People v. Nagle

2024 NY Slip Op 00329

The People of the State of New York, respondent, v. Ryan Nagle, appellant.

No. 2021-08239, Ind. No. 41/20

Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

January 24, 2024

Mary Zugibe Raleigh, Pine Bush, NY, for appellant.

David M. Hoovler, District Attorney, Goshen, NY (Robert H Middlemiss of counsel), for respondent.

FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P., JOSEPH J. MALTESE, WILLIAM G FORD, LAURENCE L. LOVE, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Hyun Chin Kim, J.), rendered October 18, 2021, as amended October 19, 2021, convicting him of sexual abuse in the first degree, forcible touching, and criminal trespass in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment, as amended, is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Orange County for a new trial.

The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the jury verdict finding him guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree and forcible touching and acquitting him of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree was repugnant, as the defendant failed to raise this contention before the formal discharge of the jury at trial (see People v Alfaro, 66 N.Y.2d 985, 987; People v Moise, 220 A.D.3d 811; People v Williams, 211 A.D.3d 1055, 1057-1058). In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit. "'A verdict is repugnant only if, when viewed in light of the elements of each crime as charged to the jury, it is legally impossible-under all conceivable circumstances-for the jury to have convicted the defendant on one count but not the other'" (People v Williams, 211 A.D.3d at 1058, quoting People v Alman, 185 A.D.3d 714, 716). Here, the acquittal on the charge of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree was not repugnant to the convictions of sexual abuse in the first degree and forcible touching, as unlawful imprisonment in the second degree contains essential elements that sexual abuse in the first degree and forcible touching do not (see People v Williams, 211 A.D.3d at 1058; People v Shoshi, 177 A.D.3d 779, 779-780).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410; People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633).

However under the circumstances of this case, the County Court erred in denying the defendant any access to the complainant's mental health records (see generally People v Baranek, 287 A.D.2d 74). Further, while the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the trial court's discretion (see Martin v Alabama 84 Truck Rental, 47 N.Y.2d 721; People v Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241; People v Roussopoulos, 261 A.D.2d 559), here, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in sustaining the People's objections to the cross-examination of the...