People v. Quezada

2022 IL App (2d) 210076

221 N.E.3d 593

468 Ill.Dec. 765

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Rickey L. QUEZADA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-21-0076

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Filed June 27, 2022

James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Ann Fick, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Jamie L. Mosser, State's Attorney, of St. Charles (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Victoria E. Jozef, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Rickey L. Quezada, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County dismissing his successive postconviction petition at the second stage. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). He argues that his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to amend his pro se petition to address potential procedural bars to his claim that his sentence violated Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Because the trial court discussed procedural bars in addressing the amended petition and correctly found that our 2018 decision in this case (see People v. Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, 2018 WL 6132546 ) precluded defendant's claim, we hold that counsel was not unreasonable in failing to address potential procedural bars. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1998)) and sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment. This court affirmed on direct appeal both his conviction and sentence. See People v. Quezada , 335 Ill. App. 3d 233, 269 Ill.Dec. 318, 780 N.E.2d 790 (2002). In July 2003, defendant filed his initial postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) ( 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)), the denial of which we affirmed. See People v. Quezada , 361 Ill. App. 3d 1100 (2005) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ). On May 30, 2017, defendant moved for leave to file a successive postconviction petition ( 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016)). In his proposed petition, defendant, who was a juvenile when he committed the offense, contended that his 45-year prison sentence was a de facto life sentence that had been imposed without proper consideration of his youth and its attendant characteristics, as required by Miller . The trial court denied the motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, as defendant had not shown the required prejudice, and defendant appealed.

¶ 4 On appeal, we addressed whether defendant had shown prejudice justifying filing a successive postconviction petition. We noted that the case law had not settled whether a discretionary sentence (such as defendant received) might constitute a de facto life sentence and, thus, trigger Miller ’s protections. Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, ¶ 22. Nonetheless, recognizing that such an issue might "soon be forthcoming" and noting that leave to appeal had recently been granted in People v. Buffer , 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, 412 Ill.Dec. 490, 75 N.E.3d 470, we considered the sentence as if it were a de facto life sentence. Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, ¶¶ 22-23. We then addressed whether defendant's " ‘de facto ’ life sentence" violated Miller . Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, ¶ 23. In doing so, we noted that the sentencing hearing record showed that the trial court had considered "most of the factors" under Miller as identified in People v. Holman , 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46, 418 Ill.Dec. 889, 91 N.E.3d 849. See Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, ¶ 24. In that regard, we pointed out that defendant's age at the time of the offense "was the subject of repeated argument and evidence, and the court found that defendant's youthfulness constituted a non-statutory mitigating factor." Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, ¶ 24. We next observed that there was evidence concerning defendant's closely-knit family, including testimony from his grandfather, mother, and aunt. Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, ¶ 24. The trial court had also made findings concerning defendant's participation in the offense, noting that, although there had been peer pressure related to defendant's gang affiliation, he had primarily undertaken the murder alone. Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, ¶ 24. As for defendant's capacity to deal with police and prosecutors, the trial court was aware of his prior experience with the court system, including his prior delinquency, probation, and court appearances. Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, ¶ 24. We further noted that the court had heard evidence regarding defendant's prospects for rehabilitation and had made explicit findings. Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, ¶ 24. Lastly, we emphasized that, after considering all sentencing factors, "including factors attendant to youth," the court determined that a 45-year sentence was appropriate. Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, ¶ 24. Thus, we held that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of prejudice sufficient to justify a successive postconviction petition because, assuming that Miller applied, the trial court "sufficiently considered the requisite factors attendant to defendant's youth before imposing" the sentence. Quezada , 2018 IL App (2d) 170738-U, ¶ 25.

¶ 5 On July 2, 2020, defendant filed another motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020)). In the accompanying petition, defendant alleged, among other things, that his 45-year discretionary prison sentence constituted a de facto life sentence under People v. Buffer , 2019 IL 122327, 434 Ill.Dec. 691, 137 N.E.3d 763, thereby entitling him to a new sentencing hearing under Miller . The trial court did not explicitly grant leave to file a successive postconviction petition; instead, it appointed counsel and advanced the petition to the second stage. Counsel, in turn, filed an amended petition, in which he incorporated defendant's claim that his sentence was a de facto life sentence under Buffer and added an argument that a finding of incorrigibility was required before imposing such a sentence. Counsel also filed a certificate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017), asserting that he had (1) reviewed the pro se petition, (2) examined the record, including the transcripts of the trial and sentencing, and (3) consulted with defendant by mail and telephone to the extent necessary to adequately represent defendant's contentions of error.

¶ 6 The State moved to dismiss the amended petition, contending, in part, that the Miller claim was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel because this court had expressly rejected it in our 2018 decision. Alternatively, the State asserted that the trial court had made the findings related to defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics, as required by Miller . At the hearing on its motion to dismiss, the State contended, among other things, that the petition should not have advanced to the second stage because we had already decided the Miller claim.

¶ 7 In response to the State's motion to dismiss, postconviction counsel argued, in part, that this court's 2018 decision predated Buffer and other "new law about juveniles." Counsel added that this court's 2018 decision never reached the issue of whether, after considering the relevant factors related to defendant's youth, the sentencing court needed to find that defendant was incorrigible and incapable of rehabilitation before imposing a de facto life sentence.

¶ 8 In dismissing the petition, the trial court found that, based on this court's 2018 decision on appeal from the dismissal of defendant's first successive petition, defendant's claim under Miller was barred by both res judicata and collateral estoppel, notwithstanding that Buffer was decided after our decision. The court further found that the sentencing court had considered the relevant age-related factors required by Miller . Accordingly, because defendant failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, the court granted the motion to dismiss. Defendant, in turn, filed this timely appeal.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant contends that postconviction counsel failed to comply with Rule 651(c) in that he did not amend defendant's pro se petition to address potential procedural bars to defendant's claims. The State responds that we should affirm the dismissal because (1) defendant did not make a showing of cause and prejudice sufficient to justify a successive petition and (2) postconviction counsel substantially complied with Rule 651(c).

¶ 11 Under the Act, a defendant may collaterally attack a conviction or sentence by asserting that it resulted from a substantial denial of his constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020); People v. Tate , 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 8, 366 Ill.Dec. 741, 980 N.E.2d 1100. However, the Act contemplates filing only one postconviction petition, and successive petitions are disfavored. People v. Johnson , 2019 IL App (1st) 153204, ¶ 31, 440 Ill.Dec. 357, 153 N.E.3d 156. A defendant seeking to file a successive postconviction petition must first obtain leave of court. People v. Edwards , 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 24, 360 Ill.Dec. 784, 969 N.E.2d 829. To obtain such leave, the petition must state a colorable claim of actual innocence or establish cause and prejudice. Johnson , 2019 IL App (1st) 153204, ¶ 32, 440 Ill.Dec. 357, 153 N.E.3d 156. When a trial court grants a defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the petition is effectively advanced to the second stage of the proceedings. Johnson , 2019 IL App (1st) 153204, ¶ 32, 440 Ill.Dec. 357, 153 N.E.3d 156.

¶ 12 At the second stage, the trial court may appoint counsel for the defendant, and counsel may amend the petition. Johnson , 2019 IL App (1...