People v. Relwani

2019 IL 123385

129 N.E.3d 1222

432 Ill.Dec. 679

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Daksh N. RELWANI, Appellant.

Docket No. 123385

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed January 25, 2019.

Gal Pissetzky, of Pissetzky and Berliner LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and David H. Iskowich, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, and his driver's license was summarily suspended under Illinois's implied consent statute ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2016) ). He filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. When defendant rested his case at the hearing on his rescission petition, the State successfully moved for a directed finding, arguing he had not met his initial burden of proof. On appeal, a divided panel of the Appellate Court, Third District, affirmed the directed finding in favor of the State. 2018 IL App (3d) 170201, 421 Ill.Dec. 152, 99 N.E.3d 152.

¶ 2 Defendant now seeks this court's review, asking whether he was required to present affirmative evidence to make a prima facie case for rescission. We answer that question in the affirmative and affirm the appellate court's judgment.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant, Daksh N. Relwani, was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2016) ) in the circuit court of Will County. In October 2016, he was found alone in an altered or partially unconscious state behind the steering wheel of a running car in a Joliet Walgreens parking lot at about 3:30 a.m. Under the Illinois implied consent statute ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2016) ), his driver's license was summarily suspended by the Secretary of State. The present appeal arose out of his petition to rescind that statutory summary suspension. In relevant part, defendant claims that rescission is warranted because he was arrested in a privately owned Walgreens parking lot that did not meet the definition of a "public highway," as required by the implied consent law.

¶ 5 At the hearing on his petition to rescind, defendant was the only witness. He testified on direct examination that he was parked in a Walgreens parking lot located at 1801 Ingalls Avenue in Joliet and "was sleeping behind the wheel of [his] car" when he "was woken up by police officers," who arrested him for DUI.

¶ 6 During the State's cross-examination, defendant was often unable to provide clear or responsive answers, repeatedly stating, "I don't remember." He admitted, however, that the police found him in his car with the keys in the ignition and the engine running. When the State asked whether the reason he did not remember performing some field sobriety tests was "because [he was] intoxicated and had taken heroin and clozapine^{[1 ]} that night," defendant answered, "I, I don't know. I guess." While defendant was able to confirm he told the police that he "had been driving from the restaurant [in Chicago] with [his] family" earlier that evening, he did not recall if he also told them that he had "used heroin and clozapine for [his] birthday that night" and was "not sure" whether "there was an open bottle of Budweiser beer in [his] car." During redirect questioning, his counsel elicited testimony affirming that "while [defendant was] at the police station, [he was] actually administered, administered a drug and then taken to Saint Joseph [Medical Center] for treatment because of [his] condition."²

¶ 7 At the close of defendant's case, the State successfully moved for a directed finding, arguing that he had not met his burden of proof in seeking rescission of his statutory summary suspension. Rejecting defendant's claim that the summary suspension statute was inapplicable because he was not driving on a "public highway," the trial court initially stated its belief that only private driveways were excluded from the statute. The judge then explained,

"[h]ere, we have not truly established the fact, by the petitioner's case, that this truly was—they said he was in the Walgreens, that it was [a] privately-owned parking lot. If I don't know that[,] I can't assume that simply because it is the parking lot of Walgreens."

The trial court denied defendant's motion to reconsider.

