People v. Ramsey

541 P.3d 1198

2023 COA 95

2023 COA 95

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee,

IN the INTEREST OF Melody Anne RAMSEY, Respondent-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1100

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

Prior Opinion Announced August 24, 2023, WITHDRAWN

OPINION PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED AS "NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)" ON AUGUST 24, 2023, IS NOW DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Announced October 12, 2023

City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 23MH551, Honorable Elizabeth D. Leith, Judge

Kerry Tipper, City Attorney, Daniel Horwitz, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Law Office of Richard Slosman, Ltd., Richard Slosman, Boulder, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE FURMAN

¶ 1 Respondent, Melody Anne Ramsey, appeals the probate court’s order certifying her for short-term involuntary treatment and authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic, mood stabilizing, and side-effect treating medications. She contends that the court violated her rights and that the evidence was insufficient to uphold the court’s order. We disagree and affirm the order.

I. A Mental-Health Hold and the Hearing

¶ 2 In May 2023, Ramsey was living without a home and was arrested for trespassing at an encampment. She spent one night in the Denver County Jail. When the police released her, she refused to leave and insisted that they file a report on her allegations that her court-appointed guardian was abusing her. The jail’s psychiatric team suspected that she was suffering from significant paranoia and delusions, so they placed her on a mental-health hold. She was transported to Denver Health Medical Center (DHMC) on May 20, 2023, where the staff in the emergency room found her to be paranoid, delusional, irritable, and unstable. DHMC admitted Ramsey into an adult inpatient unit, and her treating psychiatrist diagnosed her with delusional disorder.

¶ 3 DHMC filed its first notice of certification and certification for short-term treatment and a motion for involuntary medication administration authority in the Denver Probate Court on May 24, 2023, and the court appointed counsel for Ramsey. On Ramsey’s counsel’s motion, the probate court dismissed that case on June 2, 2023, due to a procedural defect. Later that day, DHMC filed a substantively identical second petition that cured the procedural defect. The probate court reappointed Ramsey’s previous counsel on June 2, 2023, and scheduled a hearing on the second petition for June 6, 2023.

¶ 4 Ramsey’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss on statutory grounds and a motion to continue and for discovery, arguing that more time was required to obtain and review Ramsey’s medical records and for her to undergo a complete medical examination. At the June 6 hearing, the probate court denied both motions and the hearing proceeded as scheduled.

¶ 5 Ramsey and her treating psychiatrist testified at the hearing. The treating psychiatrist was endorsed without objection as an expert in psychiatry, and she testified about diagnosing Ramsey with delusional disorder and what the diagnosis meant. The treating psychiatrist then opined that Ramsey’s delusional disorder caused her to be unable to control her behavior and resulted in a substantial disorder of her cognitive abilities, her ability to recognize reality, and her emotional processes. Because of this disorder, the treating psychiatrist concluded that Ramsey was gravely disabled.

¶ 6 At the end of the hearing, the probate court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ramsey "is a person with a mental illness" that grossly impairs her "capacities to control her behaviors and to recognize reality." And due to her mental illness, Ramsey "is gravely disabled," "incapable of providing for or making informed decisions about her essential needs without significant assistance and supervision," "at risk of substantial bodily harm from failure to attend her own needs, [and] at risk of significant psychiatric deterioration." Accordingly, the probate court upheld the certification for short-term treatment, made findings on the four required elements in People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985), and granted the People’s motion for involuntary medication administration authority. Shortly thereafter, the court issued a written order consistent with its oral ruling.

¶ 7 Ramsey appeals the probate court’s order, contending that the court violated her due process rights by denying her continuance motion. In the alternative, Ramsey contends that the evidence was insufficient to support, by clear and convincing evidence, the court’s findings (1) that she was mentally ill or gravely disabled and (2) that all four Medina elements were met. We disagree with her contentions.

