People v. Pena

36 N.Y.3d 978

163 N.E.3d 1

139 N.Y.S.3d 70 (Mem)

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant,

v.Robin PENA, Respondent.

No. 45

Court of Appeals of New York.

November 19, 2020

OPINION OF THE COURT

Order insofar as appealed from reversed, defendant's motion to suppress denied and case remitted to Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, for further proceedings on the accusatory instrument. The courts below erred as a matter of law in granting defendant's suppression motion.

MEMORANDUM (concurring).

The order of the Appellate Term, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, defendant's motion to suppress denied, and the case remitted to Criminal Court for further proceedings on the accusatory instrument.

A police officer stopped defendant's car because of a non-functioning center brake light. Defendant, who exhibited signs of intoxication, was given—and failed—a field sobriety test. Defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[1] ) and two counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2], [3] ).

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, asserting that the officer lacked probable cause to justify the seizure because, defendant argued, "operat[ing] a vehicle that has a non-illuminated middle brake light" is not a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. At the suppression hearing, relying on the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014), the People argued that the officer's belief that defendant was violating the law was "a reasonable mistake in this situation," rendering the stop permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The Judicial Hearing Officer determined that there was no ambiguity in the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and concluded that it was not "objectively reasonable for the officer in this case to mistakenly believe that a non-functioning middle brake light is a violation of the vehicle and traffic law." The suppression court adopted the Judicial Hearing Officer's findings of fact and legal conclusions in full and granted defendant's motion.

On appeal, the People raised only one substantive issue: "whether the officer's action in stopping defendant's car because of a defective middle brake light was an objectively reasonable mistake of law" (appellant's brief at 11 in People v. Pena, 61 Misc.3d 134[A], 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 51499[U], 2018 WL 5584501 [App. Term, 1st Dept. 2018] ). The Appellate Term affirmed, concluding that the officer's interpretation was "not an objectively reasonable mistake of law" because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(40)(b) is unambiguous, and a defective middle brake light does not violate the statute ( Pena, 61 Misc.3d 134(A), 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 51499[U], *1). A Judge of this Court granted the People leave to appeal ( 33 N.Y.3d 1034, 102 N.Y.S.3d 526, 126 N.E.3d 176 [2019] ).

The sole issue on appeal is whether the officer's belief that defendant violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by operating a vehicle with a non-functioning center stop light was objectively reasonable (see People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 136, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 30 N.E.3d 880 [2015] ["the relevant question before us is ... whether (the officer's) belief that a traffic violation had occurred was objectively reasonable"]; see also Heien, 574 U.S. at 59, 61, 135 S.Ct. 530 ). The "ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness" ( Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted] ). As the Supreme Court explained in Heien, "[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection’ " ( 574 U.S. at 60–61, 135 S.Ct. 530, quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 [1949] ). Accordingly, even assuming that a stop is premised upon a mistake of law, the stop may nonetheless be lawful where the officer's purported mistake was objectively reasonable ( id. at 61, 135 S.Ct. 530 ; People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 136, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 30 N.E.3d 880 [2015] ).

We conclude that the officer's interpretation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was objectively reasonable. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(40)(b) mandates that motor vehicles manufactured after a certain date be "equipped with at least two stop lamps, one on each side, each of which shall display a red to amber light visible at least five hundred feet from the rear of the vehicle when the brake of such vehicle is applied." Vehicle and Traffic Law § 376(1)(a) prohibits, in relevant part, (1) operating a vehicle "during the period from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise, unless such vehicle is equipped with lamps of a type approved by the commissioner which are lighted and in good working condition"; and (2) operating a vehicle at any time "unless such vehicle is equipped with signaling devices and reflectors of a type approved by the commissioner which are in good working condition." Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(19), in turn, prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle on highways or streets if the vehicle "is defectively equipped and lighted." Taken together, these provisions could reasonably be read to require that all lamps and signaling devices be in good working condition, and that all equipment and lighting be non-defective, regardless of whether a vehicle is actually required to be equipped with those lamps, signaling devices, equipment, or lights. Even assuming the officer was in fact mistaken on the law, it was nevertheless objectively reasonable to conclude that defendant's non-functioning center brake light violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law.^* Because any error of law by the officer was reasonable, there was probable cause justifying the stop (see Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d at 140, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 30 N.E.3d 880 ; Heien, 574 U.S. at 68, 135 S.Ct. 530 ; see also People v. Hinshaw, 35 N.Y.3d 427, 430-431, 132 N.Y.S.3d 90, 156 N.E.3d 812 [2020] ).

FEINMAN, J. (concurring).

The Vehicle and Traffic Law required the center stop lamp on defendant's 2003 Dodge Caravan to be functioning. Therefore, as defendant's center stop lamp was not functioning, the officer, having probable cause to believe that the driver was committing a traffic violation, made no mistake of law in stopping his vehicle.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(19) makes it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle on any public highway unless the motor vehicle is "equipped and lighted" as provided by sections 375 and 376, and it prohibits the operation on a public highway of a motor vehicle "which is not so equipped and lighted or which is defectively equipped and lighted." Vehicle and Traffic Law § 376(1)(b) specifically and unambiguously authorizes the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to "promulgate rules and regulations with respect to lamps, reflectors and signaling devices, their number[,] type, design, construction, location, attachment and use on vehicles being driven, operated or parked on any public highway or street in this state." The legislature set parameters for this delegated authority by providing that, in promulgating such rules and regulations, the Commissioner "shall be guided" by the requirements of rules and regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Transportation. Section 376(3), in turn, mandates that "[a]ll lights, signals and reflectors shall be of a type and design approved by the commissioner" of motor vehicles. Finally, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 376–a indicates that the police are authorized to take action and a complaint may be issued, based on a violation of section 375 or 376 "relating to required equipment" (see id. § 376–a [1], [3]-[4] ).

In its statutory delegation of authority to the Commissioner to promulgate regulations in accordance with national safety standards, the Vehicle and Traffic Law thus provides the basis for the enforcement of the Commissioner's regulations concerning the lighting equipment specifically enumerated in the statute, namely, lamps, reflectors, and signaling devices. The legislature established the policy and gave the Commissioner this extraordinary authority so that New York traffic laws concerning lamps, reflectors, and signaling devices could readily conform to and remain consistent with the federal requirements (see Letter from State of New York Department of Motor Vehicles, Bill Jacket, L 1971, ch 620 at 5; Department of Transportation Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1971, ch 620 at 7 [stating that the bill will allow conformity with national standards "without having to go through the legislative procedure each time the continually-changing Federal regulations are changed"]; Letter from New York State Thruway Authority, Bill Jacket, L 1971, ch 620 at 8 ["(T)his assignment was given to the Commissioner, rather than the Legislature, to permit immediate conformance with Federal requirements, thereby ensuring enforcement"]; see also L 1977, ch 592 [providing the Commissioner the same authority with respect to both commercial and non-commercial vehicles]; Sponsor's Mem at 2–3, Bill Jacket, L 1977, ch 592 [recognizing that "(v)ehicles of the same size, regardless of their use, constitute the same hazard on the highway and should be lit in the same manner" and stating that the bill thus "permits flexibility to conform lighting requirements for vehicles to Federal standards which are not in existence and which may be promulgated in the future"] ). The legislature, in creating this regulatory scheme, recognized that federal regulations and standards on this subject are preemptive of State law (see 49 USC § 30103 ; see also Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 35, 40–41, 677 N.Y.S.2d 17, 699 N.E.2d 376 [1998], abrogated by Geier v. American Honda Motor...