People v. Palma-Amaya

80 Misc.3d 897

196 N.Y.S.3d 662

The PEOPLE of the State of New York,

v.Eduardo PALMA-AMAYA, Defendant.

Docket No. CR-006043-23KN

Criminal Court, City of New York, Kings County.

Decided on September 8, 2023

For the People: Kings County District Attorney's Office by Maxine Weisenfeld, Esq.

For Defendant: The Legal Aid Society by Ting-Yu Wang, Esq.

Dale Fong-Frederick, J.

The defendant, Eduardo Palma-Amaya, is charged with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol ( VTL §§ 1192[1] ; 1192[2]; and 1192[3]), Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle ( VTL § 511[1][a] ), and Unlicensed Operator ( VTL § 509[1] ). The defendant moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL § 30.30 and, alternatively, he moves for a Dunaway hearing, Huntley hearing, Sandoval hearing, and a pre-trial voluntariness hearing for noticed statements, as well as the suppression of any illegally obtained evidence. The People consent to Dunaway , Huntley , and Sandoval hearings and oppose the motion in all other respects.

For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion is denied in all respects except to the extent that a Huntley/Dunaway hearing is ordered.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 18, 2023, at approximately 4:13 a.m., the defendant is alleged to have operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The police assert that they observed the defendant sleeping in the driver's seat of his vehicle with the ignition running. The defendant allegedly exhibited red watery eyes, a strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and had an unsteady gait upon exiting the vehicle. The police also allegedly observed a half empty can of Modelo beer in the vehicle console's cup holder. The defendant allegedly admitted to consuming two or three Modelo beers prior to driving the vehicle and he also submitted to a chemical breath test, which revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .112 percent.

The defendant was arraigned on February 19, 2023, when the accusatory instrument was filed. The People electronically filed a certificate of compliance (COC) and statement of readiness (SOR) in the New York State Unified Court's Electronic Document Delivery System (EDDS) on May 22, 2023, at 6:25 p.m. and a supplemental COC on August 10, 2023. The defendant filed the instant motion on July 21, 2023.

SPEEDY TRIAL

The defendant argues that the COC and SOR were electronically filed in EDDS on May 22, 2023, after business hours (ostensibly 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.); it was not actually received by the clerk for filing until the next day, May 23, 2023, during business hours; and the speedy trial time expired on May 22, 2023, at the close of business. The People counter that the filing of a COC and SOR is not limited to business hours; the filing occurred before midnight on the ninetieth day; their declaration of readiness is valid; and the motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds should be denied.

When the current version of the speedy trial statute was first enacted in 1970, electronic filing did not exist. Therefore, filings normally occurred during business hours. The practice of paper filing has resulted in a widely accepted misconception that the People were required to file their statement of readiness during business hours on the ninetieth day or face dismissal. However, that interpretation contradicts the plain language of CPL § 30.30(1), the General Construction Law, and legal precedent.

1. Filing on a Statutorily Defined Calendar Day

In ( In re Norton, 34 A.D. 79, 53 N.Y.S. 1093 [2d Dept.], app dismissed , 158 N.Y. 130, 52 N.E. 723 [1899] ), the Second Department addressed the validity of filing documents with a clerk after business hours in accordance with the controlling statutory language that allowed for filing on the entirety of the calendar day. In Norton the petitioner brought a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, the Queens County Clerk, to accept his certificate of nomination as a candidate to the New York State Senate for filing at the time it was personally handed to the clerk, which was after business hours and outside of the clerk's office. According to county law, the respondent's business hours ran from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. between the days of September 31st and April 1st. However, ELN § 59 allowed the petitioner to file his certificate of nomination with the respondent on the entire calendar day and not only during business hours. The petitioner presented his certificate of nomination to the respondent in person after the close of business on October 14th. The respondent argued that by filing after business hours, the Queens County Clerk was prevented from lawfully receiving and filing the certificate of nomination. In rejecting the respondent's argument, the Second Department held:

"As we have seen, the election law gave to the petitioner the whole day of the 14th of October in which to file his certificate. This contemplated a day of 24 hours. Such are the terms of the statutory construction law. Laws 1894, c. 447. It is quite apparent, therefore, that, if the petitioner must have filed the certificate before the clerk's office closed upon this last day, his right to a full day of 24 hours is abridged. There ought to be no abridgement of his clear legal right in this respect, unless it be worked by clear legal authority" ( Norton , at 81-82, 53 N.Y.S. 1093 ).

