People v. Padilla, B257408

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARIO SALVADOR PADILLA, Defendant and Appellant.

B257408

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR

November 20, 2015

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TA051184)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Paul A. Bacigalupo, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Paul M. Roadarmel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In 1999, appellant Mario Salvador Padilla was convicted of a murder he committed when sixteen years old, and was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The trial court denied his petition under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) (section 1170(d)(2)), which permits specified defendants sentenced to LWOP terms for murders they committed as juveniles to be resentenced.¹ He contends the trial court, in ruling that he was ineligible for resentencing, improperly examined the record of conviction to determine that the murder he committed involved torture, as defined in section 206. Alternatively, he contends the evidence in the record of conviction did not support of a finding of torture. We conclude that the record of conviction contains insufficient evidence to support the determination that the murder involved torture, and thus reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Conviction

In July 1999, a jury convicted appellant of the murder of his mother Gina Castillo (§ 187, subd. (a)) and conspiracy to murder his stepfather Pedro Castillo (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)).² The jury found true special-circumstance allegations that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery and while lying in wait (§ 190.2, subds. (15), (17)(A)), but deadlocked with respect to another special circumstance alleged in connection with the murder, namely, that it was intentional and involved torture (§ 190.2, subd. (18)). A mistrial was declared with respect to the torture special-circumstance allegation, which was dismissed.

The trial court imposed an LWOP term on the murder conviction (§ 190.2, subd. (a)), and imposed and stayed a term of 25 years to life on the conviction for conspiracy to commit murder (§ 654). In an unpublished opinion (People v. Padilla (June 1, 2001, B135651)), this court determined there was insufficient evidence to support the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding, but otherwise affirmed appellant's judgment of conviction.

B. Section 1170(d)(2)

In December 2010, Senate Bill No. 9 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) was introduced in the Legislature to authorize the resentencing of defendants sentenced as juveniles to an LWOP term. As enacted in September 2012, the bill amended section 1170 by adding subdivision (d)(2), which creates a postconviction resentencing proceeding for certain defendants serving LWOP terms.

Section 1170(d)(2) states in clause (i) of subparagraph (A) that defendants serving an LWOP term for an offense they committed when under 18 years of age may submit a petition for recall and resentencing after having served 15 years of their sentence. Clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) provides that "[n]otwithstanding clause (i)," a defendant is ineligible for recall and resentencing when the offense for which the LWOP term was imposed was one in which "the defendant tortured, as described in [s]ection 206, his or her victim," or the victim was a specified public officer or official.³

The petition must contain enumerated statements, including a description ofthe defendant's "remorse and work towards rehabilitation." (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(B).)⁴ "If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements in the petition are true, the court shall hold a hearing to consider whether to recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and to resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence." (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(E).) At the hearing, the court is authorized to resentence the defendant upon a consideration of factors relating to the defendant's circumstances before the offense, the nature of the offense, and his or her conduct after it. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(F).)⁵

If the court declines to recall the defendant's sentence, the defendant may submit a second petition after having served 20 years of his or her sentence. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(H).) If that petition is unsuccessful, the defendant may submit a third and final petition after having served 24 years of the sentence. (Ibid.)

C. Underlying Petition

On August 1, 2013, appellant filed a petition for recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(2). In November 2013, the trial court found that the statements in the petition were true, and set a hearing to determine whether to recall appellant's sentence and resentence him. Prior to the hearing, the prosecution filed an opposition to the petition and a request for relief from the court's findings regarding the petition, contending that appellant was ineligible for resentencing because his offense involved torture. After granting the request forrelief from the findings, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant's offense involved torture, as defined in section 206, and ruled that he was ineligible for resentencing under section 1170(d)(2). This appeal followed.⁶

DISCUSSION

Appellant challenges the trial court's ruling on several grounds. He maintains that the trial court misapplied section 1170(d)(2), contending that the criteria set forth in clause (A)(ii) of the statute rendering a defendant ineligible for relief must be established at trial. He further maintains that even if section 1170(d)(2) permits courts to look beyond the jury's verdicts and findings to determine whether an offense involved torture, the trial court was not authorized to make an independent finding regarding a disputed fact on the preponderance of the evidence. In the alternative, appellant contends the trial court erred in finding that his offense involved torture, as defined in section 206. As explained below, we conclude the trial court was authorized to examine the record of conviction in order to make an independent determination regarding appellant's eligibility for relief. It is unnecessary to address appellant's remaining contentions regarding the procedure governing that determination, as we conclude there is insufficient evidence to support the court's finding of torture.

A. Application of Section 1170(d)(2)

Appellants' contentions regarding the application of section 1170(d)(2)present issues of statutory interpretation subject to review de novo. (People v. Christman (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 810, 816.) "'"In construing a statute, our task is to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose for the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] If there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, its plain meaning controls; we presume the Legislature meant what it said. [Citation.] . . ." [Citations.] We examine the statutory language in the context in which it appears, and adopt the construction that best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes. [Citations.]' In addition, we may examine the statute's legislative history. [Citation.]" (People v. Whitmer (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 906, 917 (Whitmer), quoting People v. Palmer (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1149.)

As elaborated below, we find guidance regarding appellant's contentions from decisions interpreting a similar statutory scheme. In November 2012, shortly after the Legislature enacted section 1170(d)(2), the voters approved the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, which amended the "Three Strikes" law, and created a postconviction proceeding for defendants serving an indeterminate life sentence imposed pursuant to the Three Strikes law for a crime that is not a serious or violent felony. (People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 168.) That proceeding, as set forth in section 1170.126, closely resembles the proceeding established by section 1170(d)(2). The three strikes resentencing statute obliges a defendant seeking relief to submit a petition containing certain statements (§ 1170.126, subd. (d)), states eligibility criteria for resentencing (§ 1170.126, subd. (e)), and affords the court discretion to grant the petition unless, after consideration of pertinent factors, it concludes that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety (§ 1170.126, subds. (e), (f)). Although the two resentencing statutes were enacted by different legislative bodies, they presentsimilar issues of interpretation in view of their analogous provisions.⁷

1. No Requirement That Ineligibility For Resentencing Be Established By Findings At Trial

We begin with appellant's contention that a defendant's ineligibility for resentencing under clause (A)(ii) of section 1170(d)(2) must be established on the basis of special-circumstance findings rendered at the defendant's trial. Clause (A)(ii) provides in pertinent part: "[T]his paragraph shall not apply to defendants sentenced to life without parole for an offense where the defendant was tortured, as described in [s]ection 206, his...