People v. Robinson

318 Cal.Rptr.3d 717

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Royce Lanele ROBINSON, Defendant and Appellant.

G063090

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3.

Filed February 27, 2024

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Samuel Diaz, Jr., Judge. Affirmed. (Super. Ct. No. BAF2001524)

Heather L. Beugen, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Donald W. Ostertag and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

MOORE, J.

The prosecution charged Royce Lanele Robinson with committing domestic violence and other related crimes against his girlfriend Jane Doe on or about three separate dates. During a jury trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of a prior domestic violence conviction (involving a different victim) in order to show Robinson had a propensity to commit such crimes. (See Evid. Code, § 1109.)¹ The jury ultimately found Robinson guilty of committing two crimes against Doe: domestic violence with great bodily injury, and spousal battery (as a lesser included offense).

On appeal, Robinson claims the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to introduce his prior domestic violence conviction without a showing of the underlying facts. But Robinson’s claim has been forfeited on appeal because he did not raise this argument in the trial court. In any event, we find the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the section 1109 evidence. Further, even if we were to find an error, we would not find the error to be prejudicial. Thus, we affirm the judgment.

I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 17, 2020, at about 10:30 p.m., Robinson was driving his car in Hemet and Doe was in the front passenger seat. As Robinson approached a stop sign, he pushed Doe out of the passenger side door and then sped away squealing his tires. Doe landed headfirst on the side of the road. A woman saw what happened, pulled over her car, and drove Doe to a nearby gas station. The woman observed Doe had a black eye, marks on her neck, and cuts on her arms. Doe told the woman that Robinson had hit her, strangled her, and "she was scared he was going to come back looking for her."

Police arrived and spoke to Doe, who described her relationship with Robinson as "friends with benefits." Doe said she and Robinson had been at a casino where they had an argument. Doe said the argument continued in the car, where Robinson had punched her in the face, strangled her, and bit her. Doe said that at one point she told Robinson she wanted to get out of the car, and she opened the passenger door. Doe said that as the car was slowly moving Robinson pushed her out. Doe later gave a similar account to a forensic nurse.

On January 11, 2021, police went to a Hemet hospital to investigate a domestic violence report. Doe said that about five days prior she and Robinson had gotten into an argument. Doe said, "She was laying on her back on [Robinson’s] bed and he took his hand … and pushed down on her chest." Doe said, "She heard a pop or a crack." Doe was in pain and could not breathe. Doe said the day before Robinson did the same thing to her, so she went to the hospital for chest x-rays, and she had returned this day to get the results. The x-rays showed Doe had a fractured sternum.

On February 4, 2021, at a Riverside hospital, Doe reported to police that on the prior day Robinson had kept her in his bedroom for about eight hours, and during that time he repeatedly physically and sexually assaulted her.

Court Proceedings

The prosecution filed a seven-count information. Count one (November 17, 2020), and count two (January 10, 2021), alleged Robinson inflicted a corporal injury upon Doe resulting in a traumatic condition. (Pen. Code, § 273.5.) Counts three through seven (February 4, 2021), alleged the following crimes: inflicting a corporal injury (Pen. Code, § 273.5); rape by force (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)); sexual penetration by force (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)); false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236); and sexual penetration by force (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)). As to counts one through three, the information alleged great bodily injury enhancements. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (e).) The information further alleged Robinson had two prior "strike" convictions. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A).)

In a pretrial motion, the trial court admitted into evidence the record of a 2017 Penal Code section 273.5 misdemeanor conviction Robinson had sustained (the hearing will be covered in detail in the discussion section of this opinion).

As to count one, Doe testified at trial that she jumped out of Robinson’s car and "scraped myself and hit myself in the face with the pavement." As to count two, Doe said she did not remember anything related to the injury to her chest. As to counts three through seven, Doe testified that she lied to the police about what Robinson had done to her and she inflicted the injuries upon herself. As to all the counts, police officers and other witnesses generally testified as to Doe’s prior inconsistent statements.

In the defense case, Robinson’s mother testified Doe had lived with her and her son for a period of time. Ms. Robinson said that on one occasion her son was yelling for her to come into his bedroom because Doe was choking on something. Ms. Robinson said she entered the bedroom and saw her son "trying to give [Doe] the Heimlich." Ms. Robinson said her son told her to call 911, but Doe "stopped me and said, It’s okay."

As to pushing Doe out of his car (count one), the jury found Robinson guilty of misdemeanor spousal battery (as a lesser included offense). (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e).) As to inflicting Doe’s chest injury (count two), the jury found Robinson guilty as charged and found true the great bodily injury enhancement. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, 12022.7, subd. (e).) As to the remaining charges (counts three through seven), the jury found Robinson not guilty. The trial court struck one strike prior and imposed a sentence of 13 years and 364 days in state prison.

II DISCUSSION

On appeal, Robinson contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to introduce into evidence the record of his prior domestic violence conviction under section 1109. We disagree.

[1–3] We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence under section 1109 for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 531, 110 Cal. Rptr.3d 515.) "The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious." (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 250, 182 P.3d 579, fns. omitted.)

In this part of the discussion, we shall: A) state relevant legal principles; B) summarize the trial court proceedings regarding the prosecution’s motion to introduce section 1109 evidence; and C) analyze the law as applied to the facts.

A. Relevant Legal Principles

Generally, "evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmis- sible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion." (§ 1101, subd. (a), italics added.)

However, when a "defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." (§ 1108, subd. (a), italics added.) Similarly, when a "defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not Inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." (§ 1109, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)

Section 1108 and section 1109 reflect the Legislature's determination that in sexual offense cases and domestic violence cases, "similar prior offenses are uniquely probative of a defendant's guilt on a later occasion." (People v. Merchant (2019) 40 Cal. App.5th 1179, 1192, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 766; see also People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 502, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 161 P.3d 58 [" ‘section 1108 implicitly abrogates prior decisions of this court indicating that "propensity" evidence is per se unduly prejudicial to the defense’ "].)

[4] "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (§ 352, italics added.) " ‘The prejudice which … section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.’ [Citations.] ‘Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological sense of "prejudging" a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors.’ " (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 958, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.)

[5, 6] Section 1109 and section 352 require a trial court to balance " ‘ "the probative value of the evidence … against four factors: (1) the inflammatory nature of the uncharged conduct; (2) the possibility of confusion of issues; (3) remoteness in time of the uncharged offenses; and (4) the amount of time involved in introducing and refuting the evidence of uncharged offenses." ’ [Citation.] ‘ "The principal factor affecting the probative...