People v. Ryan

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL PATRICK RYAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 354031

Court of Appeals of Michigan

August 26, 2021

UNPUBLISHED

Ionia Circuit Court LC No. 2019-017881-FH

Before: Ronayne Krause, P.J., and Beckering and Boonstra, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Daniel Patrick Ryan, pleaded no contest to one count of criminal sexual conduct second degree (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (sexual contact with victim under 13 years of age), and one count of possession of child sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(4)(a), pursuant to a conditional plea agreement providing defendant with the right to appeal the trial court's prior adverse ruling on his motion to suppress evidence. The trial court sentenced defendant to 5 to 15 years' imprisonment for the CSC-II conviction, and one to four years' imprisonment for the sexually abusive material conviction, to be served concurrently. Defendant appeals as on leave granted, ^[1] arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and that the sentencing guidelines were improperly calculated. Because we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress and that there was no error in the assessment of the sentencing offense variables (OV), we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of sexual criminal conduct perpetrated against the minor victim, AS. Defendant's children, AR and SR, were close friends with AS. According to an affidavit prepared by Detective Sergeant Phillip A. Hesche of the Ionia County Sheriff's Office for the purpose of obtaining of search warrant for defendant's phone, on the evening of October 4, 2019, AS stayed the night at defendant's house for a sleepover with AR and SR. Defendant was the only adult present, as his wife was attending a church retreat. TS mother of AS, told police officers that AS came home from the sleepover very upset and reported that when she awoke at 6:00 a.m. that morning, defendant was touching her breasts and vagina over her clothes. TS confronted defendant via text message. Defendant acknowledged the assault and apologized. TS called the police, and Deputy Austin Granger of the Ionia County Sheriffs Office responded to her residence. TS then called defendant in Deputy Granger's presence. During the phone call, which Deputy Granger recorded, defendant admitted to touching AS, explaining that he was sorry, that what he did was wrong, and that he broke everyone's trust.

Deputy Granger interviewed defendant at his home. Defendant acknowledged that he touched AS's breast, and that his hand may have touched her vagina, but he asserted that the touching was purely accidental. Defendant was later arrested, and law enforcement obtained a search warrant for the contents of his cellular phone. Following the search of the phone, he was charged with two counts of CSC-II, one count of using a computer to commit a crime, MCL 752.797(3)(d), and three counts of possessing child sexually abusive material.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the court should suppress his statements to law enforcement because he was subjected to a "custodial interrogation," and he was never advised of his Miranda^[2] rights. The motion also alleged that the court should suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search of his phone because the warrant was defective in that it lacked probable cause to support such an exhaustive search. Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. Defendant entered into a conditional plea agreement in which he pleaded no contest to one count of CSC-II and one count of possession of child sexually abusive material. Under the plea agreement, the other counts were dismissed and defendant maintained the right to appeal the adverse ruling on his motion to suppress evidence. Defendant now appeals as on leave granted.

II. ANALYSIS

A. MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement because they were made during a custodial interrogation without being advised of or waiving his Miranda rights in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We disagree.

In considering a motion to suppress evidence, this Court reviews a trial court's factual findings for clear error. To the extent that the court's ruling on a motion to suppress involves an interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, the review is de novo. People v Elliott, 494 Mich. 292, 300-301; 833 N.W.2d 284 (2013). "The ultimate question whether a person was 'in custody' for purposes of Miranda warnings is a mixed question of fact and law, which must be answered independently by the reviewing court after a de novo review of the record." People v Coomer, 245 Mich.App. 206, 219; 627 N.W.2d 612 (2001). Clear error exists where the reviewing court is left with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id.

In Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444; 86 S.Ct. 1602; 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination requires that the accused be given a series of warnings before being subject to "custodial interrogation." "Custodial interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody." People v Anderson, 209 Mich.App. 527, 532; 531 N.W.2d 780 (1995), citing Illinois v Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296; 110 S.Ct. 2394; 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990). However, "volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and are admissible." Id. "Thus, the procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required where the suspect is in custody and is subjected to interrogation." Id. An individual is in custody when their freedom of movement is restricted to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v California, 511 U.S. 318, 322; 114 S.Ct. 1526; 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). The key inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Yarborough v Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663; 124 S.Ct. 2140; 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004). To determine whether a suspect is in custody, a court must examine all "the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322. "[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned." Id. at 323. "Relevant factors include the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning." Howes v Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509; 132 S.Ct. 1181; 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) (citations omitted).

In this case, Deputy Granger arrived at defendant's home in the late afternoon of October 5, 2019. Defendant's driveway led to multiple houses just east of his home. Deputy Granger parked on defendant's front lawn so he would not obstruct traffic. Deputy Granger was dressed in his standard sheriffs department uniform and arrived in a fully marked patrol car. He had a visible sidearm and handcuffs on his belt. Kevin Beck, from child protective services, separately arrived at defendant's residence at the same time. Defendant came to the door, and Deputy Granger asked him to step outside to talk. Defendant agreed. After defendant walked out of his house, Deputy Granger told defendant that he was going to be "tied up" speaking with Deputy Granger "for a while." When Deputy Granger said "tied up," he meant, "occupied;" that "it wasn't going to be a quick conversation." Deputy Granger further testified at the suppression hearing:

So, originally, he stepped out of the residence and sat down on the front step of the porch. I started talking to him, but there were a bunch of kids inside the residence, his children, and I asked him to step away from the house so the children couldn't hear what we were discussing.

Deputy Granger stated that defendant agreed to do that, and they walked toward Granger's patrol car, which was parked about 20 yards from the front porch. When defendant and Deputy Granger moved over to the patrol car, Beck went inside the residence to supervise the children because there were no other adults present. The questioning lasted approximately an hour, and defendant was free to leave afterwards.

Upon review of the record, we conclude that, under the totality of the objective circumstances, defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda because his movement was not restricted to the degree associated with a formal arrest. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322. Defendant was questioned at his own home. He voluntarily stepped outside and moved away from his home toward Deputy Granger's police car when informed that he might not want his children to hear the conversation. During the entire questioning, defendant and Deputy Granger remained on defendant's own property. As the court found, defendant had the opportunity and ability to decline to speak with Deputy Granger and to go back into his home. See Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 663. Defendant was not physically restrained at the time he made the statements. He was not told that he was required to answer questions. He was not threatened with arrest, nor was he arrested. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 509. Deputy Granger did not specifically inform defendant that he was not under arrest, but defendant does not cite any caselaw or statute that provides that such a statement is necessary.

Defendant...