People v. Price

542 P.3d 268

2023 COA 96

2023 COA 96

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Chauncey Scott PRICE, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 20CA1960

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

Announced October 19, 2023

Douglas County District Court No. 17CR381, Honorable Theresa Slade, Judge

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Lauretta A. Martin Neff, Alternate Defense Counsel, Palisade, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE

¶ 1 In this criminal case, Chauncey Scott Price appeals his conviction for violating the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA) and fourteen other convictions related to human trafficking and forgery. As a matter of first impression, we consider and reject his argument that, as applied to him, the patronizing a prostituted child statute violates his right to equal protection. We conclude that the patronizing statute criminalizes different conduct than the pimping of a child statute and discern no equal protection violation in Price’s being convicted of both crimes. But we agree that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of "enterprise" based on McDonald v. People, 2021 CO 64, 494 P.3d 1123, which our supreme court decided following the trial. We therefore reverse the COCCA conviction. Because the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of an enterprise under the overruled definition, we remand for a new trial on the COCCA charge. We affirm the remaining convictions.

I. Background

¶ 2 The trial evidence established the following facts.

¶ 3 In 2016, Price met twenty-five-year-old C.M. through his girlfriend, J.B. C.M. had a history of prostitution and drug addiction.

Price, J.B., and C.M. discussed C.M. working as a prostitute to pay rent. Price and C.M. agreed that Price would drive C.M. to meet clients and provide C.M. with protection in exchange for 60% of C.M.’s earnings. C.M. advertised her services online and Price drove her to calls and supplied her with drugs. Sometimes, Price’s associate, Michael Hughes, also known as "Tiny" or "T", would drive C.M. to calls.

¶ 4 This arrangement worked for a time, and C.M. considered Price "like a best friend." However, their relationship soured when C.M.’s sister stole electronics from Price. Price blamed C.M., and he stopped honoring their pay arrangement because he expected her to repay him for the stolen property. C.M. told Price she would repay him so that he would not hurt her.

¶ 5 Eventually, C.M. told Price that she did not want to work as a prostitute anymore. Price physically assaulted her and knocked her unconscious. Their relationship ended.

¶ 6 In 2016, J.B. also introduced Price to twenty-year-old T.C., who worked as a prostitute. As with C.M., Price drove T.C. to client calls and provided protection in exchange for 50% of T.C.’s earnings.

¶ 7 In January 2017, T.C.’s friend, seventeen-year-old G.G., made a similar arrangement with Price. After working with Price for a couple of weeks, T.C. and G.G. traveled to Texas to prostitute themselves and work at strip clubs. After T.C. returned to Colorado, she asked Price to drive her to the airport to pick up G.G. Price then drove T.C. and G.G. to a hotel where T.C. attempted to set up prostitution calls for herself and G.G.

¶ 8 A few days later, Price drove T.C. to a call at a truck stop. G.G. accompanied them. The call turned out to be a police sting and all three were arrested.

¶ 9 At trial, T.C. testified that she could not recall whether Price had driven G.G. to any prostitution calls. G.G. initially stated during an investigative interview that she had never done any calls with Price. At trial, however, G.G. testified that Price had taken her on one call with T.C. and that she had given her earnings from the call to T.C., who then gave them to Price.

¶ 10 Investigators contacted C.M. in response to a tip about possible human trafficking. C.M. said she had seen Price and Hughes make counterfeit money in a hotel room. She described how they used chemicals and a microwave to "wash[ ] the face off the bills so they could reprint the new faces of hundreds and fifties onto $1 bills." She told the investigators that Price and Hughes shared the counterfeit money and spent it at various Target stores in Colorado. Sometimes Price and Hughes would spend the money themselves, or they would recruit other people to spend it while they waited in the parking lot. C.M. testified that Price had her pass counterfeit money at Target stores to repay him for the property her sister stole.

¶ 11 The testimony of several Target loss prevention employees established the following:

• On June 4, 2016, Price and Hughes each bought gift cards using counterfeit $50 bills. They drove away in a black car. The transaction and parking lot were captured on surveillance video.

