People v. Riggs

1

2024 IL App (2d) 230266-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEREMIAH RIGGS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-23-0266

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Second District

May 14, 2024

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Kalb County. No. 13-CF-928 Honorable Marcy L. Buick, Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Birkett concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

SCHOSTOK JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: Defendant's postconviction petition did not state the gist of a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging trial counsel's failure to argue that the victim's hearsay statements were inadmissible to the extent that they accused defendant of uncharged sexual offenses that did not relate to the elements of the charged acts. There was no prejudice to defendant because evidence of those allegedly unrelated sexual offenses was introduced at trial through defendant's confession to the police. Because there was no prejudice, we do not consider whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient.

¶ 2 Defendant, Jeremiah Riggs, appeals from the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition, contending that he stated the gist of a claim that his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to challenge in part the admission at trial of the minor victim's out-of-court statements (see 725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2012)). We affirm the dismissal because defendant did not state the gist of a constitutional claim under the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The State indicted defendant on 15 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2012)). The named victim was I.H., defendant's daughter. All 15 counts alleged conduct occurring between January 1, 2011, and December 11, 2013, in De Kalb County. Defendant allegedly placed his penis in I.H.'s mouth (counts I through X), placed his penis in I.H.'s sex organ (counts XI and XII), placed his penis in I.H.'s anus (counts XIII and XIV), and placed his finger in I.H.'s sex organ (count XV).

¶ 5 The State filed a motion under section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2012)) to introduce at trial I.H.'s hearsay statements. At the hearing on the motion, Tracy Paszotta, I.H.'s kindergarten teacher, testified that, in December 2013, a parent of another student informed Paszotta that I.H. had told the other student that I.H.'s father had inappropriately touched I.H. When Paszotta questioned I.H., she told her that defendant had taken her and another child into the bathroom and made I.H. watch a pornographic film on his phone. He then pulled down I.H.'s pants and" 'touched [her].'" Paszotta returned I.H. to class and contacted the Department of Children and Family Services. Before the students were dismissed for the day, I.H. told Paszotta that defendant had" 'put his finger inside [her].' "

¶ 6 Monique Heilemeier, a forensic interviewer, testified at the hearing that, on December 11, 2013, she interviewed I.H. at the Children's Advocacy Center. A video recording and transcript of the interview were admitted into evidence. I.H. told Heilemeier of an incident in her Aunt Angie's home after I.H.'s sixth birthday party in May. I.H. was unsure how old she was when the incident occurred. She initially stated that defendant took her into a bathroom at Aunt Angie's house, pulled down his pants, and "stuck his thing in [her] private part." She further stated that she was lying on the bed in Aunt Angie's upstairs bedroom when defendant had her go into the bathroom. Defendant then pulled down his pants and "rubb[ed] his private part." He put his finger inside I.H.'s underwear, removed her clothes, and made her lie on the bed. He then put his finger "inside [of] it," got on top of her, and "hump[ed] [her]." He also made her "suck his private part." I.H. told Heilemeier that "this" happened at Aunt Angie's house more than once that day. When asked if anything went inside her "pee-pee," I.H. said that defendant's finger did. I.H. further told Heilemeier that defendant's "pee-pee" touched her mouth, and he made her suck it. I.H. described defendant's penis as "big and long."

¶ 7 I.H. also told Heilemeier that, at Aunt Angie's house, defendant placed his penis inside her "pee-pee," placed his penis inside her butt, and made her suck his penis. I.H. said that he committed each act more than once. When Heilemeier asked I.H. if defendant committed these types of acts against her anywhere besides Aunt Angie's house, I.H. said no.

¶ 8 Later, when asked if defendant did anything to her when they lived in De Kalb, I.H. told Heilemeier that defendant made her suck his penis in the bathroom. When Heilemeier asked I.H. if this occurred more than 10 times at the De Kalb house, I.H. answered, "More times. More, more, more, more."