GCN § 25 -a provides, in pertinent part:

"When any period of time ... before which an act is authorized or required to be done, ends on a Saturday, Sunday, or a public holiday, such act may be done on the next succeeding business day and if the period ends at a specified hour, such act may be done at or before the same hour of such next succeeding business day ..."

"The General Construction Law ... should be read into every statute subsequently enacted, unless the wording of such later statute plainly expresses a contrary intent" ( O'Keeffe v. Dugan , 185 A.D. 53, 172 N.Y.S. 558 [2d Dept. 1918], affd 225 N.Y. 667, 122 N.E. 887 [1919] ; People v. Powell , 179 Misc.2d 1047, 1048, 690 N.Y.S.2d 826 [App. Term 2d Dept. 1999] ). GCN § 19 provides that "[a] calendar day includes the time from midnight to midnight. Sunday or any day of the week specifically mentioned means a calendar day." Affirming the midnight-to-midnight principle of GCN § 19, the Court of Appeals held: "In the absence of an express limitation, the law does not take notice of a fraction of a day." ( Matter of Garelick v. Rosen , 274 N.Y. 64, 68, 8 N.E.2d 279 [1937] ).

CPL § 30.30(1) also expressly references calendar days and not business hours.¹ The description of whole days used in CPL § 30.30(1) is indistinguishable from the language of ELN § 59 that was addressed by the Norton court. Thus, in the same way, to arbitrarily limit the People's ability to announce ready to the hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. is to unlawfully abridge their statutory right to a full 24-hour day to fractions of the day ( Norton , supra ; Garelick, supra ). Notably, CPL § 30.30 has been amended numerous times since the advent of electronic filing, and none of the amendments have restricted the People's filings to the business hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

2. When Filing Requires Recording in Official Court Records to be Valid

The Norton court also reasoned that filings need only occur in the clerk's office during business hours in circumstances in which the filing would affect third parties:

"[L]eaving a judgment roll with the clerk after the closing of the office did not constitute the same a valid judgment as of the time of delivery, but that it became operative upon the following business morning, when the clerk opened the office. It is, however, to be observed that judgments are required to be docketed in books kept for that purpose, and cannot become effective until received at the clerk's office where such books are kept. In cases of this class, the docketing of judgments, recording of mortgages, and other similar acts, are required, not alone for the protection of the parties whose interest is to have them recorded or docketed, but it also affects or may affect the rights of third parties, as the act of record determines their status, and the necessary steps to insure a lien are required by positive law" ( Norton , at 81, 53 N.Y.S. 1093 ).

The People's obligation is to properly announce ready, and to be actually ready for trial when they announce it ( People v. Kendzia , 64 N.Y.2d 331, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 476 N.E.2d 287 [1985] ). Properly announcing ready can be effectuated by either a declaration in open court or by a notice sent to the defendant and the court clerk, to be placed in the original court file ( id. , at 337, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 476 N.E.2d 287 ). It is the communication of readiness to the defendant and the court that satisfies the first prong of Kendzia . The second prong of Kendzia is for the People to be actually ready for trial. This means that the People "have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried" ( People v. England , 84 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 613 N.Y.S.2d 854, 636 N.E.2d 1387 [1994] ). The court's inability to try the case when the announcement is made has no bearing on the validity of the People's readiness ( id. ). The communication of readiness to the court and the defendant has no legal significance for anyone outside of the immediate criminal proceeding. The communication denotes that the prosecution is ready to move to the next phase of the criminal proceeding. Moreover, a statement of readiness is not recorded in the same manner as an entry of judgment, which is recorded in a judgment roll (see Norton , at 81, 53 N.Y.S. 1093 ).

3. Discussion

Norton has remained undisturbed for over one hundred and twenty years. Norton stands for the proposition that if a filing does not have an impact on third parties and the filing can be effectuated on the proper recipient on the calendar day permitted by law, it is deemed properly filed at the time of filing,...