People v. Paul

318 Cal.Rptr.3d 142

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Jeremiah PAUL, Defendant and Appellant.

B320488

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5.

Filed February 14, 2024

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Reversed and remanded, with directions. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA485897)

Howard R. Price, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MOOR, J.

Following the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a firearm pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, Jeremiah Paul pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction (Pen. Code, § 29900, subd. (a)(1)). Paul argues that the trial court should have excluded evidence of the firearm because officers discovered it only after they obtained his parole status by unlawfully detaining him.

We reverse the trial court’s judgment, vacate the court’s order denying Paul’s motion to suppress evidence, and remand.

FACTS

Officer Kumlander's Testimony and Evidence Obtained through a Body-Worn Camera

At a hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, Los Angeles Police Department Officer Charles Kumlander testified that on March 7, 2020, at around 9:00 p.m., he and his partner Officer Helmkamp were patrolling a residential neighborhood. A Toyota Prius drew his attention because it was parked with the lights on and appeared to be occupied. Officer Kumlander drove the patrol car alongside the Prius and stopped. Officer Helmkamp, who was in the passenger seat, then illuminated the Prius with his flashlight. There was a male in the vehicle (later identified as Paul) who moved lower in his seat when the officer shined the flashlight. Officer Kumlander observed that Paul appeared to be "conceal[ing] himself from [the officers’] view." The officer also observed that Paul was male and had dreadlocks. Officer Kumlander patrolled the area regularly and knew that a parolee lived across the street from where the Prius was parked.

Officer Kumlander backed up the patrol car and parked it in the middle of the street with the headlights on. He then approached the driver’s side door of the Prius to engage Paul in conversation. Officer Kumlander illuminated the driver’s side with his flashlight. Officer Helmkamp simultaneously approached the Prius on the passenger side and illuminated that side of the vehicle with his flashlight. The Prius’s driver’s side window was rolled up, but the door was partially open. Officer Kumlander, who was standing two to three feet from the door, opened it further and spoke with Paul.

"KUMLANDER: How ya doin,’ Man?

"DEFENDANT: What’s up?

"KUMLANDER: How ya doin’?

"DEFENDANT: I’m alright, and you?

"KUMLANDER: Good.

"DEFENDANT: I’m alright.

"KUMLANDER: Alright, no, I’m just sayin’ you live right here?

"DEFENDANT: Yeah.

"KUMLANDER: Where at?

"DEFENDANT: Right here.

"KUMLANDER: That one?

"DEFENDANT: Yeah.

"KUMLANDER: Okay.

"DEFENDANT: I think so.[¹]

"KUMLANDER: Any probation or parole?

"DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

"KUMLANDER: What? What’s that?

"DEFENDANT: Parole."

Officer Kumlander confirmed Paul’s active parole status and then conducted a search of the Prius. The officers discovered and seized a firearm located inside the Prius.

Officer Kumlander testified that he parked the patrol car in a way that permitted Paul to drive the Prius away. There was a driveway behind the Prius and the patrol car was parked a full length behind it. The headlights of the patrol car illuminated the road directly in front of the patrol car, and were not aimed at the Prius. Officer Kumlander testified that he routinely asks people he contacts whether they are on parole or probation.

Paul's Testimony

Paul testified that he parked his Prius about a minute before the officers approached him. Paul had turned off the Prius’s engine, but the lights remain illuminated for a few minutes after the engine is turned off, so the lights were still on. He was on the phone with a family member who had just called. The officers pulled up beside the Prius in their patrol car. Paul did not slump down. He did not recall shielding his eyes, but he testified that he may have done so in response to the officers shining a flashlight on him. Paul did not open the door of the Prius. The officers approached on both sides of the car, so he did not want to make any sudden moves. If he had opened the door it would have hit one of the officers, who was standing right next to the Prius. The Prius’s driver’s side window was rolled up and the officer was very close—"like inches away"—when he began to address Paul through the closed window. It seemed to Paul that there was a problem, so he raised his hands to shoulder level. Paul testified, "I don’t want any problems. I don’t want to, like, you know … get shot or nothing …. [I]t’s night-time. There are two officers on the side of the car. You know, they just got out the car for really no reason. So I’m just going to, you know, show I’m not trying to have problems. I’m going to raise my hands up." Paul testified that he was on active parole at the time of the stop. Paul understood that if he was asked about his parole status he had to answer truthfully, and he did.

Trial Court's Ruling

Following the suppression hearing, the trial court issued a detailed written ruling denying Paul’s motion to suppress. At the outset, the court acknowledged that "the legal analysis and ultimate resolution of the motion … present a very close issue." The court found that the following facts suggested the encounter was consensual up until the point where Paul disclosed his parole status: (1) the patrol car was not blocking the Prius and nothing prevented Paul from backing up and departing; (2) the officer’s flashlights provided the only illumination of the Prius; the police did not use spotlights or headlights; (3) the officers did not approach the Prius at a brisk pace; (4) the officers did not touch Paul before he stated that he was on parole; (5) two officers were present; and (6) Officer Kumlander’s tone when addressing Paul was casual and conversational before Paul stated he was on parole. The court found the evidence regarding who initially opened the door of the Prius inconclusive. The court found that if the officer opened the door it would be a show of authority, but if Paul opened the door it would indicate that he consented to the encounter. Either way, the court concluded that the issue of the door would be only one factor among many to consider. The court determined that Officer Kumlander’s inquiry regarding Paul’s parole status did not, in itself, rise to the level of a detention. Considering the circumstances in their totality, the court found that the initial encounter was consensual.

DISCUSSION

[1, 2] " ‘The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ " (People v. Greenwood (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 742, 746, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 60.) "A search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within one of the ‘specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ " (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674, 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019.) "An illegal detention that uncovers evidence is generally subject to the exclusionary rule, which dictates the unlawfully obtained evidence be suppressed as ‘ "fruit of the poisonous tree." ’ " (People v. Kasrawi (2021) 65 Cal. App.5th 751, 761, 280 Cal.Rptr.3d 214.)

[3–7] "It is ‘well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conduct- ed pursuant to consent.’ " (People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 674, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019.) " ‘[Consensual encounters’ [citation], … are those police-individual interactions which result in no restraint of an individual’s liberty whatsoever—i.e., no ‘seizure,’ however minimal—and which may properly be initiated by police officers even if they lack any ‘objective justification.’ " (Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784, 195 Cal.Rptr. 671, 670 P.2d 325.) The Supreme Court has held "that the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to approach individuals at random in airport lobbies and other public places to ask them questions … so long as a reasonable person would understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate." (Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 431, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389.) "The citizen participant in a consensual encounter may leave, refuse to answer questions or decline to act in the manner requested by the authorities." (People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 941, 237 Cal. Rptr. 840.) " ‘Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some manner restrains the individual’s liberty, does a seizure occur. [Citations.] "[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." [Citation.] This test assesses the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation.’ " (People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1106, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 849; see People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 247, 302 Cal.Rptr.3d 374, 521 P.3d 563 [declining to state a bright-line rule as to whether police use of a spotlight on a driver effects a detention, and reiterating that manner of use is one relevant consideration in evaluating the totality of the circumstances].)

[8] "The...