People v. Ramirez

2023 IL 128123

220 N.E.3d 1060

468 Ill.Dec. 281

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Andrew RAMIREZ, Appellant.

Docket No. 128123

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed May 18, 2023

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Douglas R. Hoff, Deputy Defender, and Matthew M. Daniels, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Katherine M. Doersch and Katherine Snitzer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Andrew Ramirez was convicted of possession of a defaced firearm ( 720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2018)). On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on the basis that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the serial number on the firearm was defaced. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the State was required to prove only that defendant knowingly possessed the defaced firearm and not that he knew the firearm was defaced. 2021 IL App (1st) 191392-U, ¶¶ 27-28, 2021 WL 5415150. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On May 10, 2018, at approximately 10:30 p.m., police executed a search warrant at a home located at 3234 South Komensky Avenue in Chicago. The police forcibly entered the residence after nobody answered. Once inside, officers saw defendant's mother at the bottom of the stairs and defendant descending from the second floor. Defendant was detained and subsequently allowed to return upstairs, where he retrieved his shoes from the foot of a single bed in one of the bedrooms.

¶ 4 After police searched the house, they recovered a 20-gauge Benelli shotgun, a Mossberg shotgun, a 9-millimeter handgun, and ammunition. The Benelli shotgun was recovered from under the mattress of the single bed in the room where defendant had retrieved his shoes. From the same bedroom, police recovered mail bearing defendant's name and the address of the home. At trial, Adolfus Bolanos, one of the officers who executed the warrant, testified that the serial number on the Benelli shotgun had been "scratched off."

¶ 5 Defendant was taken into custody, provided Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ), and made a statement. He told police that he bought the Benelli shotgun from a coworker for $100 and lunch.

¶ 6 The State proceeded to trial on a single count, charging defendant with possession of a 20-gauge Benelli shotgun whose serial number had been "changed, altered, removed or obliterated" in violation of section 24-5(b) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) ( 720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2018)). The Benelli shotgun recovered by police was not introduced at trial. The parties stipulated, however, that the serial number on the shotgun "had been changed, altered, removed, or obliterated." The State did not present any direct evidence that defendant knew that the shotgun's serial number was defaced. Defendant did not testify or call any witnesses.

¶ 7 In finding defendant guilty, the trial court stated:

"I do believe that the State's evidence proves conclusively and beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] possessed that weapon. The next question is whether he had to have possessed it knowing that it had *** a defaced serial number. And pursuant to People v. Lee , [2019 IL App (1st) 162563, 431 Ill.Dec. 476, 127 N.E.3d 1009 ], the State does not have to prove that. They only have to prove that he knowingly possessed the firearm and that the firearm had a defaced or obliterated serial number. There will be a finding of guilty."

¶ 8 The trial court subsequently denied defendant's posttrial motions and sentenced him to two years’ probation.

¶ 9 The appellate court affirmed the conviction and rejected defendant's contention that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the serial number on the firearm was defaced. 2021 IL App (1st) 191392-U, ¶¶ 27-28, 2021 WL 5415150. Based upon People v. Stanley , 397 Ill. App. 3d 598, 336 Ill.Dec. 831, 921 N.E.2d 445 (2009), and its progeny, the court concluded that the State was required to prove only that defendant knowingly possessed the defaced firearm and not that he knew that the firearm was defaced. 2021 IL App (1st) 191392-U, ¶ 21, 2021 WL 5415150. Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the State, the court concluded that a reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant constructively possessed the defaced firearm that was recovered by police. Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 10 We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Defendant contends that, to secure a conviction under section 24-5(b) of the Code, the State was required to prove that he knew the firearm was defaced. He asserts that his conviction must therefore be reversed because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the serial number on the Benelli shotgun was defaced.