¶ 9 The trial court found that the time, content, and circumstances of I.H.'s out-of-court statements provided sufficient reliability safeguards under section 115-10 of the Code. See 725 ILCS 5/115-10(b)(1)(2)(A) (West 2012). The court ruled that the statements would be admissible, provided that I.H. testified at trial.

¶ 10 At trial, I.H. testified that, when she was in kindergarten, she lived with defendant and his wife, Amie Riggs. According to I.H., defendant touched his penis to her mouth, to her "pee pee," and to her butt. I.H. did not specify where those acts occurred.

¶ 11 On cross-examination, I.H. testified that she did not recall her kindergarten teacher asking her if anything bad had happened to her, nor did she remember telling her teacher that nothing bad had happened. According to I.H., when she was six years old, she lived in a house on Market Street with Amie and others. She did not know where Market Street was located. She had also lived with Amie and others at her grandfather's house in Aurora. She visited her Aunt Angie at her house in Yorkville. On redirect examination, I.H. testified that the Market Street house was in De Kalb.

¶ 12 Paszotta and Heilemeier testified as they had at the section 115-10 hearing.

¶ 13 Detective Mark Nachman of the De Kalb Police Department testified regarding his interview of defendant. A video recording and transcript of the interview were admitted at trial. During the interview, defendant admitted to several incidents of sexual conduct with I.H. in Yorkville. Those incidents included her touching and licking his penis, and his rubbing his penis between her buttocks and on the outside of her vagina. At one point, defendant admitted that his penis accidentally and briefly went inside I.H.'s anus and vagina. Defendant denied having anal or vaginal sex with I.H. in De Kalb. However, defendant told Nachman that he had masturbated in front of I.H. "a few times" in the De Kalb house and that he and I.H. had oral sex there three times.

¶ 14 At the end of the interview, Nachman went to get water for defendant. While he was gone, defendant ingested a large amount of Xanax. When Nachman returned to the interview room, defendant was unresponsive. He was taken to a hospital. Deputy Naomi Faivre of the De Kalb County sheriff's office testified that, when she encountered defendant at the hospital, he told her that he had" 'rubbed [his] dick on [his] daughter.' "

¶ 15 Defendant testified that he was under the influence of Xanax when he arrived for his interview with Nachman. He could recall only "[b]its and pieces" of the interview and did not remember signing a Miranda waiver (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). He denied ever putting his penis inside I.H.'s butt or vagina or placing his finger in her vagina.

¶ 16 The jury found defendant guilty of nine counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child: four counts of penis-to-mouth contact, two counts of penis-to-sex organ contact, two counts of penis-to-anus contact, and one count of finger-to-sex organ contact. The jury found defendant not guilty of the remaining six counts of penis-to-mouth contact.

¶ 17 Defendant filed a posttrial motion, which was denied. He then filed a pro se motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (1984)). The trial court denied the motion, finding that defendant's claims all related to trial strategy and, therefore, he was not entitled to new counsel.

¶ 18 Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied his right to confront I.H., as her trial testimony accused defendant of fewer offenses than her hearsay statements admitted under section 115-10 of the Code. People v. Riggs, 2019 IL App (2d) 160991, ¶ 23. According to defendant, I.H. could not be considered available for cross-examination as to the offenses she described in her statements but not in her trial testimony. Riggs, 2019 IL App (2d) 160991, ¶ 23. We rejected that contention and affirmed defendant's convictions. Riggs, 2019 IL App (2d) 160991, ¶ 1. In doing so, we noted that defendant did not dispute that I.H.'s statements to Paszotta and Heilemeier were admissible under section 115-10. Riggs, 2019 IL App (2d) 160991, ¶ 39.

¶ 19 On April 28, 2023, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition under the PostConviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)). The petition alleged actual innocence and raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Defendant claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective for inter alia, failing to challenge the admissibility of I.H.'s hearsay statements...