People v. Paige

51 Cal.App.5th 194

264 Cal.Rptr.3d 855

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Fritz PAIGE, Defendant and Appellant.

A157494

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Filed June 25, 2020

Robert H. Derham, San Anselmo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share and Alisha M. Carlile, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

STEWART, J.

Penal Code section 1170.95, which became effective in January 2019, was adopted by the Legislature as part of the changes in the application of the felony murder and natural and probable consequences theories of murder liability contained in Senate Bill No. 1437. It entitles certain defendants to petition the superior court for resentencing. Defendant Fritz Paige filed such a petition, which the trial court denied. The court based its denial on the fact that Paige, although he was charged with felony murder, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter via a plea agreement. Paige argues, based on principles of statutory interpretation and his equal protection rights under the federal and California constitutions, that the court erred. We follow the other appellate courts regarding these issues and affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2010, the Alameda County District Attorney charged Paige with murder. The prosecution contended that Paige, although not the actual killer, aided and abetted an armed robbery in Oakland, California during which a man was shot and killed.¹

The record, which largely consists of Paige's own statements to police, indicates that in December 2005, Paige suggested to a person he referred to as his "partner," a long-time friend who needed money, that some day they should rob the attendees of a local dice game in which Paige regularly played and thousands of dollars were being wagered. The partner called Paige on the morning of the incident and complained about his need for money. Paige told him to find two "youngsters" to act as accomplices, obtain a couple of handguns, and conduct an armed robbery of the game's attendees, who would include Paige, that evening at an Oakland park. Paige told him the attendees would be unarmed and have about $10,000 with them, and that his partner should not shoot anyone.

At about 6:15 p.m. that evening, Paige's partner and two accomplices arrived at the dice game armed with two handguns and a rifle and announced their hold-up. Paige was attending the game. Another man turned a flashlight on Paige's partner, who shot the man, resulting in his death. Paige ran from the scene. Subsequently, he met with his partner and received a share of the stolen money.

After being held to answer on the murder charge, Paige entered into a negotiated disposition of his case in 2010, which led to his conviction for voluntary manslaughter and other charges and a 20-year prison sentence. This sentence consisted of an 11-year term for manslaughter, a one-year term for an arming enhancement allegation, and two consecutive four-year terms for other charges unrelated to the incident.² The court ordered that he receive certain custody and conduct credits, and imposed various fine and fees.

In January 2019, Paige filed what he titled a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on Penal Code section 1170.95,³ which became effective on January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Paige requested that his manslaughter conviction be vacated and that he be resentenced under section 1170.95. He contended that the information filed against him enabled the prosecution to try him under a theory of felony murder, that he accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial, and that he could not now be convicted of murder under the recent changes to the Penal Code contained in Senate Bill No. 1437, of which section 1170.95 was a part.

The court appointed Paige counsel and directed the district attorney's office to file a response. The district attorney's office subsequently argued that: (1) based on documents it submitted, including Paige's statements to police, Paige could still be convicted of murder under the new laws as a major participant who acted with reckless disregard for human life, and (2) Paige was ineligible for relief because section 1170.95 applies only to defendants convicted of murder, and Paige was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.

Paige filed further briefs. Among other things, he argued that section 1170.95 applied to defendants who, like him, were charged with murder but were convicted of voluntary manslaughter under a plea agreement.

The trial court heard arguments at a hearing in which it also considered two petitions by other persons that raised the same issue—whether a defendant charged with murder but convicted of voluntary manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement could petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. After hearing argument, the court ruled that such defendants could not petition under section 1170.95 and, thus, that Paige had not made a prima facie case that he was eligible for relief. The court did not decide whether, as the prosecution also argued, Paige had been a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life and thus could be convicted of first degree murder under present law, which would have also rendered him ineligible for relief under section 1170.95.

Paige filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I.The Superior Court Correctly Interpreted Section 1170.95.

A. Legal Standards

Where a question of statutory interpretation based on undisputed facts is presented, we conduct an independent review of the statute in question. ( People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1166, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 251, 354 P.3d 148.) "In doing so, ‘ "our fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ " ’ " ( Ibid . ) "We begin by examining the words of the statute, affording them ‘their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context’ [citation], for ‘ "if the statutory language is not ambiguous, then ... the plain meaning of the language governs." ’ " ( People v. Colbert (2019) 6 Cal.5th 596, 603, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 665, 433 P.3d 536.) "We ... must, if possible without doing violence to the language and spirit of the law, interpret it so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions." ( People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 14, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 980 P.2d 829.)

We turn to extrinsic aids to assist in our interpretation "when the statute's language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation." ( Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 155 P.3d 284.) Extrinsic interpretative aids include the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. ( People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1369, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 324 P.3d 245.) " ‘ "Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute." ’ " ( Ibid . )

B. Analysis

The relevant part of section 1170.95 provides:

"(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply:

"(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

"(2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder.

"(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." ( § 1170.95, subd. (a), italics added.) The part of subdivision (a) that we have italicized limits relief under the statute to "person[s] convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory," and the nature of the relief afforded is the right to petition "to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated." (Italics added.)

The People assert, and our research confirms, that our appellate courts have repeatedly rejected the argument Paige makes here regarding his voluntary manslaughter conviction. As the Fourth Appellate District observed earlier this year in People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 706 ( Turner ), courts, "[r]elying on the clear language of [ section 1170.95 ], ... have concluded that section 1170.95 is unambiguous and does not provide relief to persons convicted of manslaughter. ( People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 176] [Second District] ( Cervantes ) [‘The plain language of the statute is explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions.’]; accord, People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 993 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 205] [Fourth District] [ Flores ].) For similar reasons, other courts have rejected claims that the statute extends relief to those convicted of attempted murder. ( [People v. ] Lopez [2019] 38 Cal.App.5th [1087,] 1104 [252 Cal.Rptr.3d 33] [Second District], rev. granted[, People v. Lopez (2019) ––– Cal. ––––, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 638, 451 P.3d 777 ]; [People v. ] Munoz [2019] 39 Cal.App.5th [738,] 754 [252 Cal.Rptr.3d 456], rev. granted[, People v. Munoz (Jan. 2, 2019) ––– Cal.App.5th ––––, ––– Cal.Rptr.3d ––––, 2018 WL 4927249, 2019 Cal. LEXIS 108 ]; People v. Medrano (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1015-1016 [256 Cal.Rptr.3d 200] [Second District] ; People v. Larios (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 956,...