People v. Reyes

2023 IL App (2d) 210423

219 N.E.3d 684

467 Ill.Dec. 674

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Zachary REYES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-21-0423

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Filed March 22, 2023

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Christopher L. Gehrke, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Eric C. Weiss, State's Attorney, of Yorkville (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and David Friedland, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In 2012, a jury convicted the defendant, Zachary Reyes, of one count of first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2008)) and two counts of attempted murder with a firearm (id. §§ 8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) ), all committed during a single incident when he was 16 years old. Although the trial court sentenced Reyes to the minimum sentence possible on each count, the law required add-ons for his use of a firearm and also required the sentences to run consecutively, with the result that Reyes's sentence was a mandatory minimum of 97 years’ imprisonment. Our supreme court ultimately determined that Reyes's sentence was an unconstitutional mandatory de facto life sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. People v. Reyes , 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9, 407 Ill.Dec. 452, 63 N.E.3d 884.

¶ 2 On remand, the trial court sentenced Reyes to 66 years’ imprisonment. Reyes appealed, and we vacated Reyes's sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing, finding that the sentence did not comply with the requirements for sentencing a defendant who committed his crimes while he was a minor, as set out by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Holman , 2017 IL 120655, 418 Ill.Dec. 889, 91 N.E.3d 849. On remand, the trial court once again sentenced Reyes to 66 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 3 Reyes again appeals, arguing that the trial court violated our mandate as well as the federal and Illinois constitutions by imposing a de facto life sentence without finding that he was permanently incorrigible. He also argues that, even if the trial court was not required to make such a finding, the trial court relied on improper factors in determining his sentence. For the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 A. Original Proceedings

¶ 6 In 2010, Reyes was charged with the first degree murder of Jason Ventura and the attempted murders of Eduardo Gaytan and Jorge Ruiz. The indictment alleged that on December 20, 2009, defendant personally discharged a firearm in the direction of a vehicle occupied by Ventura, Gaytan, and Ruiz and that defendant's actions caused the death of Ventura, as well as serious injury to Gaytan. Reyes, who was 16 years old at the time of the shootings, was prosecuted as an adult. See 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a)(i) (West 2008). Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of the charged offenses.

¶ 7 The trial court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction, consisting of the minimum 20-year sentence for murder (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2008)) plus a 25-year mandatory firearm enhancement (id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii)). The court also sentenced Reyes to 26 years’ imprisonment on each of the two convictions of attempted murder: the minimum 6-year sentence for attempted murder (see id. § 5-4.5-25(a)) plus the 20-year mandatory firearm enhancement (id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(ii)). In addition, as required by statute (see id. § 5-8-4(d)(1)), the trial court found that all of Reyes's sentences must run consecutively to each other. As a result, Reyes was sentenced to a mandatory minimum aggregate sentence of 97 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 8 Reyes appealed, arguing in part that his sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to Miller , 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a sentencing scheme that mandated a sentence of natural life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders violated the eighth amendment of the federal constitution. See People v. Reyes , 2015 IL App (2d) 120471, ¶ 16, 400 Ill.Dec. 871, 49 N.E.3d 19. Reyes argued that his aggregate term-of-years sentence was a de facto mandatory natural life term of imprisonment and was likewise unconstitutional under Miller . Id. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with this argument. Reyes , 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9, 407 Ill.Dec. 452, 63 N.E.3d 884. The court concluded that Reyes's de facto life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment and therefore vacated his sentence ( id. ¶ 10 ), remanding the case for resentencing ( id. ¶ 12 ).

¶ 9 In its ruling, the court noted that, while Reyes's appeal was pending, the legislature had enacted a new law, codified at section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2018)), which (1) required a court sentencing a juvenile offender to take into account several mitigating factors in determining the appropriate sentence and (2) made the imposition of firearm enhancements on a juvenile offender a matter of discretion. Reyes , 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 11, 407 Ill.Dec. 452, 63 N.E.3d 884. The court held that Reyes should be resentenced in accordance with the new statute. Id. ¶ 12.

