People v. Robinson

1

2023 IL App (4th) 220096-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER A. ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-22-0096

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fourth District

May 30, 2023

This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County No. 03CF3197 Honorable Joseph G. McGraw, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

KNECHT, JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: (1) The appellate court affirmed the trial court's third-stage denial of defendant's amended postconviction petition. (2) Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to base the pretrial motion to suppress defendant's confession on its alleged involuntariness, and appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. (3) Defendant did not satisfy his burden of demonstrating a substantial constitutional violation at the third-stage evidentiary hearing. (4) Postconviction counsel did not provide unreasonable assistance at the third-stage evidentiary hearing in attempting to demonstrate the claimed ineffectiveness of trial and appellate counsel.

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Christopher A. Robinson was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2002)) and sentenced to 50 years in prison. On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. People v. Robinson, No 2-07-0691 (April 20, 2009) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). In February 2010, defendant filed a pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010)). The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, but the appellate court reversed and remanded for second-stage proceedings. People v. Robinson, 2012 IL App (2d) 100536-U. Thereafter, defendant, through counsel, filed an amended postconviction petition, asserting both trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. On remand, a different trial court judge granted the State's motion to dismiss the postconviction petition. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for third-stage proceedings. People v. Robinson, No. 2-17-0561 (December 18, 2019) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). On remand, a different trial court judge denied defendant's postconviction petition following the third-stage evidentiary hearing.

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying his amended postconviction petition following the third-stage evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On November 26, 2003, defendant was charged by indictment with one count of first degree murder knowing such act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2002)) following the fatal shooting of Shontrelle Graham in October 2003. A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and the trial court sentenced him to 50 years' imprisonment.

¶ 6 Defendant appealed, arguing the prosecutor's improper remarks during closing argument deprived defendant of a fair trial, and the appellate court affirmed. Robinson No. 2-07-0691 (April 20, 2009) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 7 On February 1, 2010, defendant filed a pro se petition under the Act, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective in connection with a pretrial motion to suppress his confession where he failed to present evidence of diminished mental capacity, purportedly establishing the involuntariness of the confession. (This motion was instead grounded on the purported illegality of defendant's detention at the time of his confession.) More specifically, defendant alleged he had informed trial counsel, inter alia, of having been (1) diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and a learning disability, (2) previously hospitalized for mental health issues, and (3) physically abused as a child. Defendant argued trial counsel's failure to base the pretrial suppression motion on his diminished mental capacity amounted to unreasonable performance and, but for this, there is a reasonable probability he would not have been convicted. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding defendant's contentions of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness to be "frivolous and patently without merit." The court found defendant's claims of his appellate counsel's ineffectiveness "likewise frivolous and patently without merit."

¶ 8 Defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for second-stage proceedings, holding "the failure to base *** the motion to suppress on the defendant's alleged diminished mental capacity arguably fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and this failure arguably prejudiced defendant as a motion to suppress grounded on his diminished mental capacity and the alleged involuntariness of his confession arguably would have been granted. Robinson, 2012 IL App (2d) 100536-U, ¶¶ 21-22. The appellate court noted, had the motion been grounded on this basis and granted, "[t]he outcome of the trial arguably would have changed because the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming." Id. ¶ 22.

¶ 9 Following remand for second-stage proceedings, defendant, through counsel, filed an amended postconviction petition. Defendant argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence at the hearing on the pretrial suppression motion regarding his alleged diminished mental capacity even though both defendant and his mother had informed trial counsel of his condition. Defendant argued this amounted to unreasonable assistance which prejudiced him at trial, as his purportedly involuntary confession was read to the jury. Defendant additionally argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to have raised trial counsel's ineffectiveness. A different trial court judge presided over the second-stage evidentiary hearing and granted the State's motion to dismiss. The court found the pretrial suppression motion would not have been granted even if the information as to defendant's mental health issues was presented and, therefore, he did not suffer prejudice from trial counsel's failure to present that information.

¶ 10 Defendant appealed the trial court's dismissal and the appellate court reversed and remanded for third-stage proceedings. Robinson, No. 2-17-0561 (December 18, 2019) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). Specifically, the appellate court found the trial court engaged in improper fact-finding and credibility determinations where the pertinent question at the second-stage evidentiary hearing is "whether the petition and accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation." Id. ¶¶ 7-10. The appellate court also directed the case be assigned to a different judge for third-stage proceedings. Id. ¶ 11.

¶ 11 Defendant was the only witness postconviction counsel called to testify at the third-stage evidentiary hearing. Defendant testified about being interrogated by Rockford police detectives and how Detective Mark Jimenez transcribed defendant's verbal statements. Defendant testified he was unable to read or understand the written transcript of his statements and Detective Jimenez read the transcript aloud to him. Defendant explained he had been prescribed psychiatric medication but was not taking it regularly prior to giving his statement. Defendant stated he had also been previously hospitalized for depression. According to defendant, he informed his trial counsel of his mental health issues during their discussions at the jail. Defendant also testified to receiving Social Security benefits for his mental health issues.

¶ 12 During closing argument, postconviction counsel emphasized the only issue trial counsel raised in the pretrial suppression motion was the illegality of defendant's detention. Trial counsel did not raise any issue regarding defendant's purported mental health issues; had he done so, and had this suppression motion been granted, the outcome of the trial would likely have been different given the conflicting eyewitness accounts as to the identity of the shooter. Postconviction counsel noted affidavits and medical records were attached to the instant petition, and those were the only evidence he had given the unavailability at that point of additional records. Postconviction counsel requested the trial court grant the petition and grant defendant a new trial.

¶ 13 For its part, the State argued generally a defendant's mental health issues do not by themselves render a confession involuntary. The State pointed out defendant had an eleventh-grade education at the time he gave his statements he had been apprised of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) and signified his comprehension thereof, and there was no allegation the police engaged in any mental or physical abuse of defendant which could undermine the voluntariness of his confession. The State argued trial counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to base the pretrial suppression motion on defendant's mental health issues and, derivatively, appellate counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to raise this issue. Moreover, the State asserted the documents attached to the petition were inadmissible hearsay. The State then referred to the trial testimony of various detectives pertaining to how defendant acknowledged his understanding of his Miranda rights and agreed to speak, was...