People v. Reed

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMANDA ASHLEIGH-MARIE REED, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 353140

Court of Appeals of Michigan

September 2, 2021

UNPUBLISHED

Presque Isle Circuit Court LC Nos. 19-003234-AV 19-003235-AV.

Before: Ronayne Krause, P.J., and Beckering and Boonstra, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by leave granted^[1] the circuit court's order affirming the district court's order for the destruction of her two dogs under MCL 287.286a. We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 15, 2019, defendant's two American Bulldogs escaped from her yard while she was raking leaves. She spent the next six hours searching for the dogs. That evening, an area resident, Charles Kendziorski (Kendziorski), went to his barn to tend to his horse. Kendziorski discovered that defendant's dogs were in his barn, near the horse's stall, and that the horse had suffered serious injuries as the result of an apparent animal attack. The dogs and the barn were covered with blood, and one of the dogs appeared to be injured.^[2] The horse was examined by Laura Jackowiak, DVM, who determined that the horse had suffered serious injuries from an animal attack and that the most humane option was for the horse to be euthanized. Presque Isle County subsequently instituted civil proceedings against defendant under MCL 287.286a. The district court held a show-cause hearing. After the conclusion of the prosecution's proofs, defendant moved for either summary disposition or a directed verdict. The district court denied the motion and subsequently ordered that defendant's dogs be euthanized, stating in relevant part:

I indicated earlier, there's no doubt to this Court what happened to that horse that day. And, your two animals were found in the stable and they just mauled that horse near to death that day. And there's just no other explanation for it. That poor horse, what happened to that poor horse. And, there's blood all over the dogs, the horse's wounds as described by the Veterinarian were horrific, simply horrific. That dog, the horse was mauled from head to foot. And the Vet testified that there were bite marks all over the horse consistent with a dog attack. The two dogs are in the stall with the horse. There's blood all over the dogs, there's blood everywhere. I-even the officer had a hard time describing what he observed that day. There's no evidence that there were other wild animals that had gotten into the pen and there's simply no doubt in my mind what happened that day. Is that those two dogs got loose and they went into the stall and they mauled the horse. And, a horse is a very large animal, a big animal, and these two dogs were still able to do what they did to a horse. I can't let that happened [sic] to someone, and that's my concern, is if they do that to a horse, what would they do to someone walking along the street. So, the Court is ordering that the dogs be destroyed.

Defendant appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the district court's order. This appeal followed.^[3]

II. VALIDITY OF MCL 287.286a

Defendant argues that MCL 287.286a, which is a provision of the Dog Law of 1919 (the Dog Law), MCL 287.261 et seq., was repealed by implication when the Legislature passed the Dangerous Animals Act (DAA), MCL 287.321 et seq., and that it is unconstitutionally vague and therefore void. We disagree in both respects.

A. REPEAL BY IMPLICATION

Defendant argues that the district court erred by ordering that her dogs be euthanized under a law that she contends was repealed by implication as a result of the passage of the DAA. We disagree. We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich. 226, 229; 661 N.W.2d 557 (2003).

When interpreting a statute, we follow the established rules of statutory construction, the foremost of which is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. To do so, we begin by examining the most reliable evidence of that intent, the language of the statute itself. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted. Effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in the statute and, whenever possible, no word should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory. Only when an ambiguity exists in the language of the statute is it proper for a court to go beyond the statutory text to ascertain legislative intent. [Vermilya v Delta College Bd of Trustees, 325 Mich.App. 416, 418-419; 925 N.W.2d 897 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

