People v. Romulus

189 A.D.3d 553

136 N.Y.S.3d 291

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Clefrantz ROMULUS, Defendant–Appellant.

12276

Ind. No. 3670/15

Case No. 2018-04186

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

ENTERED: December 15, 2020

Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Molly Schindler of counsel), for appellant.

Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Diana J. Lewis of counsel), for respondent.

Acosta, P.J., Singh, Kennedy, Scarpulla, Shulman, JJ.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Raymond L. Bruce, J.), entered on or about November 16, 2018, which adjudicated defendant a level two sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6–C), affirmed, without costs.

On this appeal, we are asked to decide whether defendant was properly adjudicated a level two sex offender pursuant to the Sexual Offender Registration Act (SORA) (Correction Law art. 6–C). We find that the SORA court providently exercised its discretion in reducing defendant's designation to risk level two and in declining to further reduce defendant's designation to risk level one. We further find that the facts and circumstances of this case do not warrant a further downward departure from defendant's presumptive sex offender risk assessment pursuant to our interest of justice jurisdiction.

As an initial matter, we agree with our colleagues that the record does not support an assessment of points under the risk factor for a history of drug or alcohol abuse. While defendant had reported to probation officials that he had used marijuana daily for five years, his more recent history reflected a period of prolonged voluntary abstinence and did not support a finding that defendant had a history of substance abuse that would increase his risk of reoffending (see generally People v. Palmer, 20 N.Y.3d 373, 376, 960 N.Y.S.2d 719, 984 N.E.2d 917 [2013] ). In any event, while we find that defendant should not have been assessed points on this risk factor, a reduction of 15 points does not alter defendant's presumptive risk level two designation.

However, we disagree with our colleagues that a further downward departure is warranted. The Court of Appeals established a three-pronged process for determining whether to permit a downward departure from defendant's presumptive risk level designation ( People v. Gillotti, 23 N.Y.3d 841, 861, 994 N.Y.S.2d 1, 18 N.E.3d 701 [2014] ). First, a court must decide whether the offered mitigating circumstances are "of a kind or to a degree not adequately taken into account by the guidelines" ( id. ). Second, a court must determine whether a defendant has proven the existence of these circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence ( id. at 864, 994 N.Y.S.2d 1, 18 N.E.3d 701 ). Finally, if a defendant meets the first two prongs, a court can permit a downward departure as a matter of discretion "by weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure to avoid an over- or under-assessment of the defendant's dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism" ( id. at 861, 994 N.Y.S.2d 1, 18 N.E.3d 701 ; see also People v. Mirabel, 187 A.D.3d 514, 130 N.Y.S.3d 315 [1st Dept. 2020] ; People v. Anthony P., 187 A.D.3d 479, 130 N.Y.S.3d 296 [1st Dept. 2020] ; People v. Aleman, 187 A.D.3d 482, 130 N.Y.S.3d 285 [1st Dept. 2020] ; People v. Andrew A., 187 A.D.3d 445, 129 N.Y.S.3d 784 [1st Dept. 2020] ).

Here, we find that, under the Gillotti rubric, a downward departure is not warranted. Defendant offers alleged mitigating circumstances that include his "nearly [ ] unblemished" criminal history, that there is no "reliable" evidence that he intentionally targeted a minor, and that this crime is merely "statutory in nature." We do not agree. The record shows that this 27 year-old defendant engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with the victim, who was 14 years old, the only relevant crime considered by the SORA court regarding his risk level designation. Thus, we need not address defendant's lack of criminal record. Additionally, defendant specifically targeted the victim at least four times on the street and on social media. Defendant claimed that the victim first told him she was either 15 or 16 years old, which indicates that he knew she was a minor when he targeted her. Defendant later claimed that the victim first told him she was 19 years old, but this story change is incredible since he twice approached her while she was wearing her school uniform. On one of those occasions, he accosted her while she was walking to a bus stop in her school uniform.

Our colleagues disagree, finding that the mitigating factors cited by defendant were not adequately considered by the SORA court, but they do not articulate how this case meets the criteria articulated by the Court of Appeals in Gillotti. Instead, they emphasize the alleged lack of weight the SORA court afforded to defendant's retained psychiatrist's evaluation, which our colleagues concede is "not technically a mitigating factor." In any event, we need not rely on a defendant's retained psychiatrist when determining a defendant's risk level ( People v. Ferrer, 69 A.D.3d 513, 894 N.Y.S.2d 387 [1st Dept. 2010], lv denied 14 N.Y.3d 709, 2010 WL 1755095 [2010] ).