¶ 13 In addressing defendant's sufficiency of the evidence argument, this court must analyze the underlying provision of the Code. Our primary objective when construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and give effect to that intent. People v. Molnar , 222 Ill. 2d 495, 518, 306 Ill.Dec. 116, 857 N.E.2d 209 (2006). The best evidence of legislative intent is the statutory language itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Woods , 193 Ill. 2d 483, 487, 250 Ill.Dec. 730, 739 N.E.2d 493 (2000). Statutes must be read as a whole, and all relevant parts should be considered. People v. Reed , 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393, 226 Ill.Dec. 801, 686 N.E.2d 584 (1997). This court may not depart from the language of the statute by interjecting exceptions, limitations, or conditions tending to contravene the purpose of the enactment. People v. Martinez , 184 Ill. 2d 547, 550, 235 Ill.Dec. 452, 705 N.E.2d 65 (1998). Our review of matters of statutory interpretation is de novo. Id.

¶ 14 Section 24-5 of the Code is titled "Defacing identification marks of firearms." 720 ILCS 5/24-5 (West 2018). Subsection (a) criminalizes the changing, altering, removing, or obliterating of the serial numbers placed on any firearm by the manufacturer or importer as a Class 2 felony. Id. § 24-5(a). The mental state applicable to subsection (a) is specified as "knowingly or intentionally." Id. Defendant was convicted of possession of a defaced firearm in violation of subsection (b), which provides: "A person who possesses any firearm upon which any such importer's or manufacturer's serial number has been changed, altered, removed or obliterated commits a Class 3 felony." Id. § 24-5(b).

¶ 15 This court has not previously addressed whether possession of a defaced firearm requires proof of a mens rea or whether the element(s) of section 24-5(b) include both possession and defacement. The parties agree that, in contrast to subsection (a), subsection (b), as written, contains no specific mens rea requirement. They further agree that section 24-5(b) does not constitute an absolute liability offense.

¶ 16 Defendant asserts that knowledge of the defacement is, and must be, an element of the offense. Otherwise, innocent conduct could be criminalized, and a person who is unaware that a firearm's identification marks have been defaced could be convicted of a Class 3 felony. The State, however, relying upon Stanley and cases that followed it, contends that knowledge of the firearm's defacement is not an element of the offense. Instead, the State argues that section 24-5(b) should be interpreted by this court as requiring proof of "(1) knowing possession of a firearm and (2) a defaced firearm."

¶ 17 In Stanley , the defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty of violating section 24-5(b) because there was no proof of his knowledge that the marks had been scratched off the shotgun that he possessed. Stanley , 397 Ill. App. 3d at 603, 336 Ill.Dec. 831, 921 N.E.2d 445. Alternatively, he argued that if the statute did not require proof of a mental state, thereby imposing absolute liability, it would be unconstitutional as tending to criminalize innocent conduct without a showing of a culpable mental state. Id. After recognizing that the statute made no reference to a mens rea requirement, the court examined the statutory guidelines in section 4-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 ( 720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2006) ), which provides the default rules for a culpable mental state. Stanley , 397 Ill. App. 3d at 605, 336 Ill.Dec. 831, 921 N.E.2d 445. Noting that the legislature can create absolute liability for a felony, but only if it clearly indicates its intent to do so, the appellate court recognized that such intent would not be inferred from the mere absence of a mens rea requirement in the statute. Id. at 605-07, 336 Ill.Dec. 831, 921 N.E.2d 445 (citing 720 ILCS 5/4-9 (West 2006) ). The court found that section 24-5(b) contained no such clear statement of intent. Id. at 607, 336 Ill.Dec. 831, 921 N.E.2d 445.

¶ 18 To avoid absolute liability, the Stanley court found that a mens rea must be inferred into section 24-5(b) and concluded that the provision required the defendant's knowing possession of the firearm. Id. The court ultimately held the knowledge requirement of the statute applied only to the possessory component of the offense. Id. at 608, 336 Ill.Dec. 831, 921 N.E.2d 445. In reaching this holding, the court stated:

"[W]e discern that the elements of this offense are properly the mens rea and the possession, that is, the State must prove the knowing possession of the defaced firearm

...