People v. N. River Ins. Co.

53 Cal.App.5th 559

267 Cal.Rptr.3d 722

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.The NORTH RIVER INSURANCE CO., et al., Defendants and Appellants.

B295923

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

Filed August 17, 2020

Jefferson T. Stamp, San Jose, for Defendants and Appellants The North River Insurance Company and Bad Boys Bail Bonds.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Adrian G. Gragas, Assistant County Counsel and Michael J. Gordon, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

PERLUSS, P. J.

Penal Code section 1306, subdivision (a),¹ requires "the court which has declared the forfeiture" of the bail bond to enter summary judgment against the bondsman if the defendant has failed to appear within the statutory appearance period. The North River Insurance Company and its bail agent Bad Boys Bail Bonds (collectively the North River parties) moved in superior court to set aside the summary judgment against them as void because it was entered by a different superior court judge from the one who had declared the forfeiture. The court denied the motion. We affirm.²

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 14, 2016 the North River parties posted a $20,000 bail bond for the release of Raheim Watts. On May 26, 2016 Watts failed to appear at his scheduled arraignment, and the court (Judge Suzette Clover) ordered bail forfeited.

On June 3, 2016 the clerk of the court mailed the North River parties the notice of forfeiture, advising them their contractual obligation to pay the bond would become absolute on the 186th day following the date of the mailing of the notice unless forfeiture was set aside and the bond reinstated.

On December 30, 2016 the court (Judge Dorothy Kim) granted the North River parties’ request for an extension of the appearance period to June 28, 2017.

On August 4, 2017, after Watts failed to appear during the extended appearance period, the court (Judge Kim) entered summary judgment on the forfeited bond in accordance with the terms of the bond. Notice was mailed to the North River parties.

On September 25, 2018 the North River parties timely filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment, arguing, as a matter of statutory interpretation and due process, summary judgment must be entered by the same bench officer who declared the forfeiture unless he or she is unavailable. Because there was no indication Judge Clover was unavailable when Judge Kim entered summary judgment, the North River parties argued, summary judgment was void.

The court (Judge Maame Frimpong) denied the motion. The North River parties filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. Governing Law and Standard of Review

A bail bond " ‘ "is a contract between the surety and the government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the defendant's appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the bond." ’ " ( People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc . (2016) 2 Cal.5th 35, 42, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 79, 384 P.3d 1226.) When a person for whom a bail bond has been posted and against whom a criminal complaint has been filed fails without sufficient excuse to appear as required, the court must declare the bail forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a); see County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty & Surety , Inc . (2018) 5 Cal.5th 309, 312, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 459, 419 P.3d 934 ; People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co . (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 657, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020.)

Once forfeiture is declared, the surety that posted the bond has a period of 180 days (plus five days for mailing) after the clerk of the court mails a notice of forfeiture to move to vacate forfeiture and exonerate the bond. (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1); People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co ., supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 657, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020.) Upon a showing of good cause, the court may extend this appearance period by no more than 180 days from the date the trial court orders the extension. (§ 1305.4; People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 44, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 79, 384 P.3d 1226.) If the forfeiture has not been set aside by the end of the appearance period, inclusive of any extension, "the court which has declared the forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment against each bondsman named in the bond in the amount for which the bondsman is bound." ( § 1306, subd. (a).)

The superior court's order granting or denying a motion to vacate the forfeiture of a bail bond is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion. ( People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 797, 804, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 432.) However, when, as here, the facts are undisputed and the matter raised is a question of statutory construction, our review is de novo.

( County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 314, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 459, 419 P.3d 934 ; The North River Ins. Co. , at p. 804, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 432.) We must strictly construe the applicable forfeiture statutes in favor of the surety to avoid the "harsh results" of forfeiture. ( People v. International Fidelity Ins. Co. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 345, 354, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 69 ; The North River Ins. Co. , at p. 804, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 432.)

2. The Court Did Not Err in Denying the North River Parties’ Motion To Set Aside the Summary Judgment

"Our primary task ‘in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature's intent, giving effect to the law's purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ " ( California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 64, 416 P.3d 53.) " ‘ "We interpret relevant terms in light of their ordinary meaning, while also taking account of any related provisions and the overall structure of the statutory scheme to determine what interpretation best advances the Legislature's underlying purpose.’ " [Citation.] ‘If we find the statutory language ambiguous or subject to more than one interpretation, we may look to extrinsic aids, including legislative history or purpose, to inform our views.’ " ( In re A.N. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 343, 351-352, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 132, 462 P.3d 974 ; accord, Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 293, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 107, 386 P.3d 773.)

Section 1306, subdivision (a), requires "the court which has declared the forfeiture" to enter the summary judgment against the surety when the appearance time has expired and no motion to vacate forfeiture is pending. The statute refers to "court," not "judge" or "bench officer." A court is a single entity consisting of multiple judges or bench officers. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4 ["[i]n each county there is a superior court of one or more judges"]; People v. Konow (2004) 32 Cal.4th 995, 1018, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 301, 88 P.3d 36 [" ‘jurisdiction is vested by the Constitution in the court and not in any particular judge or department thereof; and that whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same court’ "]; B.F. v. Superior Court (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 621, 628, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 730 [same]; see also In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 428, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 526 [" ‘[t]he Superior Court of Los Angeles County, though comprised of a number of judges, is a single court’ "].)

The North River parties contend the term "court" is ambiguous, insisting "court" and "judge" are often used interchangeably. (See Mabee v. Nurseryland Garden Centers, Inc. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 420, 424, 152 Cal.Rptr. 31 ["[a] legion of cases without comment equate ‘court’ with the ‘judge’ in interpreting attorney fee clauses"], fn. omitted; Newby v. Bacon (1922) 58 Cal.App. 337, 339, 208 P. 1005 ["the [L] egislature often uses the words ‘court’ and ‘judge’ without discrimination, and such words will be construed as synonymous whenever it is necessary to carry into effect the obvious intent of the [L]egislature"].) This ambiguity in section 1306, subdivision (a), they continue, is resolved by standard principles of statutory construction requiring every word of the statute be given meaning. (See People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 230, 397 P.3d 936 [we "must ‘accord[ ] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose’ and have warned that ‘[a] construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided’ "].) Had the Legislature intended to permit any judge to enter summary judgment, they argue, it would have used the indefinite article "a" to modify court rather than the definitive article "the." (See Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1034, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 609 ["[t]he Legislature's use of the definitive article ‘the’ is significant because the definitive article ‘the’ refers to a specific person or thing"].) Likewise, they assert, if any judge could enter summary judgment, the phrase "the court that declared the forfeiture" would be surplusage.

The North River parties’ argument misses the mark. Section 1306 plainly requires the court that declared the forfeiture to enter the summary judgment. However, that language does not state, and does not mean, the same judge of the court must enter both orders. As discussed, it is the court that has jurisdiction of the matter, not a particular judge. (See People v. Osslo (1958) 50 Cal.2d 75, 104, 323 P.2d 397 ["[a]n individual judge (as distinguished from a court) is not empowered to retain jurisdiction of a cause[;] [t]he cause is before the court, not the individual judge of that court"]; People v. Madrigal (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 791, 796, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 498 [same].)

The legislative history of section 1306, subdivision (a), reinforces our conclusion. Originally enacted in 1872, section 1306 was rewritten by the Legislature in 1927, at a time when state courts included justice and municipal courts, to provide, "When any bond is forfeited, if the court which has declared...