People v. Ramirez

Page 311

49 Cal.Rptr.2d 311

41 Cal.App.4th 1608, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 602,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 922

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Salvador Hernandez RAMIREZ, Defendant and Appellant.

No. D021646.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Jan. 26, 1996.

Review Denied April 18, 1996. ^*

[41 Cal.App.4th 1610] Sharon L. Rhodes, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Esteban Hernandez and Niki Cox Shaffer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

HUFFMAN, Associate Justice.

In Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 331, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416-2417, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, the Supreme Court set forth general standards for reviewing investigative decisions made by the police based on the totality of the circumstances, including information provided by an anonymous tip. Such a tip can support a lawful detention where the information provided is "sufficiently corroborated to furnish [the requisite] reasonable suspicion." (Ibid.) In this case we apply this standard to analyze the amount of corroboration required to make the tip sufficiently reliable to permit a reasonably trained police officer to act upon it in conducting an investigative detention.

Salvador Hernandez Ramirez appeals a judgment convicting him of possessing a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11378) following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (PEN.CODE, § 1538.5)¹. He contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him, and all evidence seized after the unlawful detention must be suppressed as the direct product of the detention. As we shall explain, we conclude the information provided by the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated under the totality of these circumstances to provide reasonable suspicion he was engaged in criminal activity. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 14, 1994, at 11:48 a.m., San Diego Police Officer Bret Righthouse responded to a radio dispatch to investigate narcotics activity at 1300 25th Street in Golden Hill Park. Officer Righthouse and his partner were informed an anonymous person had reported three Hispanic males in a two-door blue Buick, California license plate number 1MBK445, were dealing narcotics from their vehicle on the east side of the park. Within five minutes of receiving the dispatch, the officers arrived at the designated location and found a car containing three Hispanic males matching precisely the information received from the anonymous informant. As the officers approached this vehicle on foot, they saw the occupants engaged in conversation with the windows open. Officer Righthouse testified at Ramirez's preliminary hearing that when he walked up to the car, he saw a beer can which he believed was on the ground outside of the passenger's door, as well as another possibly inside the vehicle on the floorboard.

Based on Officer Righthouse's professional experience, the nature of the call and his knowledge that the Golden Hill park area was a very "proliferate" area for narcotics, he knew there was a nexus between people dealing narcotics and simultaneously possessing weapons. Consequently, he requested the occupants to step out of the car. The officers then patted them down for weapons. Ramirez, who was a passenger in the rear seat, held a jean jacket in his hand as he got out of the car. Officer Righthouse requested he place it on the back of the car for safety purposes. After patting Ramirez down for weapons, Officer Righthouse asked him if he had any contraband or drugs on his person or in his jacket. After Ramirez said no, Officer Righthouse asked him for consent to search his jacket and person for drugs. Ramirez agreed. Officer Righthouse then discovered a small black plastic object marked "battery pack" in Ramirez's left jacket pocket and asked if it belonged to him. Ramirez admitted it did, explaining it was for his remote control car. Upon hearing a rattling sound inside it, Officer Righthouse asked Ramirez if he could open it. Again, Ramirez consented. Officer Righthouse then discovered 10 small plastic bindles, confirmed to contain very large pieces of rock methamphetamine packaged for sale, inside the battery area of the plastic pack. After Officer Righthouse admonished Ramirez of his constitutional rights, Ramirez explained he had obtained the methamphetamine prepackaged in the battery pack from a friend of a friend in a bar, he was going to sell the drugs for $50 a bindle, and the explanation of the storage box belonging to his remote control car was a story he had been told to use if he were stopped by the police for dealing narcotics.

After being arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance for sale and simple possession, Ramirez brought a suppression motion at his preliminary hearing on the ground the officers illegally detained him because they did not have reasonable suspicion he had committed or was about to commit a crime. (§ 1538.5.) The motion was denied. On April 8, 1994, an information charging Ramirez with the two crimes was filed. On May 5, he renewed his suppression motion. In argument, the deputy district attorney pointed out the officer's knowledge of the area where the car was located as a narcotics-prone area was significant, and suggested that if the tip had mentioned an area where drug dealing was unknown to police, the tip would have been weaker. The trial court denied the motion on May 27. On June 3, Ramirez pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance for sale, and the second count was dismissed. On July 29, the court suspended imposition of sentence and imposed supervised probation for three years on a variety of terms and conditions, including fourteen days in county jail. Ramirez appeals the judgment.

DISCUSSION

Where the facts bearing on the legality of a challenged detention are undisputed, an appellate court is confronted with a question of law; we must independently determine whether the factual record supports the trial court's and the magistrate's conclusions this detention met the constitutional standard of reasonableness. (People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 477, 198 Cal.Rptr. 538, 674 P.2d 240; In re Eskiel S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1638, 1641, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 455; People v. Gallant (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 200, 206, 275 Cal.Rptr. 50; People v. Verin (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 551, 555, 269 Cal.Rptr. 573.) We first set forth the standards that have been developed for evaluating investigative detentions in the circumstances of an anonymous tip, and then apply them to these facts.

I Reasonable Suspicion to Detain

"In order to justify a detention 'the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity. Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal activity and same involvement by the person in question.' " (People v. Aldridge, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 478, 198 Cal.Rptr. 538, 674 P.2d 240, quoting In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957.)

Where, however, an investigative stop or detention is "predicated on circumstances which, when viewed objectively, support a mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch," the stop is unlawful even though the officer may have been acting in good faith. (People v. Conway (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 385, 389, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 533.) ²

In discussing the difficulty courts have had in defining the standard for reviewing investigative decisions made by the police, the Supreme Court in United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, said:

"Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person. Terms like 'articulable reasons' and 'founded suspicion' are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances--the whole picture--must be taken into account. Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. [Citations.]"

An anonymous tip can support a lawful detention where the information provided is "sufficiently corroborated to furnish [the requisite] reasonable suspicion that [the suspect] was engaged in criminal activity...." (Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 331, 110 S.Ct. at p. 2416.) Like probable cause, reasonable suspicion "is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors--quantity and quality--are considered in the 'totality of the circumstances--the whole picture,' [citation], that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable." (Id. at p. 330, 110 S.Ct. at p. 2416.) In performing this calculus, the Supreme Court declined to hold that "an anonymous caller could never provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry [v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S....