People v. Ruiz

59 Cal.App.5th 372

273 Cal.Rptr.3d 496

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Bryant RUIZ, Defendant and Appellant.

D076580

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed December 30, 2020

John L. Staley, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

McCONNELL, P. J.

IINTRODUCTION

Bryant Ruiz appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss a petition to revoke parole filed by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) for lack of jurisdiction. Even though the parties stipulated Ruiz was not convicted of a serious felony and should have been placed on post-release community supervision (PRCS) rather than parole when he was released from prison, the trial court denied Ruiz's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely under Penal Code ¹ section 3000.08, subdivision (l ), because he did not challenge his supervision placement within 60 days of his release. Ruiz contends the application of section 3000.08, subdivision (l ) in this instance infringed his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. We conclude the application of the 60-day limitation in this case violated Ruiz's procedural due process rights. Therefore, we reverse the order and direct the trial court to enter a new order granting Ruiz's motion to dismiss and transferring Ruiz from parole supervision to PRCS.

IIFACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ruiz pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of brass knuckles ( § 21810 ) and misdemeanor vandalism ( § 594, subds. (a), (b)(2)(A) ) for defacing another's property by tagging where the value of the damage was less than $400. He admitted an allegation the vandalism was done in association with and for the benefit of a street gang ( § 186.22, subd. (d) ). He was sentenced to three years in state prison.

Ruiz was released from prison on parole supervision on April 9, 2018. The CDCR provided him a document entitled "Notice and Conditions of Parole," which stated he was being released to parole supervision and advised him of the conditions of his parole. The notice advised him of the right to appeal the conditions of his parole.

Ruiz was continued on parole without formal revocation seven times between April and the end of December 2018. The CDCR filed a parole revocation petition in June 2019 alleging Ruiz had absconded parole supervision since January 2019.

On June 24, 2019, the court revoked Ruiz's parole and set a hearing for the next day. Ruiz's appointed counsel for the parole revocation proceeding discovered Ruiz's crimes did not constitute a serious felony and, therefore, he should have been placed on PRCS instead of under parole.

The next day, Ruiz filed a form requesting a parole revocation evidentiary hearing and challenging parole jurisdiction. He also moved to dismiss the parole revocation proceeding on grounds that the Department of Parole lacked jurisdiction and the application of section 3000.08, subdivision (l ), violated his constitutional rights of equal protection and due process. He asked the court to terminate parole supervision and order him to report to PRCS.

Ruiz also completed and mailed an administrative appeal form on June 25, 2019. The CDCR cancelled the administrative appeal as untimely under section 3000.08, subdivision (l ) and, therefore, not within the jurisdiction of the CDCR.

The People opposed Ruiz's motion to dismiss asserting, as they do here, that the court did not have the authority to terminate parole or address Ruiz's classification issues based, in part, on section 3000.08, subdivision (l ). The People asserted Ruiz should seek a remedy through a petition for habeas corpus after exhausting his administrative remedies. Although the People conceded the CDCR made a mistake and should have placed Ruiz on PRCS instead of parole supervision because he was not charged with a serious felony, they contended section 3000.08, subdivision (l ) prohibits transfer of supervision to PRCS. They further contended section 3000.08 is not unconstitutionally vague and Ruiz did not show the statute was applied in an unconstitutional manner.

The trial court found it had jurisdiction to hear Ruiz's motion, but denied the motion to dismiss the petition. The court determined a parolee, such as Ruiz, has the right to contest the validity of his type of supervision within the context of a parole violation hearing. The court noted the parties agreed Ruiz should have been placed on PRCS rather than parole. However, the court concluded section 3000.08, subdivision (l ) was not unconstitutionally vague and the application of the 60-day limit for challenging supervision placement did not violate due process. The court revoked Ruiz's parole, reinstated it with the same terms and conditions, and ordered Ruiz to serve 100 days in custody as a sanction with credits of 93 days.