II. Denial of Continuance

¶ 8 Ramsey contends that the probate court violated her due process rights by denying her continuance motion because her counsel was appointed late in the afternoon on Friday, June 2, and the hearing was held the following Tuesday, June 6. She argues that one full business day was insufficient time for counsel to obtain and review the medical records and documents necessary to prepare for the hearing, so the court was obligated to reschedule the hearing to a later date within the ten-day statutory period. See § 27-65-113(5)(a), C.R.S. 2023 ("Upon the filing of such a petition, the court shall appoint an attorney … to represent the respondent or person and hear the matter within ten days."). We are unpersuaded.

¶ 9 While Ramsey’s contention is framed as a violation of her due process rights, her appeal also challenges the propriety of the court’s denial of her continuance. So we consider each aspect of her claim in turn.

A. Procedural Due Process

[1] ¶ 10 "[C]ommitment of a patient to a mental institution in the first instance constitutes a severe infringement on the basic interest of that individual to be free from governmental restraint and thus requires protection under the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions." Medina, 705 P.2d at 967.

[2] ¶ 11 "When the administration of involuntary antipsychotic medication is at issue, … a court must conduct a ‘full and fair adversary hearing’ on the matter with certain ‘procedural protections.’ " People in the Interest of Strodtman, 293 P.3d 123, 128 (Colo. App. 2011) (citations omitted). The respondent "has the right to counsel, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to present evidence to support … her refusal" to accept treatment. Id. And short-term treatment hearings under section 27-65-113 "shall be conducted in the same manner as other civil proceedings before the court." Strodtman, 293 P.3d at 128 (quoting § 27-65-111(1), C.R.S. 2011); see § 27-65-113(1).

[3] ¶ 12 Not all alleged procedural errors violate a respondent’s due process rights. Strodtman, 293 P.3d at 128. We review alleged violations "for their impact on the fairness of the hearing ‘by (1) evaluating the gravity of the deviation from statutory provisions, including a consideration of due process concerns, and (2) determining any prejudice to the respondent caused by the deviation.’ " Id. (quoting Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 126 (Colo. 2000)).

B. Standard of Review

[4, 5] ¶ 13 "We review procedural due process claims de novo." People in Interest of B. H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 49, 488 P.3d 1026 (quoting People in Interest of C.J., 2017 COA 157, ¶ 25, 410 P.3d 839). And we review the probate court’s denial of a continuance for an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14, 521 P.3d 637 (citing C. S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627, 638 (Colo. 2004)). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. Id. (citing Fisher v. People, 2020 CO 70, ¶ 13, 471 P.3d 1082).

C. Ramsey’s Rights Were Not Violated and the Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

¶ 14 We conclude that the probate court did not err by denying Ramsey a continuance for two reasons.

[6] ¶ 15 First, when the probate court receives a petition for a short-term involuntary treatment certification and authorization to involuntarily administer medication, "the court [must] appoint an attorney, if one has not been appointed, to represent the respondent or person and hear the matter within ten days." See § 27-65-113(5)(a). The record shows that the probate court adhered to these statutory procedures, so no statutory deviation prejudiced Ramsey’s procedural due process rights. See Strodtman, 293 P.3d at 128. And the record also shows that Ramsey was both afforded the opportunity to meet with her counsel and offered access to the medical records in DHMC’s possession. Ramsey argues that the court should have granted her more time because her counsel had only one business day to prepare for the hearing; but under a statutory scheme that requires the court to hold the hearing within ten days, it is unclear why the number of business days, rather than the total number of days, before the hearing would be a dispositive factor in determining whether Ramsey’s counsel was provided adequate time to prepare the case.

¶ 16 And while Ramsey contends that records and documents have a "heightened importance" in this case, she does not explain why this is so, or what prevented her counsel from requesting and reviewing the records that were offered. So in the absence of a specific and justifiable impediment to her preparation, we conclude that Ramsey received a full and fair hearing and the court did not violate her procedural due process rights by denying the continuance. See id.; see also People in Interest of Uwayezuk, 2023 COA 69, ¶ 14, 537 P.3d 377 (concluding respondent failed to show prejudice where counsel was appointed one full day before the hearing and counsel did not have access to respondent).

[7] ¶ 17 Second, we conclude that the probate court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ramsey’s motion to continue....