People v. Riley

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LESTER KENJI RILEY, Defendant and Appellant.

D077512

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

May 27, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. SCE383309)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Lantz Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.

Gary V. Crooks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos, Kathryn Kirschbaum and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted Lester K. Riley of attempted murder after he randomly attacked and stabbed a 75-year-old man on the street. On appeal, Riley asserts the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial and in failing to order a second competency hearing before sentencing him. He also contends there was insufficient evidence to support his attempted murder conviction. Because we conclude there was no error and substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

75-year-old S.H.¹ was on an evening walk with his adult daughter and her two young children. As the family waited at a crosswalk to cross the street, Riley approached them with a steak knife in his hand. Riley made eye contact with S.H. and, without saying a word, rushed at S.H. and started stabbing him. Neither men knew each other. As S.H. tried to back away, he tripped over a rock and fell on his back. Riley continued stabbing S.H. When a witness across the street yelled at Riley—"Hey, what are you doing?"—Riley stopped and fled. Riley never said a word during the attack.

Police responded within minutes and quickly located Riley about a block away from the crime scene, still holding the knife. He eventually complied with police commands to drop the knife but refused to get on the ground. The police fired a beanbag round and tased Riley to make him comply. As he was being arrested, Riley made "mostly nonsensical" statements to the officers. Concerned he may be suicidal, the officers transported Riley for a mental health evaluation. Blood drawn from Riley did not detect alcohol or drugs in his system.

Riley stabbed S.H. at least five times, including once in the face above his eye, twice in his upper chest, and twice in his left arm. At the hospital,S.H. received stitches, but he did not need surgery and he went home the same day.

A jury convicted Riley of attempted murder (Pen. Code,² §§ 187, subd. (a), 664),³ assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and two misdemeanor counts of cruelty to a child (§ 273a, subd. (b)). As to the attempted murder and assault charges, the jury also found true the allegations that Riley inflicted great bodily injury upon an elderly person (§ 12022.7, subd. (c)) and personally used a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced Riley to 15 years in prison.

DISCUSSION

I.No Error in Trial Court's Competency Decision

Riley claims the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial after conducting a hearing on the issue and erred again when it failed to order a second competency hearing at the time of his sentencing. We conclude there was no error.

A. Trial Court Proceedings

After arraignment, defense counsel declared a doubt as to Riley's competency to stand trial. The trial court suspended proceedings pursuant to section 1368, set a competency hearing, and appointed Dr. Matthew Carroll to conduct a competency evaluation of Riley.

After evaluating Riley, Dr. Carroll concluded "with reasonable medical certainty, that although [Riley] appears to have a history of psychotic disorder, and clinically has a lower than average intellect, he does understand the nature of the proceedings against him, and he can assist his attorney in a rational manner in his own defense at this time."

Upon reviewing Dr. Carroll's report, Riley asked the court to continue the competency hearing so he could obtain his own evaluation. The court granted the continuance. When the competency hearing was held, Riley's counsel informed the court that he "was able to consult with an independent doctor" and that he would "stipulate to the qualifications of [Dr. Carroll] and submit on those findings."

Based on the parties' stipulation, the trial court received Dr. Carroll's report into evidence at the competency hearing. Neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor offered any argument on the question of Riley's competence. The court determined that Riley was mentally competent to stand trial and reinstated criminal proceedings. After a two-day trial, the jury convicted Riley on all counts and the court set the matter for sentencing.

A probation officer interviewed Riley to prepare a probation and sentencing report. The probation officer observed that Riley was "polite throughout the interview" and although "[i]t was slightly difficult to keep him on track, . . . he was able to answer most questions posed by the [probation officer], without venturing too far off topic." Riley accepted responsibility for the attack, "but disagree[d] with his actions being labeled and charged as attempted murder." He did not provide details on the attack "on the advice of his attorney," who was present at the interview.

For the sentencing hearing, Riley submitted a statement in mitigation and a report from Dr. David DeFrancesco, whom defense counsel had hired toconduct an independent psychological evaluation of Riley. The purpose of Dr. DeFrancesco's evaluation of Riley was "to assess [Riley] for a mental disorder and if found[, to] describe how it impacts [Riley's] functioning and to provide an opinion regarding his risk for future acts of violence." Dr. DeFrancesco offered no opinion as to Riley's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to rationally assist his attorney in his own defense.

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that Riley's mental illness was a mitigating factor warranting a reduced sentence but did not declare any doubt about Riley's competence.

The trial court expressed sympathy for Riley's mental health issues but stated public safety was its priority. The court noted that Riley had a "history of escalating violence," and there was "uncertainty of what's going to happen if Mr. Riley is in an unstructured environment." The court sentenced Riley to a term of 15 years in prison.

B. Legal Principles

" ' "Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent." ' " (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1032 (Mai), quoting Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 181; § 1367, subd. (a) ["A person shall not be tried or adjudged to punishment . . . while that person is mentally incompetent"].) " ' "A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he or she lacks ' "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—[or lacks] . . . a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him." ' " ' " (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1032; § 1367, subd. (a)) ["A defendant is mentally incompetent . . . if, as a result of a mental healthdisorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner."].) The law presumes the defendant competent unless he proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f).)

"Both federal due process and state law require a trial judge to suspend trial proceedings and conduct a competency hearing whenever the court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial." (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847 (Rogers).) Accordingly, section 1368 provides that, "[i]f, during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment, . . . a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant" (§ 1368, subd. (a)) or if defense counsel declares a doubt as to the defendant's mental competence (§ 1368, subd. (b)), the court shall order a competency hearing and suspend criminal proceedings until the defendant's mental competence has been determined (§ 1368, subd. (c)).

"Substantial evidence of incompetence exists when a qualified mental health expert who has examined the defendant states under oath, and ' " 'with particularity,' " ' a professional opinion that because of mental illness, the defendant is incapable of understanding the purpose or nature of the criminal proceedings against him, or of cooperating with counsel." (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 1032-1033.) "Evidence of incompetence may [also] emanate from [other] sources, including the defendant's demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental evaluations." (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847.) " '[M]ore is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions[citation] or bizarre statements' " by the defendant. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 742 (Welch).)

"On appeal, the reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the trial court's finding" as to defendant's competence during a competency hearing. (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131, citing People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31.) "By the same token, and absent a showing of 'incompetence'...