People v. Moon

2022 IL 125959

215 N.E.3d 58

465 Ill.Dec. 262

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Omega MOON, Appellant.

Docket No. 125959

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed April 7, 2022.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Douglas R. Hoff, Deputy Defender, and Eric E. Castañeda, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Garson S. Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 A jury found defendant, Omega Moon, guilty of domestic battery. The Cook County circuit court, however, failed to administer a trial oath to the jury at any time prior to the jury rendering its verdict. Defendant, therefore, was convicted by a jury that was never sworn to try the case. During the trial, defendant did not object to the unsworn status of the jury until after the jury rendered its guilty verdict. Defendant raised the issue for the first time in her posttrial motion requesting a new trial. The circuit court denied the posttrial motion, recognizing that the error occurred but concluding that the error was harmless.

¶ 2 The appellate court agreed that the circuit court's failure to administer a trial oath to the jury was "clear error." 2020 IL App (1st) 170675, ¶¶ 42, 44, 445 Ill.Dec. 731, 168 N.E.3d 195. The appellate court, however, concluded that defendant forfeited this error by failing to object at the trial. The appellate court declined to address the error under the plain error rule because, the appellate court concluded, defendant was not prejudiced by the error. Id. ¶¶ 45-46.

¶ 3 We are now asked to determine, under plain error principles, whether defendant's trial before an unsworn jury requires automatic reversal without a showing of prejudice to defendant. For the following reasons, we conclude that a reversal of defendant's conviction is required under these circumstances, regardless of the strength of the evidence or any showing of prejudice to defendant. Therefore, we reverse the appellate and circuit courts’ judgments and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 The State charged defendant with one count of domestic battery, alleging that defendant caused bodily harm to a minor, S.M., in violation of section 12-3.2(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 ( 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2014)). Specifically, the State alleged that on or about June 22, 2014, defendant struck the minor several times with an object that left redness, swelling, and belt buckle-shaped marks on the child's body.

¶ 6 The parties and prospective jurors appeared in court for defendant's jury trial on October 24, 2016. Before jury selection, the circuit court typically administers a voir dire oath to the prospective jurors.¹ In the present case, the record does not establish whether the circuit court administered a voir dire oath to prospective jurors at any time prior to or during jury selection.

¶ 7 During voir dire , the circuit court asked the prospective jurors whether they understood and accepted the Zehr principles: (1) that defendant is presumed innocent of the charges against her, (2) that the presumption of innocence is not overcome unless and until the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, (3) that the State carries the burden throughout the case of proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, (4) that defendant is not required to prove her innocence or present any evidence at all and may rely on the presumption of innocence, and (5) that defendant does not have to testify and that election not to testify cannot be held against her. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012); People v. Zehr , 103 Ill. 2d 472, 83 Ill.Dec. 128, 469 N.E.2d 1062 (1984).

¶ 8 The circuit court further asked each potential juror if he or she would follow the law as given by the court; if he or she would be fair to both sides; if he or she would decide the case without sympathy, bias, or prejudice to either side; and if he or she would wait for all the evidence, arguments, and instructions before reaching a decision. All the prospective jurors indicated that they would follow these instructions.

¶ 9 After the completion of voir dire and after the parties selected 12 jurors and 1 alternate juror, the circuit court asked the circuit court clerk, "Would you swear the Jury in?" The transcript of the trial proceeding does not include a verbatim record of the oath that the circuit court clerk administered to the jury. Instead, the transcript includes only the following notation: "(Jury sworn to answer questions.)." In addition, the circuit court judge later acknowledged that she did not hear the circuit court clerk swear in the jury. However, the parties stipulated that the clerk incorrectly administered the voir dire oath to the already-selected jurors as follows: "[D]o you solemnly swear or affirm you'll truthfully answer all questions asked concerning your qualifications as jurors in this case?" The parties were finished questioning the prospective jurors about their qualifications when the clerk administered this voir dire oath, and the parties agree that the circuit court never administered a trial oath² to the jury after the completion of jury selection.

¶ 10 During the trial, defendant never objected to the unsworn status of the jury. Instead, defendant raised an issue concerning the lack of a jury oath for the first time in her posttrial motion that she filed after the jurors had already found her guilty. In her motion, defendant requested a new trial because the jurors were never sworn to try the case. Defendant's posttrial motion included the affidavits of two assistant public defenders who did not represent defendant but were, nonetheless, in the courtroom and witnessed the jury's swearing. The two assistant public defenders testified in their affidavits that they witnessed the circuit court clerk administer the voir dire oath to the jury instead of a trial oath.

¶ 11 The circuit court denied defendant's posttrial motion. The trial judge took "full responsibility" for the error but ultimately concluded that a trial by an unsworn jury was not per se reversible error. Instead, the circuit court concluded, the defendant must show prejudice. The circuit court determined that defendant failed to show prejudice because, during voir dire , all potential jurors were admonished regarding the legal principles governing a criminal case and all potential jurors were asked if they could decide the case without prejudice or sympathy and wait for all the evidence, arguments, and instructions before so deciding.

¶ 12 In defendant's direct appeal from the conviction, a majority of the appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, concluding that defendant forfeited the error by failing to object at trial and concluding that the failure to swear the jury with a trial oath, under the facts of this case, did not constitute plain error under either prong of the plain error rule. 2020 IL App (1st) 170675, ¶¶ 42, 44-46, 445 Ill.Dec. 731, 168 N.E.3d 195.

¶ 13 In its analysis, the majority first held that it "need not resolve the effect under Illinois law of a forfeited claim of a trial by an unsworn jury because the jury here was not completely unsworn," even though the "jury was given the voir dire oath rather than the trial oath just before trial." Id. ¶ 43. The majority then agreed that swearing the jury with the wrong oath was "clear error" but concluded that the clear error was not plain error. Id. ¶¶ 44-46. The majority held that the error was not reviewable under the first prong of the plain error rule because the evidence was not closely balanced. Id. ¶ 44. The majority held that the error was not reviewable under the second prong of the plain error rule because the failure to properly swear the jury did not affect the fairness of the trial or the integrity of the judicial process. Id. ¶ 46. On this latter point, the majority explained:

"Here, the [circuit] court asked every potential juror during voir dire if he or she would decide this case without sympathy, bias, or prejudice to either side; if he or she would wait for all the evidence, arguments, and instructions before making up his or her mind; if he or she would follow the law as given by the court; and if he or she would be fair to both sides." Id.

Therefore, according to the majority, "those inquiries, and the [circuit] court's other instructions and admonishments, sufficiently addressed the purposes of the trial oath to conclude that the clear error did not affect the fairness of the trial or challenge the integrity of the judicial process." Id. The majority, therefore, concluded that "[g]iving the wrong oath was clear error but not plain error under either prong." Id.

¶ 14 Justice Connors dissented, disagreeing with her colleagues’ conclusion that the circuit court's admonishments, instructions, and inquiries were sufficient to cure the circuit court's failure to administer a trial oath to the jury. Id. ¶ 63 (Connors, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury and that the trial oath is designed to protect that fundamental right. Id. ¶ 67. Emphasizing the difference between the voir dire oath and the trial oath, the dissent concluded that "[a] jury is not a jury until it is sworn to the trial oath—not the voir dire oath." Id. ¶¶ 64-66. The dissent also concluded that "the failure to properly swear the jury—that is, administer the trial oath—is structural error" and that, because of the importance of the right involved, defendant's conviction by an unsworn jury requires automatic reversal regardless of the strength of the evidence or a showing of prejudice to the defendant. Id. ¶...