¶ 10 B. First Resentencing

¶ 11 On remand, the trial court ordered a new presentence investigation report (PSI) and, at Reyes's request, psychological testing. In September 2017, Reyes underwent an evaluation of his mental health and intellectual abilities. The report from that evaluation indicated that Reyes received special education accommodations in school from 2002 to 2009. During that time, he suffered from attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and took medication for that condition. ADHD caused problems with inattention and impulsivity but was not classified as an intellectual disability. When Reyes took his medication, he showed marked progress in his academic functioning. However, in seventh and eighth grade, Reyes stopped taking his medication and exhibited behavioral issues as a result. In seventh grade, he was suspended for gang-related writing. On a General Ability Index (GAI) evaluation, which the report indicated "represent[ed] a reliable and valid estimate of his overall intellectual ability," Reyes scored in the tenth percentile, which indicated that he was in the low average range of functioning. The report noted that, despite Reyes's ADHD and low GAI score, he did not meet the criteria for intellectual disability as defined by section 5-1-13 of the Code ( 730 ILCS 5/5-1-13 (West 2016) ).

¶ 12 The 2017 PSI indicated that, before the charges in this case, Reyes's juvenile record consisted of one charge of unlawful possession of a firearm without a valid firearm owner's identification card. At the time of his arrest, he was in the ninth grade at East Aurora High School. Since he had been incarcerated, he had taken classes and earned numerous certificates, in roofing, insulation, and vinyl decking. He had also earned an anti-violence awareness certificate and had attended Bible study classes. The report indicated that his parents never married and his father did not play an active role in his life. He grew up at home with his mother and with four half-siblings. He described his relationship with his half-siblings as "good." Reyes became involved with the Latin Kings street gang when he was 13 or 14 years old. Reyes expressed remorse for his offenses and specifically for the death of Ventura.

¶ 13 According to the PSI, a "Level of Service Inventory-Revised" (LSI-R) was administered to predict Reyes's risk to reoffend, based on the factors and details that were relevant to him at the time of the offenses, December 20, 2009. According to Reyes's LSI-R, Reyes was a medium risk for recidivism at the time of the commission of the offense. The PSI also noted that, at the time of his arrest in December 2009, Reyes was on probation for his previous juvenile charge of unlawful possession of a weapon. Based on that, the PSI stated that Reyes's attitude was supportive of crime.

¶ 14 An addendum to the PSI included a written statement from Reyes, expressing remorse for the shooting and stating that he took full responsibility for his actions. Reyes added that, while incarcerated, he had been taking classes because he wanted to learn and become a better person. On the night of the shooting, older members of the Latin Kings had taken advantage of him because he wanted to be liked, had low self-esteem, and did not know how to refuse them when they asked him to shoot.

¶ 15 At the second sentencing hearing, the State submitted two disciplinary reports for Reyes from the Menard Correctional Center (Menard), from July 2012 and May 2014. Both disciplinary tickets were for possession of contraband: one for having a weapon (a piece of metal that had a hook on one end), and one for literature related to the Latin Kings (the Latin Kings "Holy Prayer" and "Code of Kingdom"). The State also submitted an April 2016 affidavit from Reyes, which had been filed in a different Kendall County case against a codefendant, Francisco Salazar. In the affidavit, Reyes admitted to receiving the gun used in the shooting from higher ranking members of the Latin Kings and firing all the shots into Ventura's car based on orders from the higher-ranking gang members. Reyes also claimed that Salazar was not aware of the gun or the plan. This differed from Reyes's testimony at his own trial, where he had testified that he was not the one who fired the shots toward Ventura's car.

¶ 16 Reyes submitted his school records, which showed that he had an Individual Education Plan (IEP) and was in the ninth grade at age 16. Reyes's mother testified that Reyes had...