People v. Owens

2018 IL App (4th) 170506

127 N.E.3d 648

431 Ill.Dec. 115

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Randell L. OWENS, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-17-0506

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Filed October 23, 2018

Randell Owens, of Springfield, appellant pro se.

John C. Milhiser, State’s Attorney, of Springfield (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Kathy Shepard, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In April 2016, the State charged defendant, Randell L. Owens, with failure to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Act). 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2016). In April 2017, defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss, arguing that the double jeopardy clause and the due process clause barred this prosecution. The trial court denied his motion.

¶ 2 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the Act subjects him to double jeopardy, (2) collateral estoppel bars the State's prosecution for his failure to register as a sex offender, and (3) the Act creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. We disagree and affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A. The Underlying Conviction

¶ 5 In September 1999, defendant was convicted of criminal sexual assault. 720 ILCS 5/12-13 (West 1998). This conviction required defendant to register as a sex offender. 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1), 3(a) (West 2016).

¶ 6 B. Defendant's Alleged Failure to Register

¶ 7 In April 2016, the State charged defendant with failure to register as a sex offender under the Act. 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2016). In April 2017, defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss, arguing that the Act violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV. Likewise, defendant argued that the Act violated the due process clause and the double jeopardy clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 10.

¶ 8 In June 2017, the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. Later that month, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(f), defendant filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(f) (eff. July 1, 2017) ("The defendant may appeal to the Appellate Court the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal proceeding on grounds of former jeopardy.").

¶ 9 This appeal followed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the Act subjects him to double jeopardy, (2) collateral estoppel bars the State's prosecution for his failure to register as a sex offender, and (3) the Act creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. We address these issues in turn.

¶ 12 A. Double Jeopardy

¶ 13 Defendant argues that the Act, which enacts a punishment for failing to register as a sex offender, subjects him to double jeopardy. We disagree, concluding that defendant's prosecution for failure to register as a sex offender arises from a different criminal act.

¶ 14 1. The Applicable Law

¶ 15 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment, provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const., amend. V. The Illinois Constitution also provides that "[n]o person shall be * * * twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10. The double jeopardy clause of our state constitution is to be construed in the same manner as the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution. People v. Staple , 2016 IL App (4th) 160061, ¶ 13, 409 Ill.Dec. 896, 68 N.E.3d 1004.

¶ 16 The double jeopardy clause proscribes (1) a second prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense following a conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Ohio v. Johnson , 467 U.S. 493, 498, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984). Registering as a sex offender is not a punishment. People v. Cardona , 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 24, 369 Ill.Dec. 117, 986 N.E.2d 66 ; People v. McArthur , 2018 IL App (1st) 150626, ¶¶ 54-55, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d –––– ; see Joanna Wells, Community Notification Provisions for Sex Offenders: Not Punishment for Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Purposes , 22 S. Ill. U. L.J. 243, 266-67 (1997).

¶ 17 The application of the double jeopardy clause often turns on whether there were multiple acts or a single act. People v. Sienkiewicz , 208 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 280 Ill.Dec. 516, 802 N.E.2d 767, 771 (2003). The definition of an "act" is "any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense." People v. King , 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844-45 (1977). "[I]f the prosecutions are predicated on different criminal acts, then the prohibition against double jeopardy is not violated." Sienkiewicz , 208 Ill. 2d at 6, 280 Ill.Dec. 516, 802 N.E.2d 767.

¶ 18 However, if there was only a single physical act, then a court must apply the same elements test to determine whether multiple prosecutions violate the double jeopardy clause. Id. Under the same elements test, if each crime requires proof of a fact not required by the other, then multiple prosecutions do not violate the double jeopardy clause. Id. When neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses are at issue, the trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for double jeopardy grounds is a question of law reviewed de novo . People v. Ventsias , 2014 IL App (3d) 130275, ¶ 10, 383 Ill.Dec. 74, 13 N.E.3d 825.

¶ 19 The Criminal Code of 1961 (Code), as it existed in 1999, defined criminal sexual assault as follows:

"The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she:

(1) commits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force; or

(2) commits an act of sexual penetration and the accused knew that the victim was unable to understand the nature of the act or was unable to give knowing consent; or

(3) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was a family member; or

(4) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was at least 13 years of age but under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was 17 years of age or over and held a position of trust, authority or supervision in relation to the victim." 720 ILCS 5/12-13 (West 1998).

¶ 20 The definition of a sex offender includes an individual convicted of criminal sexual assault. 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1)(a), (B)(1) (West 2016). The Act mandates that "[a] sex offender * * * shall * * * register in person and provide accurate information as required by the Department of State Police." Id. § 3(a). The Act further states that "[a]ny person who is required to register under this Article who violates any of the provisions of this Article * * * is guilty of a * * * felony." Id. § 10(a).

¶ 21 2. This Case

¶ 22 Defendant's double jeopardy argument fails because the State is prosecuting him for a different criminal act. Sienkiewicz , 208 Ill. 2d at 6, 280 Ill.Dec. 516, 802 N.E.2d 767. The State originally charged defendant with criminal sexual assault of which he was convicted. That charge required proof that defendant committed sexual penetration under the circumstances set forth in the Code. 720 ILCS 5/12-13 (West 1998). Defendant's conviction required him to register as a sex offender. 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1), 3(a) (West 2016). The State is now prosecuting defendant for his alleged failure to register. Id. § 10(a). Obviously, failing to register is a completely different act than sexual penetration . Compare 720 ILCS 5/12-13 (West 1998), with 730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2016). Likewise, being a sex offender is a status rather than an act. See People v. Coats , 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 27, 423 Ill.Dec. 13, 104 N.E.3d 1102 ("A felon's status is not an ‘act’ but, rather, a state of being. To clarify, a defendant's status is not factored into * * * whether a defendant's conduct consists of one act or several acts."). Accordingly, defendant's double jeopardy argument is without merit. Sienkiewicz , 208 Ill. 2d at 6, 280 Ill.Dec. 516, 802 N.E.2d 767.

¶ 23 B. Collateral Estoppel

¶ 24 Defendant further argues that collateral estoppel bars a prosecution for failure to register as a sex offender. We disagree.

¶ 25 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, in the criminal context, is a component of the double jeopardy clause. People v. Fort , 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 34, 417 Ill.Dec. 566, 88 N.E.3d 718. This doctrine holds that an issue raised and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction may not be relitigated in a later action between the same parties in the same or a different cause of action. People v. Krstic , 292 Ill. App. 3d 720, 723, 226 Ill.Dec. 909, 686 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1997). Collateral estoppel applies when (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one present in the suit in question, (2) there was a judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. People v. Brown , 2017 IL App (1st) 160025, ¶ 27, 417 Ill.Dec. 390, 88 N.E.3d 31. The applicability of the collateral estoppel doctrine is a question of law reviewed de novo . People v. Christian , 2016 IL App (1st) 140030, ¶ 80, 401 Ill.Dec. 675, 50 N.E.3d 1157.

¶ 26 Simply put, the issue decided in defendant's conviction for criminal sexual assault is not identical to the issue of whether he failed to register. In defendant's prosecution for criminal sexual assault, the State was required to prove that defendant committed sexual penetration under the circumstances set forth in the Code. 720 ILCS 5/12-13 (West 1998). In the present case, the State will be required to prove that defendant, as a sex offender, failed to register as required under the Act. 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1), 3(a) (West 2016). The State need not and...