People v. Ramirez

1

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAIRO DARIO RAMIREZ, Defendant and Appellant.

F085380

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

August 24, 2023

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County (Super. Ct. No. 2066877). Carrie M. Stephens, Judge.

Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Ivan P. Marrs, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

THE COURT ^[*]

Defendant Jairo Dario Ramirez appeals from a December 5, 2022 order of the Stanislaus County Superior Court denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code^[1] section 1172.6. Citing the "doctrine of absurd consequences," he contends "section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) should be construed as barring the prosecution from using a defendant's manslaughter plea against him at the evidentiary hearing." We reject Ramirez's argument and affirm the order.

BACKGROUND

Ramirez and codefendant Timothy Fee were initially charged with the murder of David H. (§ 187, subd. (a)), which occurred during the perpetration of a robbery and/or kidnapping (§ 189, subd. (a)). The original information further alleged Ramirez (1) had been released on bail prior to a judgment becoming final on an earlier felony offense (§ 12022.1); and (2) served two prior separate prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). Subsequently, in an amended information, Ramirez was charged with voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a) [count I]) and robbery (§ 211 [count II]) and alleged to have been released on bail prior to a judgment becoming final on an earlier felony offense (§ 12022.1). He pled guilty to these counts and admitted the on-bail allegation. The trial court imposed 11 years (the upper term) on count I and one year (one-third the middle term) on count II plus two years for the on-bail enhancement.^[2]

On January 13, 2022, Ramirez filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95, which has since been renumbered section 1172.6. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) He marked the following checkboxes:

"1. A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against me that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [Citation.]

"2. I was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or I accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which I could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [Citation.]

"3. I could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. [Citation.]"

The parties agreed Ramirez's petition set forth a prima facie case for relief and the trial court issued an order to show cause.

An evidentiary hearing commenced December 1, 2022, and lasted two days. Among other things, the trial court admitted into evidence the transcript of Ramirez's change-of-plea hearing. The transcript recorded the following exchange:

"THE COURT: .... What's your plea . . . as charged in Count One of the first amended information, that on or about the 8th day of August, 2016, at and in the County of Stanislaus State of California, and prior to the filing of the information, you did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and without malice kill David H[.], a human being, upon a sudden quarrel and heat of passion? What's your plea to that charge?

"[RAMIREZ] Guilty."

Ultimately the court denied appellant's petition, finding "beyond a reasonable doubt [Ramirez] would still be convicted of murder based on the facts under current law." It relied-in part-on the change-of-plea hearing transcript:

"The charge alleged [Ramirez] willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and without malice killed David H[.] upon a sudden quarrel and heat of passion. [Ramirez] entered a guilty plea to this charge in a court of law before a superior court judge with counsel by his side. [Ramirez] essentially admitted to being the actual killer. When he was asked by the judicial officer who took his plea if he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty, he answered yes. [¶] So the admission is what the Court is considering ....It was [Ramirez]'s admission in court that he was guilty of manslaughter by being the actual killer in a sudden quarrel and heat of passion."^[3]

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Ramirez argues "the trial court erred by using [his] manslaughter plea against him at the section 1172.6 subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing." (Boldface &capitalization omitted.) He acknowledges "the prosecution would seemingly be allowed to use a defendant's manslaughter plea against him at the evidentiary hearing" "under a literal reading of the statute." Nevertheless, Ramirez contends:

"In enacting [Senate Bill No.] 775 [(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)], the Legislature decided to extend the benefits of section 1172.6 to those defendants who were induced to pled [sic] guilty to manslaughter in order to avoid being prosecuted for murder under a now-abrogated theory of murder liability. Once a prima facie case has been made and the trial court has issued an order to show cause, for a defendant's manslaughter plea to then be turned around and used against him at a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing would frustrate the Legislature's entire purpose of expanding section 1172.6 to include defendants who were induced into pleading guilty to manslaughter to avoid the potential of a now-invalid murder conviction. Therefore, to avoid an absurd consequence that the Legislature did not intend, [Ramirez]'s manslaughter plea should not have been used against him at the evidentiary hearing."

"The issue before us is, therefore, one of statutory interpretation. 'Questions of statutory interpretation . . . present questions of law, which we review de novo.' [Citation.]" (California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 250, 265.)

I. Section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95)

"Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017 2018 Reg. Sess.)] 'to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.'" (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959, quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) "Through the passage of Senate Bill [No.] 1437 the Legislature effectively eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder convictions, and reduced the scope of the felony-murder rule." (People v. Prado (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 480, 487.) "To effectuate these changes, the Legislature amended sections 188 and 189 ...." (Ibid.; see §§ 188, subd. (a)(3) ["Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime."]; 189, subd. (e) ["A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2."].) Senate Bill No. 1437 also "added [former] section 1170.95, which provides a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief." (People v. Lewis, supra, at p. 959.)

"In October 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 775 . . ., effective January 1, 2022....Senate Bill No. 775 amend[ed] subdivision (a) of [former] section 1170.95 to allow persons convicted of 'attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine' and manslaughter (in addition to those convicted of murder) to seek relief from their convictions ...." (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 544; see Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a) ["The Legislature finds and declares that this legislation . . . [¶] . . . [c]larifies that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder under the same theories."]; People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 978 [Sen. Bill No. 775 "expanded the scope of" Sen. Bill No. 1437's changes].)

"Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered [former] section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 with no change in text." (People v. Gonzalez (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 869, 871, fn. 1, citing Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10; accord, People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 715, fn. 3.)

A petitioner is entitled to relief under section 1172.6 if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the prosecution "proceed[ed] under a theory of felony murder,...