People v. Ryan

235 N.E.3d 803

2023 IL App (2d) 220414

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Frank E. RYAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-22-0414

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Filed December 19, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. No. 20-CF-160, Honorable David P. Kliment, Judge, Presiding.

Gilbert C. Lenz, of DePaul University Legal Clinic (Sarah Van Pelt, law student), of Chicago, for appellant.

Jamie L. Mosser, State’s Attorney, of St. Charles (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Max C. Boose, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant, Frank E. Ryan, was found guilty of two counts of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2020)) based on evidence that he rerouted a natural gas line into the home of Richard Rittgarn, while Rittgarn and his son were sleeping. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent six-year prison terms. Defendant argues on appeal that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with the intent to kill. Defendant alternatively argues that the trial court erred in requiring him to be shackled during trial. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Kelsey Pranaitis married Richard Rittgarn in 2021. Before then, Kelsey had been in a relationship with defendant from 2012 to late 2019, at which point she began, or was already in, a relationship with Rittgarn. In the early morning of January 19, 2020, Rittgarn and his son were asleep on the second floor of Rittgarn’s house in Elburn. Rittgarn awoke at about 2:15 a.m. to the smell of natural gas. Rittgarn fell asleep again but reawoke, still smelling gas. Rittgarn discovered that gas was flowing into the house from tubing that was run through a hole in the outside wall of his first-floor office. Rittgarn used a pen to plug the opening of the tubing. Rittgarn went outside to the gas meter and discovered that tubing had been crudely attached to the natural gas line with clamps and a block of wood. The tubing had been fed into the house. After pulling the tubing out of the house, Rittgarn called 911. Rittgarn noticed that his Ring doorbell camera had been covered with duct tape.

¶ 4 Michael Huneke, the duty chief with the Elburn and Countryside Fire Protection District, testified that he arrived at the scene at 2:27 a.m., at which point he turned off the gas. Lieutenant Matt Linden also responded to the 911 call, arriving at the scene at about 2:30 a.m. After the gas was turned off, firefighters entered the house with equipment to measure the level of natural gas inside. They determined the level was 2 to 3% on the first floor and 2% upstairs. Linden testified that he had never heard of a higher gas level in a home. Huneke further testified that the methane in natural gas becomes explosive at a level of 5% if exposed to an ignition source. If an explosion had occurred in Rittgarn’s house, the damage would have been catastrophic and Huneke would not have expected any house occupants to survive. Huneke also testified that natural gas is an asphyxiant.

¶ 5 John Shepard, a detective with the Elburn Police Department, investigated the incident. Shepard testified that the tubing used to pipe the gas into the house had sequential foot markers. The police found a spool of the same tubing at a hardware store in Sugar Grove. The tubing had been cut at the marker next in the sequence of markers on the tubing found at Rittgarn’s home. Surveillance video from the store showed defendant purchasing the tubing. A receipt from the transaction also showed defendant purchasing, inter alia, duct tape and a 12-inch drill bit.

¶ 6 Shepard and Commander Brandon McKiness of the Kane County Sheriff’s Office conducted a video-recorded interview with defendant, which was admitted into evidence. During the interview, defendant indicated that; in November 2019, he learned that Kelsey was having an affair with Rittgarn. Defendant initially indicated that the items he purchased at the hardware store were for use at his home and that he would be shocked to learn that they had been found at Rittgarn’s home. Defendant showed the officers data from his Fitbit showing that he was asleep at the time of the incident. Eventually, however, defendant admitted that he attached the tubing to the gas line at Rittgarn’s house and fed it into the house through a hole he drilled in the wall. Defendant indicated that he intended only to scare the occupants of the house. He explained that he lent his Fitbit to his father so that it would appear to show that defendant was sleeping at the time of the incident. Defendant arrived at Rittgarn’s house at about 1 a.m. and was there for about 40 minutes. He admitted covering the doorbell camera with duct tape. Defendant did research on whether natural gas would rise or fall. Defendant wanted the gas to rise so that the upstairs occupants would smell the gas odor. When asked about the possibility that a spark might ignite the gas, defendant responded that he knew the Rittgarns got up at about 5 a.m. and that not enough gas would have accumulated by then to cause an explosion. He explained that, in every story he had heard about homes with gas leaks, it took a day or two before "something happen[ed]." Defendant also indicated that he did not think an explosion would occur because, at the connection between the gas line and the tubing, the tubing was "shooting gas out through everything," including toward the ground, and thus would probably not pump any gas into the house.

¶ 7 McKiness testified that defendant gave the impression during the interview that he believed that the smell of the gas would wake the house’s occupants and they would leave.

¶ 8 After the trial court found him guilty of attempted first degree murder, defendant filed a posttrial motion. The court denied the motion. Following his sentencing, defendant filed this timely appeal.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[1–4] ¶ 11 Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, " ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). "[A] reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses." People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224-25, 336 Ill.Dec. 223, 920 N.E.2d 233 (2009).

[5] ¶ 12 Section 8-4(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILC 5/8-4(a) (West 2020)) provides, "A person commits the offense of attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he or she does any act that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense." (Emphasis added.) Under section 4-4 of the Code (id. § 4-4), "[a] person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct." In People v. Petermon, 2014 IL App (1st) 113536, ¶ 39, 385 Ill.Dec. 557, 19 N.E.3d 115, the court observed that, "[t]o support a conviction for attempted murder, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant performed an act constituting a ‘substantial step’ toward the commission of murder, and (2) the defendant possessed the criminal intent to kill the victim." Intent to kill "may be inferred when it has been demonstrated that the defendant voluntarily and willingly committed an act, the natural tendency of which is to destroy another’s life." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In Petermon—where the defendant shot, but did not kill, another individual—the court affirmed the defendant’s attempted murder conviction, noting that "an intent to kill may be proven where the surrounding circumstances show that the defendant fir[ed] *** a gun at or towards another person with either malice or a total disregard for human life." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶¶ 39, 44. We see no reason to limit this principle to cases involving firearms, as opposed to other dangerous instrumentalities. Hence, proof that a defendant committed potentially lethal acts with a total disregard for human life is sufficient to establish the intent element of the offense of attempted first degree murder.

¶ 13 With these principles in mind, we consider defendant’s argument that the State failed to prove he acted with the requisite intent to kill the occupants of the home. Defendant argues that the State failed to prove he intended anything other than scaring the occupants. Although that is what defendant told the police, the trial court was under no obligation to believe defendant’s self-serving statements that were not made under oath.

¶ 14 Defendant also points out that there is no evidence that he knew natural gas is an asphyxiant. However, it is a matter of common knowledge that natural gas is an asphyxiant, and it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that defendant would have been aware of that fact. Moreover, there is no question that a home filled with natural gas poses a serious danger of a lethal explosion. Defendant admitted that he was aware of this danger, although he told police that, in the accounts of gas leaks...