus stop, exited his vehicle, and approached C.E. on foot. He grabbed the back of C.E.'s hair, forced her into the passenger seat of his vehicle, and said, "[D]o what I t[ell] you to do and nothing is going to happen."

¶ 12 Defendant began driving and forced C.E. to perform oral sex on him. Defendant stopped his vehicle in an alley and removed C.E.'s clothes while C.E. begged him to release her. Defendant refused and put his tongue on C.E.'s vagina. Another vehicle approached and C.E. screamed for help. Defendant began driving and forced C.E. to perform oral sex on him again. Defendant stopped his vehicle and inserted his penis in C.E.'s vagina. C.E. attempted to move to the rear of the vehicle but defendant inserted his penis in her anus. C.E. turned over because she was in pain and defendant inserted his penis in her vagina again. C.E. said she could not breathe, so defendant lowered one of the vehicle's windows. C.E. heard voices and screamed for help. Defendant began driving again and struck the left side of C.E.'s face against the glove compartment. He then forced C.E.'s mouth onto his penis, stopped in an alley, and inserted his penis in C.E.'s vagina.

¶ 13 During this incident, defendant had an object that appeared to C.E. to be a firearm. He pressed this object against C.E.'s temple and ran it down to her chin while asking if she knew "how many women survived sexual assaults." While defendant was driving, he stored his weapon beneath his legs and asked C.E., "do you want me to take it out?" C.E. told defendant that she had a young daughter who would be left alone if defendant killed her. Defendant opened the passenger door of his vehicle, pushed C.E. out, threw her clothing at her, and drove away. C.E. encountered two men nearby who summoned police.

¶ 14 C.E. received medical treatment for injuries she sustained during this incident. Defendant's DNA was present on vaginal swabs from a sexual assault kit administered to C.E. C.E. identified defendant to police in a photo array in April 2017, approximately 11 months after the incident.

¶ 15 Defendant testified that he and C.E. had consensual vaginal sex in his vehicle on May 27, 2016. He denied having a weapon, striking C.E. in the face, and having nonconsensual sex with her. He also denied having oral or anal sex with C.E. Police arrested defendant in April 2017. He told detectives he had not had sex with anyone but his wife and that he had never seen C.E.

¶ 16 The court found defendant guilty of both counts of aggravated kidnapping and all 12 counts of ACSA. The court acquitted defendant of armed robbery.

¶ 17 C. Sentencing

¶ 18 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged aggravated kidnapping count II into aggravated kidnapping count I. The court also merged the 12 ACSA counts into 6 convictions of ACSA premised on defendant's commission of criminal sexual assault while armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm.

¶ 19 The presentence investigation (PSI) reflected that defendant was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence in 2012 and had a pending domestic battery case at the time of trial in this case. The State reported that defendant received supervision in the domestic battery case; the victim in that case was his wife. Defendant attended three years of high school but dropped out to work full-time. He was last employed as a shipping and receiving laborer for a food company. Defendant stated that he had a good relationship with his wife, who visited him often in jail and was supportive.

¶ 20 In aggravation, the State presented C.E.'s victim statement. C.E. stated that she felt "weak and fearful," was "not the same woman [she] used to be," and could not "overcome all these things yet that cloud [her] life and tarnish [her] family's life." There was "not a single day" that she went to bed without thinking about this incident. C.E. stated that defendant's imprisonment would not "make [her] happy even a little" because it would not "undo what [he] did to [her]." Her "greatest hope" was that there would "be no more victims for this man."

¶ 21 In mitigation, defendant stated that he supported three children before he was arrested, worked for the same company for seven years, had a good relationship with his daughters, and had the support of his family. Defendant argued that his criminal history was "minimal."

¶ 22 In allocution, defendant stated that he would have been able to gather evidence to demonstrate his innocence if he had been arrested immediately after this incident rather than approximately a year later.

¶ 23 The State argued that the ACSA counts had a sentencing range 6 to 30 years each as Class X felonies plus a 10-year enhancement due to defendant's use of a weapon during his sexual assault of C.E. The State also maintained that the ACSA sentences had to run consecutively to each other and to the aggravated kidnapping sentence, which had a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years as a Class X felony. According to the State, the minimum total sentence was 102 years: 16 years on each of the six ACSA counts-96 years-plus 6 years on the...