People v. Reamy

1

2024 IL App (2d) 240084-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOE D. REAMY JR., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2-24-0084

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Second District

March 26, 2024

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Kalb County. No. 24-CF-0054 Honorable Joseph C. Pedersen, Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

BIRKETT, JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: The State failed to establish that there were no mitigating conditions that could prevent defendant's pretrial release from causing harm to any person or the public at large.

¶ 2 The State appeals the circuit court's order denying the pretrial detention of defendant, Joe D. Reamy Jr., pursuant to Public Acts 101-562 and 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act).^[1] For the reasons below, we affirm.

¶ 4 On January 30, 2024, the State charged defendant with eight counts of possessing child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 2022)) and two counts of disseminating child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(2) (West 2022)). On January 31, 2024, the State filed its verified petition to detain pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). Also on January 31, 2024, the court held a hearing on the State's petition. During the hearing, the State made a proffer describing how, according to a police synopsis, the De Kalb County sheriffs office had received a tip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, leading them to obtain certain "subscriber information" for a Kik Messenger^[2] account that had uploaded child pornography-specifically, three videos and two photos. Eventually, after obtaining a subpoena, the sheriffs office determined that the account belonged to defendant. Officers obtained a search warrant for defendant's residence and recovered defendant's cell phone, which was found to have contained three videos of child pornography. Officers further found additional photos and videos elsewhere in the residence. Defendant admitted to officers that he possessed the discovered child pornography, and that he had transmitted to others the two videos forming the basis of his charges for dissemination of child pornography.

¶ 5 After obtaining a search warrant for defendant's Kik account, police found messages purportedly sent by defendant to other Kik users, in which defendant seemingly solicited others to trade child pornography. In other messages defendant asked another user, "[H]ow hot is your daughter? You play with her? What's stopping you? The longer you wait, the more likely she will tell."

¶ 6 After making its proffer, the State argued that "the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of the community at large based on the specific articulable facts of this case." The State further added that "[n]o conditions or combination of conditions can mitigate that threat." Specifically, the State argued that, even if defendant were to be prohibited from accessing the Internet, "he can get to the Internet if he's released from custody."

¶ 7 The defense, on the other hand, underlined the fact that defendant-a 50-year-old veteran with no criminal history-was "not involved in any type of assaultive or violent behavior," and that he was not alleged to have produced any of the child pornography underlying his charges. Defendant further argued that the minors depicted in the subject pornography had not been identified, suggesting that the State did not establish that they would personally face any threat resulting from defendant's pretrial release. Given defendant's age, his "multiple physical and medical conditions," and the fact that no firearms were recovered from his home, defendant suggested that he posed little threat to the community.

¶ 8 Defendant proposed that, if he were to be released, he would surrender any items he owned that would allow him to access the Internet, including cell phones. Electronic home monitoring could also be imposed to verify defendant's compliance with this directive, as it would allow the sheriff's department "to go to his residence and to verify his compliance." Defendant further suggested that he be ordered to refrain from contacting any minors.

¶ 9 Following the parties' arguments, the court first found "that the proof [was] evident or the presumption great that *** defendant ha[d] committed [the] qualifying offenses." The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that defendant posed a threat to others, including any minor children "he may come in contact with." Nonetheless, "based on the specific articulable facts of [the] case," the court stated that it was unable to find "that there are no conditions that would mitigate the real and present risk to the community or to any certain individuals." For this reason, the court ordered that defendant would be released on pretrial supervision, "that he [would] be placed on electronic home monitoring, that he [would] have no unsupervised contact with underage minors, [that he] may not reside in a home with any underage minors, and that he be prohibited from accessing the Internet," as well as possessing "any Internet-connected devices, including but not limited to a smartphone, tablet, or laptop." The trial court additionally specified that defendant would only be entitled to leave his home for medical appointments. The court memorialized these findings in a written January 31, 2024, order, and the State timely appeals.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions could mitigate the threat defendant's pretrial release posed to others. The State offers several specific reasons on appeal as to how the trial court abused its discretion, asserting that: (1) the court failed to "properly weigh the fact that the minor subjects of the pornography defendant allegedly possessed and disseminated are victims whether defendant had personal contact with them or not;" (2) "the conditions imposed both fail[ed] to mitigate defendant's threat to the community and cannot be adequately enforced;" and (3) given the nature of defendant's alleged offense, "no conditions of pretrial release are adequate to keep the community safe and prevent a defendant's flight from prosecution."

¶ 12 Pursuant to the Code, pretrial release may be denied only in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). In order to successfully establish that a defendant should be detained pending trial, the State bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense under section 110-6.1 of the Code; and (2) that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat that defendant's release would pose to any person or the community at large. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a), (f) (West 2022).

¶ 13 In reviewing whether a trial court erred in detaining a defendant under the Act, our standard of review is two-fold. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. We review the trial court's factual findings-including the court's findings as to whether the State presented clear and convincing evidence that any conditions of release are inadequate to protect others-under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Id. In analyzing the ultimate decision as to pretrial release, we review for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision is so arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable that no reasonable person would agree with the court's position. People v. Whitaker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232009, ¶ 50.

¶ 14 Here, the State's first argument-that the trial court failed to appreciate that the minors depicted in the pornography defendant allegedly possessed were themselves victims-is, without further elaboration, irrelevant. While the children depicted in the materials clearly are victims, there is no evidence that defendant had any contact with them. Again, the trial court denied the State's petition to detain because it found that the State failed to show that no conditions could mitigate the threat to any person or the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3)(i) (West 2022). To this point, the State offers no argument as to how the depicted minors' status as victims has any bearing on this determination.

¶ 15 The State's second argument-that the conditions imposed on defendant are inadequate or unenforceable-is also easily dispensed with. In order to rebut the presumption that a defendant is eligible for pretrial release, among other things, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that "no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of [the Code] can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specifical articulable facts of the case." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022). Section 110-10(a) of the Code provides certain mandatory conditions that must be imposed for defendants released prior to trial, while section 110-10(b) provides discretionary conditions that the trial court may impose. 725 ILCS 5/110-10(a), (b) (West 2022); People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 16.

¶ 16 Here, as outlined in the State's memorandum, the trial court imposed the following conditions on defendant for his pretrial release: (1) t...