Further, even if we were to rely on defendant's psychiatrist, he based his opinion on defendant's statements, and failed to discuss that defendant targeted a 14–year–old child in her school uniform and that defendant admitted this in his plea allocution. More importantly, defendant's retained psychiatrist conducted four separate actuarial tests to calculate defendant's risk of re-offense, three of which placed defendant at low risk. However, the test specifically highlighted by the psychiatrist in his report as "arguably the most validated and thoroughly studied risk assessment instrument [RAI] for sexual recidivism," the Static 99–R, placed defendant at average risk, which the SORA court also designated defendant.

We note that the RAI prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders found defendant to be risk level three, meaning a "high risk of repeat offense and a threat to public safety exists." The SORA court weighed the RAI against the psychiatrist's evaluations and defendant's arguments, and properly concluded that defendant had a moderate risk of re-offense so that a downward departure from risk level three to risk level two designation was appropriate.

Our colleagues further contend that there is no evidence that defendant knew that the victim was 14 years old. As stated above, the record evidence shows that he did. In fact, at defendant's plea allocution, he admitted that "on February 4, 2015, when [he] had sexual intercourse with [the victim], [he] knew she was less than fifteen years old at that time [and that] [s]he was fourteen."

Defendant and our colleagues further attempt to characterize this crime as simply "statutory in nature," but this too is unavailing. While courts have recognized that sexual conduct that was nonconsensual solely by virtue of age may result in an over-assessment in risk level designation, those cases did not involve a defendant who was nearly twice as old as the victim, as in this case (see People v. Secor, 171 A.D.3d 1314, 1315, 95 N.Y.S.3d 665 [3d Dept. 2019] [10–year age difference but the victim was about to turn 17, the age of legal consent, and consented to sexual intercourse]; People v. Fisher, 177 A.D.3d 615, 111 N.Y.S.3d 80 [2d Dept. 2019] [six-year age difference]; People v. Carter, 138 A.D.3d 706, 707, 30 N.Y.S.3d 141 [2d Dept. 2016] [five-year age difference] ). Further, the cases that held that a downward departure was warranted involved sexual consent. Here, the record establishes that the sexual activity was nonconsensual and, at times, forceful ("[M]idway through the second encounter ... she ceased to consent,"; "[T]he complainant in this case testified in the grand jury that she, on several occasions, said no and asked the defendant to stop and that he did not head [sic] her protest of no,"; "[The victim] told him no multiple times and got up and tried to leave. [Defendant] placed his arm in front of the victim which blocked her from going down the stairs.... [Defendant] pulled her pants and underwear down, bent her over," and commenced sexual intercourse). In sum, we disagree with our colleagues and find that defendant has not proven the existence of any mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.

Finally, the circumstances here do not mirror the "rare cases in which we should exercise our discretion" in the interest of justice "to depart downward from [a] defendant's presumptive sex offender risk assessment level" ( People v. Williams, 148 A.D.3d 540, 540, 49 N.Y.S.3d 671 [1st Dept. 2017] [where 30 years after defendant was convicted of the rape and robbery of a 22–year–old woman the court granted a downward departure to risk level two, finding that his pain and mobility problems paired with his completion of significant academic and therapeutic programing "greatly diminish[ed] his likelihood of re-offending"]; see also People v. McKelvin, 127 A.D.3d 440, 7 N.Y.S.3d 94 [1st Dept. 2015] [where we exercised our discretion to grant a downward departure after the SORA court found that defendant's mental retardation warranted an upward departure] ). The considerations that underpin the above cases are not present here, and while our colleagues disagree, they do not point to any other circumstances warranting a further departure in the exercise of our discretion.

Accordingly, a level two risk designation is appropriate, given defendant's average risk of sexual recidivism.

All concur except Acosta, P.J., and Shulman, J., who dissent in a memorandum by Acosta, P.J., as follows:

ACOSTA, P.J. (Dissenting)

I agree with the majority that the record does not support an assessment of points under the risk factor for a history of drug...