"[R]epeals by implication have long been disfavored and will only be found if no other intention by the Legislature is possible." Telford v Michigan, 327 Mich.App. 195, 199-200; 933 N.W.2d 347 (2019). "It is generally presumed that if the Legislature had intended to repeal a statute or statutory provision, it would have done so explicitly. When presented with a claim that two statutes conflict, a court must endeavor to construe the statutes harmoniously if possible." AK Steel Holding Corp v Dep 't of Treasury, 314 Mich.App. 453, 464; 887 N.W.2d 209 (2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted). That being said, "a repeal of a statute may be inferred in two instances: (1) where it is clear that a subsequent legislative act conflicts with a prior act; or (2) when a subsequent act of the Legislature clearly is intended to occupy the entire field covered by a prior enactment." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, "[r]epeals by implication will be allowed only when the inconsistency and repugnancy are plain and unavoidable." Int'l Business Machines Corp v Dep't of Treasury, 496 Mich. 642, 651; 852 N.W.2d 865 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A repeal by implication only occurs if the "two statutes are so incompatible that both cannot stand . . . ." Id. at 652 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Dog Law contains a variety of provisions relating to the ownership of dogs, including requirements for dog licenses, requirements for kennel licenses, leash requirements, vaccination requirements, and authorization for the killing of dogs that attack wildlife, livestock, or humans. The district court ordered the destruction of defendant's dogs under MCL 287.286a, which provides:

(1) A district court magistrate or the district or common pleas court shall issue a summons similar to the summons provided for in section 20^[4] to show cause why a dog should not be killed, upon a sworn complaint that any of the following exist:

(a)After January 10 and before June 15 in each year a dog over 6 months old is running at large unaccompanied by its owner or is engaged in lawful hunting and is not under the reasonable control of its owner without a license attached to the collar of the dog.

(b) A dog, licensed or unlicensed, has destroyed property or habitually causes damage by trespassing on the property of a person who is not the owner.

(c)A dog, licensed or unlicensed, has attacked or bitten a person.

(d)A dog has shown vicious habits or has molested a person when lawfully on the public highway.

(e)A dog duly licensed and wearing a license tag has run at large contrary to this act.

(2)After a hearing the district court magistrate or the district or common pleas court may either order the dog killed, or confined to the premises of the owner. If the owner disobeys this order the owner may be punished under section 26. Costs as in a civil case shall be taxed against the owner of the dog, and collected by the county. The county board of commissioners shall audit and pay claims for services of officers rendered pursuant to this section, unless the claims are paid by the owner of the dog. [MCL 287.286a.]

MCL 287.286a was added to the Dog Law in 1927 by 1927 PA 114.

The DAA was enacted by 1988 PA 426 and became effective in 1989. This Court has found that by enacting the DAA, "the Legislature sought to curtail the ownership of dangerous animals" by including provisions designed "to prevent dangerous animals from running at large or injuring persons" and "by placing owners on notice that they will be held criminally liable for any harms caused by their dangerous animals." People v Janes, 302 Mich.App. 34, 53; 836 N.W.2d 883 (2013) (emphasis omitted). The DAA defines a "dangerous animal" as follows:

(a) "Dangerous animal" means a dog or other animal that bites or attacks a person, or a dog that bites or attacks and causes serious injury or death to another dog while the other dog is on the property or under the control of its owner. However, a dangerous animal does not include any of the following:

(i) An animal that bites or attacks a person who is knowingly trespassing on the property of the animal's owner.

(ii) An animal that bites or attacks a person who provokes or torments the animal.

(iii) An animal that is responding in a manner that an ordinary and reasonable person would conclude was designed to protect a person if that person is engaged in a lawful activity or is the subject of an assault.

(iv) Livestock. [MCL 287.321.] Section 2 of the DAA MCL 287.322, provides in relevant part:

(1) Upon a sworn complaint that an animal is a dangerous animal and the animal has caused serious injury or death to a person or has caused serious injury or death to a dog, a district court magistrate, district court, or a municipal court shall issue a summons to the owner ordering him or her to appear to show cause why the animal should not be destroyed.

* * *

(3) After a hearing, the magistrate or court shall order the destruction of the animal, at the expense of the owner, if the animal is found to be a dangerous animal that caused serious injury or death to a person or a

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