People v. Ravenell

175 A.D.3d 1437

107 N.Y.S.3d 408

The PEOPLE, etc., Appellant,

v.Thomas RAVENELL, Respondent.

2019–01713

Ind. No. 10006/17

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—June 13, 2019

September 18, 2019

Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Julian Joiris of counsel), for appellant.

Brooklyn Defender Services, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Susannah Karlsson, Sarah Burleson, and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP [Avi Weitzman, Ashley Fernandez, and Trevor Gopnik], of counsel), for respondent.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from.

The evidence at the defendant's pretrial suppression hearing established that, on December 16, 2017, at approximately 2:10 a.m., three plainclothes police officers were on an anti-crime patrol in an unmarked vehicle in a Brooklyn neighborhood. At that time, the officers received a "ShotSpotter" notification, indicating that a gunshot had been detected near the intersection of Newport and Osborn Streets in Brooklyn. The officers responded and found an unidentified witness on the sidewalk approximately one-half to one block away from that intersection. The witness informed the officers that he heard at least one gunshot coming from the corner of Osborn Street and that he observed two males walking up Osborn Street toward Riverdale Avenue. The witness stated that one of the individuals was wearing dark clothing and the other was wearing a white jacket. He did not provide any other description of the men he saw, nor did he state that he saw either man holding or firing a gun. While speaking to the witness, at approximately 2:12 a.m., the officers received a second "ShotSpotter" notification indicating that another gunshot was detected near the intersection of Osborn Street and Riverdale Avenue.

The officers responded to the location where the most recent gunshot was reported and observed the defendant and another man, both of whom wore clothing that matched the description provided by the witness, entering the courtyard of an apartment complex located at the intersection. The officers drove to the other side of the courtyard and approached the two men. One of the officers approached the defendant and asked him to stop. At the time of the inquiry, the defendant's hands were located in his jacket pockets. Upon being asked to stop, the defendant fled and the officer immediately pursued him.

Eventually, the defendant hid behind an SUV, and the officer heard a gunshot and something hitting the ground. The defendant was arrested, and a gun was recovered nearby. Once back at the police station house, the defendant was informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, waived them, and denied having fired a gun. The defendant was indicted for one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and one count of criminal possession of a firearm. In an omnibus motion, the defendant moved, inter alia, to suppress the physical evidence and his statements to the police. Following a suppression hearing, in an order dated November 9, 2018, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted those branches of the defendant's motion. The People appeal.

" ‘On a motion to suppress physical evidence, the People bear the burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct in the first instance’ " ( People v. Furrs , 149 A.D.3d 1098, 1099, 53 N.Y.S.3d 147, quoting People v. Clermont , 133 A.D.3d 612, 613, 20 N.Y.S.3d 85 ). " ‘In order to justify police pursuit, the officers must have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed’ " ( People v. Furrs , 149 A.D.3d at 1099, 53 N.Y.S.3d 147, quoting People v. Clermont , 133 A.D.3d at 613, 20 N.Y.S.3d 85 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Holmes , 81 N.Y.2d 1056, 1058, 601 N.Y.S.2d 459, 619 N.E.2d 396 ). "Police pursuit of an individual significantly impede[s] the person's freedom of movement and thus must be justified by reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed" ( People v. Holmes , 81 N.Y.2d at 1057–1058, 601 N.Y.S.2d 459, 619 N.E.2d 396 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Jones , 164 A.D.3d 1363, 1365, 85 N.Y.S.3d 75 ; People v. Furrs , 149 A.D.3d at 1099, 53 N.Y.S.3d 147 ; People v. Clermont , 133 A.D.3d at 613, 20 N.Y.S.3d 85 ). A suspect's flight alone, even in conjunction with equivocal circumstances that might justify a common law inquiry, is insufficient to justify pursuit (see People v. Moore , 6 N.Y.3d 496, 500, 814 N.Y.S.2d 567, 847 N.E.2d 1141 ; People v. Holmes , 81 N.Y.2d at 1058, 601 N.Y.S.2d 459, 619 N.E.2d 396 ; People v. Furrs , 149 A.D.3d at 1099–1100, 53 N.Y.S.3d 147 ; People v. Clermont , 133 A.D.3d at 614, 20 N.Y.S.3d 85 ). However, a defendant's flight plus "other specific circumstances indicating that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity, may give rise to reasonable suspicion, the necessary predicate for police pursuit" ( People v. Sierra , 83 N.Y.2d 928, 929, 615 N.Y.S.2d 310, 638 N.E.2d 955 ; see People v. Parker , 32 N.Y.3d 49, 56, 84 N.Y.S.3d 838, 109 N.E.3d 1138 ; People v. Moore , 6 N.Y.3d at 500–501, 814 N.Y.S.2d 567, 847 N.E.2d 1141 ; People v. Holmes , 81 N.Y.2d at 1058, 601 N.Y.S.2d 459, 619 N.E.2d 396 ; People v. Furrs , 149 A.D.3d at 1100, 53 N.Y.S.3d 147 ; People v. Clermont , 133 A.D.3d at 614, 20 N.Y.S.3d 85 ).

Here, the police lacked reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, the necessary predicate for pursuit. Although clothing worn by the defendant and his companion matched the clothing described by the unidentified witness,...