¶ 8 On appeal, a majority of the appellate court affirmed. Relying on the appellate decisions in People v. Helt , 384 Ill. App. 3d 285, 287, 322 Ill.Dec. 957, 892 N.E.2d 594 (2008), and People v. Culbertson , 258 Ill. App. 3d 294, 296, 196 Ill.Dec. 554, 630 N.E.2d 489 (1994), the majority concluded that "a parking lot on privately owned property may constitute a public highway for the purposes of the summary suspension statute." 2018 IL App (3d) 170201, ¶ 17, 421 Ill.Dec. 152, 99 N.E.3d 152 (citing Helt , 384 Ill. App. 3d at 288, 322 Ill.Dec. 957, 892 N.E.2d 594 ). More specifically, a parking lot would be considered a "public highway" for summary suspension purposes if it is publicly maintained and open to the public for vehicular travel. See 625 ILCS 5/1-126 (West 2016) (defining "highway" for purposes of the Illinois Vehicle Code). Defendant bore the burden of establishing a prima facie case for rescission. Because the only evidence he offered on whether the parking lot was a "public highway" was noting it was near a Walgreens store, the majority concluded the trial court's directed finding for the State was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 2018 IL App (3d) 170201, ¶¶ 18-20, 421 Ill.Dec. 152, 99 N.E.3d 152.

¶ 9 The dissenting justice argued that defendant met his burden of establishing a prima facie case for rescission by providing evidence that he was arrested inside his car in a Walgreens parking lot, citing People v. Ayres , 228 Ill. App. 3d 277, 169 Ill.Dec. 427, 591 N.E.2d 931 (1992), and People v. Kissel , 150 Ill. App. 3d 283, 103 Ill.Dec. 646, 501 N.E.2d 963 (1986), overruled on other grounds by People v. Brown , 175 Ill. App. 3d 725, 125 Ill.Dec. 153, 530 N.E.2d 71 (1988). The dissent maintained that because defendant established that he was arrested in a Walgreens parking lot the burden shifted to the State to prove that the parking lot was publicly maintained and used for public vehicular travel. The dissent asserted that the Third District should not follow the Second District's approach in Helt , requiring the motorist to provide proof that the parking lot was not a "public highway" for purposes of summary suspension, because that approach "places an undue burden on defendants to prove that private property is not publicly maintained." 2018 IL App (3d) 170201, ¶¶ 35-42, 421 Ill.Dec. 152, 99 N.E.3d 152 (Lytton, J., dissenting). This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The dispositive question in this appeal is narrow: Was a defendant seeking rescission of the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license required to offer affirmative evidence to satisfy his initial burden of making a prima facie showing that he was not on a "public highway" while in control of his car?

¶ 12 While on its face the idea that a parking lot can be a "public highway" may seem to be easily dismissed, "[a] parking lot that is publicly maintained and open to use by the public for vehicular travel will constitute a ‘highway,’ even if the parking lot is on privately owned property." Helt , 384 Ill. App. 3d at 288, 322 Ill.Dec. 957, 892 N.E.2d 594. Reading their texts together, the applicable statutes create a cohesive statutory scheme supporting that conclusion.

¶ 13 Under the Illinois Vehicle Code, the implied consent statute in DUI cases states:

"Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent *** to a chemical test or tests of blood, breath, other bodily substance, or urine for the purpose of determining the content of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds or any combination thereof in the person's blood if arrested *** [for a DUI offense] ***." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West 2016).

¶ 14 If the driver refuses or fails to complete any of the enumerated tests when requested by a law enforcement officer possessing probable cause and after receipt of appropriate warnings and documentation, the individual's driver's license "shall" be summarily suspended by the Illinois Secretary of State. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(a), (c), (d), (e) (West 2016). To seek rescission of the summary suspension,

"[w]ithin 90 days after the notice of statutory summary suspension *** is served under Section 11-501.1, the person may make a written request for a judicial hearing in the circuit court of venue. The request to the circuit court shall state the grounds upon which the person seeks to have the statutory summary suspension *** rescinded." 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2016).

¶ 15 In the instant defendant's attempt to rescind his summary suspension, he chose to disprove that "the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that [defendant] was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway while under the influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination of both." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b)(2) (West 2016). Critically, for purposes of the Illinois Vehicle Code, a "highway" is defined as "[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel or located on public school property." 625 ILCS 5/1-126 (West 2016). Based on that definition, a property is a "public highway" within the meaning of the implied consent statute if it is both "publicly maintained" and either open to use by the...