IIIDISCUSSION

AJurisdiction

" ‘PRCS was created as part of the 2011 Criminal Justice Realignment Act (Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011–2012, ch. 12, § 1 ), which "changed the paradigm for the incarceration and postconviction supervision of persons convicted of certain felony offenses." [Citation.] "In the wake of realignment, a person released from prison is subject to a period of either parole ( § 3000 et seq. ) or postrelease community supervision ( § 3450 et seq. ). [Citation.] Parole applies to high-level offenders, i.e., third strikers, high-risk sex offenders, and persons imprisoned for serious or violent felonies or who have a severe mental disorder and committed specified crimes. ( § 3451, subd. (b).) All other released persons are placed on [PRCS]. ( § 3451, subd. (a).)" ’ " ( People v. Johnson (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 379, 392, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 639 ( Johnson ).)

An objective of realignment was to transfer substantial responsibilities from the state to the local level to reduce recidivism and improve public safety. Reaffirming its commitment to reducing recidivism ( § 17.5, subd. (a)(1) ), the Legislature declared that "[c]riminal justice policies that rely on building and operating more prisons" were "not sustainable" and did "not result in improved public safety" (§ 17.5, subd. (a)(3)); that "California must reinvest its criminal justice resources to support community-based corrections programs and evidence-based practices" to "achieve improved public safety" (id. , subd. (a)(4)); and that to improve public safety and facilitate reintegration back into society, "low-level felony offenders who do not have prior convictions for serious, violent, or sex offenses" should be realigned "to locally run community-based corrections programs," (id. , subd. (a)(5)).

The Realignment Act shifted jurisdiction over most petitions to revoke parole from the Board of Parole Hearings to the superior courts. ( § 3000.08, subds. (a), (f), added by Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 38 [Assem. Bill No. 117]; amended by Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 35 [Sen. Bill No. 1023].) "In 2012 the Legislature amended section 1203.2 to incorporate parole into the statutes governing revocation of probation, mandatory supervision, and postrelease community supervision. ( § 1203.2, subds. (a), (b)(1), (f)(3)(E), as amended by Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 30 [Sen. Bill No. 1023].) Its stated intent was ‘to provide for a uniform supervision revocation process for petitions to revoke probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision, and parole.’ (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2, subd. (a).)" ( People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 647, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 784, 399 P.3d 13 ( DeLeon ).)

In Johnson, supra , 45 Cal.App.5th at page 401, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 639, we rejected the People's argument that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to transfer a defendant from parole supervision to PRCS in the context of a parole revocation proceeding "merely because the defendant also has the remedy of an administrative appeal and a habeas corpus petition." We concluded that, although a trial court may not terminate parole as a sanction for violating the conditions of parole, it may transfer someone from parole supervision to PRCS when the CDCR has made a mistake in classifying the person. ( Johnson, supra , 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 396, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 639.)

"[T]he placement of an inmate on parole supervision rather than PRCS is not a discretionary decision. The law provides that unless the requirements for placement on parole are met, ‘all other offenders released from prison shall be placed on [PRCS].’ ( § 3000.08, subd. (b), italics added.) In contrast, many of CDCR's decisions about which conditions of parole to impose are discretionary. (See, e.g., §§ 3002 – 3004, 3006, 3008 – 3010, 3010.5, 3010.8.) Because the Legislature gave trial courts the authority to intrude on discretionary choices by CDCR regarding parole supervision, it is reasonable to conclude that it also gave trial courts the authority to correct errors made by CDCR in applying the mandatory rules determining a defendant's classification." ( Johnson, supra , 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 400, fn. 14, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 639.) Thus, "the trial court has the authority in a parole revocation proceeding to consider the issue of whether the defendant was improperly placed on parole supervision rather than PRCS and, if appropriate, to order that supervision be transferred from parole to PRCS under the provision allowing it to ‘modify ... supervision of the person.’ ( § 1203.2, subd. (b)(1).)" ( Johnson , at p. 402, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 639.)

Here, as in Johnson , the CDCR mistakenly classified a defendant as a serious felon and assigned him to parole supervision when he should have been placed on PRCS. We agree with the rationale of Johnson and conclude that, under these circumstances, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion to dismiss th...