People v. Moore

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEECLIFTON JEROME MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 349584

Court of Appeals of Michigan

December 15, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Kent Circuit Court LC No. 05-009552-FC

Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Letica and Rick, JJ.

Per Curiam

Defendant LeeClifton Jerome Moore, appeals as of right the trial court's order continuing defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole following a resentencing hearing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama 567 U.S. 460; 132 S.Ct. 2455; 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Defendant's sentence stems from his 2006 jury trial conviction of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b) on the basis of first-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(2). We conclude for reasons discussed below that the trial court erred in its application and consideration of several Miller factors, and the Michigan Supreme Court's recent holding in People v. Taylor,___ Mich___;___ N.W.2d___ (2022) (Docket No. 154994); slip op at 11. Given the changes to the legal landscape in this area of the law Defendant's sentence must be vacated, the matter must be remanded, and the defendant must be resentenced.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant's conviction arises from the 2005 death of two-year-old AC. Defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of the offense, was in a romantic relationship with AC's mother. Defendant admitted to hitting AC with a belt and shaking AC. AC died as a result of the injuries. A jury found defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder, and the court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

Following the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190; 136 S.Ct. 718; 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the trial court was tasked with reviewing defendant's sentence. The prosecution requested that defendant be resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, asserting that none of the Miller factors weighed in favor of resentencing defendant to a term of years. Defendant argued that he should be resentenced to a term of years, explaining that he had matured while in prison and was now capable of controlling his anger. Following a one-day Miller hearing, the trial court again sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole.

In February 2020, this Court granted defendant's motion to remand for the trial court to determine whether defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the Miller hearing. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that defendant's counsel was not ineffective and denied defendant's request for a new Miller hearing. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. BURDEN OF PROOF

Defendant asserts that he is entitled to resentencing because the prosecution has the burden of proving that a juvenile offender is irreparably corrupt. Because the Michigan Supreme Court recently held that the prosecution has the burden to rebut the presumption that a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile offender is constitutionally disproportionate in People v. Taylor,___ Mich___;___ N.W.2d___(2022) (Docket No. 154994); slip op at 11, we agree that defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

In People v. Bennett, 335 Mich.App. 409, 413-414; 966 N.W.2d 768 (2021), this Court explained the process for resentencing a defendant who was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) as a juvenile:

Anticipating that the United States Supreme Court would give Miller retroactive effect, Michigan's Legislature designed a system for resentencing all prisoners serving life without parole who were under the age of 18 when they committed the offense. MCL 769.25a. In those cases, the resentencing court must select either life without parole or a term-of-years sentence. Prosecutors seeking imposition of a life-without-parole sentence are obligated to file a motion specifying the grounds for imposing that punishment. The resentencing court then must hold a hearing to consider the juvenile sentencing factors set forth in Miller and other relevant information, including the defendant's record while incarcerated. The court is additionally obligated to specify on the record the aggravating and mitigating circumstances considered by the court and the court's reasons supporting the sentence imposed. [Quotation marks and citations omitted.]

In Taylor,___ Mich. at___; slip op at 11, our Supreme Court held that "there is a rebuttable presumption against the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences in Michigan and that it is the prosecution's burden to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence at a Miller hearing." Taylor,___ Mich. at___; slip op at 11. The Court then addressed what exactly a prosecutor must prove at a Miller hearing, stating that a prosecutor seeking to have a juvenile offender sentenced to life imprisonment without parole has the burden of overcoming the presumption that life without parole is disproportionate. Id. at___; slip op at 16. The Court explained that "[i]n doing so, the prosecutor must prove facts and circumstances that rebut the presumption against LWOP by the well-known standard of clear and convincing evidence." Id. at___; slip op at 17.

Next, the trial court "must consider all the evidence before it and determine whether the presumption has been rebutted in order to impose LWOP." Id. at___; slip op at 17.

Because the trial court did not follow the appropriate framework outlined in Taylor concerning the burden of proof at a Miller hearing, defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

B. APPLICATION OF MILLER FACTORS

Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in its application of the Miller factors. We agree.

"This Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion." People v. Skinner, 502 Mich. 89, 131; 917 N.W.2d 292. The trial court's fact-finding is reviewed for clear error and questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 137 n 27.

In Skinner, our Supreme Court set forth the circumstances, as discussed in Miller, that a court should consider in deciding whether to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on a juvenile offender:

The following are the factors listed in Miller: (1) "his chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences"; (2) "the family and home environment that surrounds him-and from which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional"; (3) "the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him"; (4) whether "he might have been charged [with] and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth-for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys"; and (5) "the possibility of rehabilitation . . . ." [Skinner, 502 Mich. at 114-115, quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-478 (alteration in original).]

"It is undisputed that all of these factors are mitigating factors," and are factors "that 'counsel against irrevocably sentencing [juveniles] to a lifetime in prison.'" Skinner, 502 Mich. at 115, quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480. Moreover, "[a] judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

At a Miller hearing, the court must consider these factors and any other relevant criteria, "including the individual's record while incarcerated." MCL 769.25(6). When rendering its sentence, the court must explain the "aggravating and mitigating circumstances" that it considered and why it chose the sentence imposed. MCL 769.25(7). Our Supreme Court recently emphasized, "[w]e caution the trial courts to ensure that the Miller factors are not used as aggravators." Taylor,___ Mich. at___n 25; slip op at 20 n 25. "If a particular Miller factor does not militate against LWOP, for example, at most that factor will be considered neutral." Id. at___ n 25; slip op at 20 n 25, citing People v. Masalmani, 505 Mich. 1090, 1090 (2020) (McCormack, C.J., dissenting).

As Chief Justice McCormack has noted: "Abuse of discretion is a deferential standard. But even so, the trial court's sentencing decision must be a reasonable and principled outcome based on 'case-specific detailed factual circumstances.'" Masalmani, 505 Mich. at 1090 (McCormack, C.J., dissenting), quoting Skinner, 502 Mich. at 134. Importantly, "Miller requires that we start from the premise that every youthful offender possesses these characteristics." Taylor,___ Mich. at___; slip op at 4 (McCormack, C.J., concurring). Here, the trial court's treatment of the Miller factors shows that it treated these factors as aggravating rather than mitigating. "That is, the court did not consider them for what they are-circumstances and features common to juvenile offenders generally, consideration of which would lead to reasons not to impose the maximum sentence allowed by our federal constitution." Masalmani, 505 Mich. at 1090 (McCormack, C.J., dissenting); see also Taylor,___ Mich. at n___ 25; slip op at 20 n 25. Therefore, for the reasons explained below, we concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in applying the Miller factors.

1. CHRONOLOGICAL AGE AND ITS HALLMARK FEATURES

On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erroneously considered defendant's age as an aggravating factor. The court found the fact that defendant committed the offense only days before his eighteenth birthday...