• On June 8, 2016, Hughes was arrested for trying to pass counterfeit money at a Target store. Price managed to buy gift cards using counterfeit $50 bills and drove away in a black car. The transaction and parking lot were captured on surveillance video.

• In November 2016, Price and Hughes bought a vacuum cleaner with two counterfeit $50 bills. The transaction was captured on surveillance video. Later that day, a Target loss prevention officer at a different store recognized Price and Hughes from prior suspicious activity. When Hughes tried to purchase gift cards with eight $100 bills, the officer and the head cashier intervened and stopped the transaction. The cashier returned the money to Hughes and Price, and Hughes left in a black car.

¶ 12 A jury convicted Price of one count of violating COCCA through a pattern of racketeering activity, human trafficking for sexual servitude (G.G.), human trafficking for sexual servitude (C.M.), pimping of a child (G.G.), patronizing a prostituted child (G.G.), pandering of a child (G.G.), two counts of pimping (C.M. and T.C.), three counts of forgery, possession of a forged instrument, possession of a forgery device, and theft. The court adjudicated him a habitual criminal and sentenced him to 304 years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC).

II. COCCA Violation

[1, 2] ¶ 13 Price challenges his COCCA conviction on two grounds. First, he contends that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the conviction. His contention is premised on the holding in McDonald, 2021 CO 64, 494 P.3d 1123, decided after the trial in this case. Under McDonald, to establish an "associated-in-fact enterprise," the prosecutor must prove an ongoing organization of associates who functioned as a continuing unit that existed separately from the pattern of racketeering conduct in which it engaged. Id. at ¶ 45. According to Price, the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence of such an organization. Second, Price contends that the trial court plainly erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on the meaning of an associated-in-fact enterprise as articulated in McDonald. Plain error must be obvious and substantial and so undermine the fundamental fairness of the proceedings as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. People v. Hagos, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14, 288 P.3d 116.

[3] ¶ 14 While recognizing that the trial court didn’t have the benefit of McDonald when instructing the jury, we agree that the court plainly erred. The error here was obvious at the time of appeal because intervening authority from a higher court overruled the prior precedent the trial court followed at the time of trial. See Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, ¶¶ 16–17, 390 P.3d 832 (noting the general rule that such errors are not obvious subject to limited exceptions like intervening authority from a higher court overruling prior precedent). And the error here was substantial and undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial, casting serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction, because there was a reasonable possibility that application of the prior precedent, which McDonald overruled by changing the entire framework required for a COCCA enterprise—a central element of Price’s conviction—contributed to his conviction. See id. at ¶¶ 15, 18; see also People v. Luna, 2020 COA 123M, ¶ 20, 474 P.3d 230 (finding substantial error in contradictory self-defense jury instructions where self-defense was central to the case).

¶ 15 Nevertheless, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict Price of violating COCCA under the previous definition of "enterprise" articulated in People v. James, 40 P.3d 36 (Colo. App. 2001), overruled by McDonald, 2021 CO 64, 494 P.3d 1123, and thus, the prosecutor may retry him on that charge. McDonald, ¶¶ 63–68. Therefore, we need not address his jury instruction argument.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

[4, 5] ¶ 16 We review the record de novo to determine whether the evidence before the jury was sufficient in quantity and quality to sustain a conviction. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63, 442 P.3d 379. Our review examines the relevant direct and circumstantial evidence as a whole to analyze whether the evidence is substantial and sufficient for a reasonable mind to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[6, 7] ¶ 17 Evidence sufficient for a criminal conviction means more than a modicum of relevant evidence—not mere guesses, speculation, or conjecture. People v. Sprouse, 983 P.2d 771, 778 (Colo. 1999). However, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference fairly drawn from the evidence. McCoy, ¶ 63; Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1292 (Colo. 2010).

¶ 18 As relevant here, section 18-17-104(3), C.R.S. 2023, makes it "unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to knowingly conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of...