People v. Owens

59 N.E.3d 187

405 Ill.Dec. 894

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Andre M. OWENS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 4–14–0090.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Aug. 2, 2016.

Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and Daaron V. Kimmel, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, Springfield, for appellant.

Julia Rietz, State's Attorney, Urbana (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice POPE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In July 2013, a jury convicted defendant, Andre M. Owens, of driving while his driver's license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6–303(a) (West 2012)). In October 2013, the trial court, finding statutory aggravating factors, sentenced defendant to 18 months' imprisonment for a Class 4 felony (625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–2), (d–3) (West 2012)).

¶ 2 Defendant appeals, arguing his felony conviction must be reduced to a Class A misdemeanor because the State failed to prove the reason for his license revocation beyond a reasonable doubt at trial in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). In the alternative, defendant argues the State failed to establish the reason his license was revoked at sentencing. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On July 11, 2012, the State charged defendant by information with driving while his driver's license was revoked, a Class 4 felony (625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–3) (West 2012)). The information alleged on June 11, 2012, defendant “drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Champaign County, Illinois, at a time when his license to drive was revoked due to a prior violation of section 11–501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar out-of-state statute, and defendant has previously committed three or more violations of [section 6–303(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6–303(a) (West 2012)) ].”

¶ 5 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine, arguing, pursuant to Apprendi, to increase the offense of driving with a revoked or suspended license from a Class A misdemeanor (see 625 ILCS 5/6–303(a) (West 2012)) to a Class 4 felony (see 625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–3) (West 2012)), the State would have to prove to the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, not only did defendant drive while his license was revoked or suspended, but also the revocation or suspension was for a violation of section 11–501, i.e., for driving under the influence (DUI). See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

¶ 6 During the July 25, 2013, hearing on defendant's motion in limine, defendant reiterated the arguments found in his motion. For its part, the State cited a number of cases and argued case law showed felony enhancement was an issue for sentencing and not an element to be proved to the jury. After hearing arguments, the trial court disagreed with defendant's interpretation of the case law and denied his motion.

¶ 7 During the trial, Dustin Morgan, a Rantoul police officer, testified he was parked at a four-way intersection in Champaign County on June 11, 2012, around 6:55 p.m., when a vehicle drove by, traveling 31 miles per hour. The speed limit in that area was 20 miles per hour. Morgan followed the car into a driveway. As the driver, whom Morgan identified in court as defendant, was getting out of the car, Morgan rolled down his window and told him, “ ‘[H]ey, I need to talk to you for a minute.’ ” Defendant held up his hand and said, “[‘J]ust a minute.[’]” Defendant then shut the car door and sprinted away from the car. Morgan eventually caught up to defendant and asked him, “[ ‘W]hat did you run for?[’]” Defendant replied, “ ‘because I don't have a license.’ ”

¶ 8 Defendant then identified himself to Morgan as Andre Owens. Morgan had the dispatcher send him a photograph of defendant to confirm his identity. Because the database indicated defendant's driver's license had been revoked, Morgan issued him a citation for driving with a revoked license.

¶ 9 Morgan identified People's exhibit No. 1 as an abstract of defendant's driver's license. He testified, according to this exhibit, the revocation of defendant's driver's license “was in effect on June 11th, 2012.” Over defense counsel's foundational objection, the trial court admitted into evidence People's exhibit No. 1, which was a redacted version of defendant's driving abstract stating the license “REVOCATION WAS IN EFFECT ON 06–11–2012.” The State then rested.

¶ 10 At that point, defendant moved for a directed verdict. Defendant argued, according to his “complete driving abstract” (which he attached to the motion in limine ), the Secretary of State revoked his driver's license on December 28, 2002, for driving without a valid license or permit, and later, on August 17, 2007, it purported to again revoke defendant's driver's license, this time “for a DUI offense,” even though the Secretary never had reinstated the license in the interim. Defendant, citing People v. Heritsch, 2012 IL App (2d) 090719, ¶ 9, 361 Ill.Dec. 820, 972 N.E.2d 305, maintained the August 17, 2007, revocation “ultimately didn't have any effect, because [defendant's] license was already revoked.”

¶ 11 Defendant also argued, under Apprendi, a revocation for DUI was a fact, other than a previous conviction, that “increased the maximum possible penalty faced by [defendant],” and thus, the revocation for DUI had to be proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, to a jury, which defendant argued the State had not done. According to defendant, “the evidence the People have put on * * * has not in any way indicated what the basis for [the] revocation is, and so we would move that the court enter a directed verdict of not guilty on behalf of [defendant].”

¶ 12 In response, the State reiterated its argument the reason for the prior revocation, DUI, was something that should be proved in the sentencing hearing, not during the jury trial. Specifically, the State argued, “these are issues that were discussed during the motions in limine this morning such that the People do not have to prove the underlying DUI conviction. Such things are, these are felony enhancements for sentencing. All we have to prove is that he was driving on the public highways of Champaign County at a time when his license was revoked.”

¶ 13 In denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the trial court found Heritsch distinguishable and was unconvinced a “status” or an “administrative decision” had to be proved to a jury under Apprendi.

¶ 14 Defendant rested without presenting any evidence.

¶ 15 Thereafter, the jury convicted defendant of driving while his license was revoked.

¶ 16 During the October 2013 sentencing hearing, the State requested a six-year sentence. Defendant's attorney asked for a one-year sentence. The presentence investigation report (PSI) showed an extensive criminal history starting in 1997, which included repeated instances of DUI, driving with a suspended license, and driving with a revoked license. The PSI also reflected multiple felony convictions for drugs and battery. Defendant presented a statement in allocution and asked for “just one more chance.”

¶ 17 In sentencing defendant to 18 months' imprisonment, the trial court stated the following:

“I've heard the statement in allocution, considered the arguments and evidence in this case, and I note from the [PSI] report and addendum thereto that there will be an extensive record of violent offenses, drug offenses, and traffic offenses of the defendant. This being the seventh driving under suspension and revocation case of the defendant, I have already ruled that it is a Class 4 felony.”

¶ 18 On October 17, 2013, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial. In the latter motion, defendant argued, under Apprendi, the State was required to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that the basis for the revocation of his license was a violation of Section 11–501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.” Because the State had failed to present this “essential piece of evidence” in the jury trial, defendant was entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial.

¶ 19 Following a January 31, 2014, hearing, the trial court denied defendant's posttrial motions.

¶ 20 Thereafter, defendant timely filed his notice of appeal. On August 24, 2015, defendant's appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), which this court denied. (We note defendant has since served his sentence and period of mandatory supervised release.)

¶ 21 This appeal followed.

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 On appeal, defendant argues the State failed to (1) prove the reason for his license revocation beyond a reasonable doubt at trial in violation of Apprendi and, in the alternative, (2) sufficiently prove the reason for the revocation at sentencing.

¶ 24 A. Effect of Prior Revocation

¶ 25 As an initial matter, we note defendant previously argued the 2007 revocation of his license was ineffective because his license was originally revoked in December 2002 and has never been reinstated. Defendant maintained because his license had never been reinstated, the Secretary of State's subsequent suspensions or revocations had no effect. Because defendant included this issue in the factual background of his brief, we address the issue in the context of defendant's larger appeal. In support of his position in the trial court, defendant cited the Second District's decision in Heritsch, 2012 IL App (2d) 090719, ¶ 9, 361 Ill.Dec. 820, 972 N.E.2d 305 (finding the Secretary's 2001 formal administrative sanction of revocation had...