People v. A.S.M.

517 P.3d 675

In re: the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado,

v.In the Interest of: A.S.M., a Juvenile.

Supreme Court Case No. 22SA71

Supreme Court of Colorado.

September 26, 2022

Attorneys for the People of the State of Colorado: John Kellner, District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District, L. Andrew Cooper, Deputy District Attorney, Centennial, Colorado

Attorneys for A.S.M.: Appeal to Justice LLC, Amy D. Trenary, Broomfield, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent Arapahoe County District Court: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Joseph A. Peters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 The question before us in this delinquency case is whether A.S.M., a juvenile, is entitled to have the juvenile court judge review the preliminary hearing finding made by the juvenile court magistrate.¹ The answer is yes.

¶2 Following a preliminary hearing, a magistrate in the Eighteenth Judicial District determined that probable cause existed to believe that A.S.M. had committed the delinquent acts alleged. A.S.M. timely sought review of the magistrate's probable cause determination. But the juvenile court declined to review the matter on the merits, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the magistrate's preliminary hearing finding did not constitute a final order. A.S.M. then invoked our original jurisdiction, and we issued a rule to show cause.

¶3 We now make the rule absolute. While only a district court magistrate's final orders or judgments—namely, those fully resolving an issue or claim—are reviewable under C.R.M. 7(a)(3), the preliminary hearing statute in the Children's Code, section 19-2.5-609(3), C.R.S. (2022), specifically permits review of a magistrate's preliminary hearing finding.² Section 19-1-108(5.5), C.R.S. (2022), which sets the ground rules for a section 19-2.5-609(3) review, doesn't alter this conclusion. Therefore, we need not get in the middle of the parties' tug-of-war over whether the magistrate's preliminary hearing finding in this case constituted a final order. Instead, we hold that section 19-2.5-609(3) entitles prosecutors and juveniles alike to ask a juvenile court to review a magistrate's preliminary hearing finding in a delinquency proceeding.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶4 Between July 1 and July 4, 2020, A.S.M., then sixteen years old, allegedly committed delinquent acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute two class 6 felonies, two class 1 misdemeanors, and one class 2 misdemeanor. The prosecution filed a five-count delinquency petition against him, and he was detained pending adjudication. Because A.S.M. was accused of two offenses that would qualify as class 6 felonies in the adult arena (attempted aggravated motor vehicle theft in the second degree and conspiracy to commit that crime), and because he was in custody, he was eligible for a preliminary hearing on those offenses. § 19-2.5-609(2)(b).

¶5 A.S.M. requested, and a magistrate conducted, a preliminary hearing. During the hearing, the prosecution called one witness, the investigating detective. At the conclusion of the hearing, A.S.M. argued that the prosecution had failed to establish probable cause to believe that he had committed the delinquent acts alleged in the two counts in question. The magistrate thought this was a "close" call but ultimately found that probable cause existed as to both offenses. A.S.M. then timely petitioned the juvenile court for review of the magistrate's probable cause determination.

¶6 In a well-written order, the juvenile court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the magistrate's probable cause finding. To unravel the "confusion around this issue," the court first looked to section 19-2.5-609(3) for guidance. It pointed out that this provision "seemingly suggests" that either party may ask a juvenile court to review a magistrate's preliminary hearing finding in a delinquency proceeding. But the court felt that section 19-2.5-609(3) was in conflict with other authority.

¶7 To begin, the court observed that section 19-2.5-609(3) states that any review of a preliminary hearing finding must be performed pursuant to section 19-1-108(5.5), which the court read as requiring a final order. The court added that C.R.M. 7 ("Review of District Court Magistrate Orders or Judgments") and People in the Interest of J.D., 2020 CO 48, 464 P.3d 785, corroborate the conclusion that parties can only seek review of a magistrate's ruling if it constitutes a final order or judgment. See C.R.M. 7(a)(3) ("Only a final order or judgment of a magistrate is reviewable under this Rule. A final order or judgment is that which fully resolves an issue or claim."); J.D., ¶ 12, 464 P.3d at 788 (indicating that, under C.R.M. 7(a)(3), a district court magistrate's decisions "that are not themselves final become subject to review by a district court judge only after entry of a final order or judgment, which fully resolves the issue or claim being litigated at the proceeding in question"). Continuing, the court reasoned that the magistrate's preliminary hearing finding was not a final order subject to review under C.R.M. 7 and J.D. because it did not fully resolve an issue or claim. Lastly, the court analogized a provision in section 19-2.5-609 to parts of Crim. P. 5 and 7, the rules governing preliminary hearings in adult cases. Like Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(III) and 7(h)(4), section 19-2.5-609(1)(d) requires that the accused's case be set for trial upon a finding of probable cause following a preliminary hearing. The court inferred from this similarity that the next step in the proceeding was to set A.S.M.'s case for trial, thereby eliminating any opportunity for review of the magistrate's preliminary hearing finding.

¶8 A.S.M. thereafter filed a petition in our court seeking exercise of our original jurisdiction pursuant to C.A.R. 21. For the reasons we set forth next, we decided to exercise our original jurisdiction.

II. Reasons Justifying Exercise of Our Original Jurisdiction

¶9 Under C.A.R. 21, we have sole discretion to exercise our original jurisdiction. See C.A.R. 21(a)(1). However, because a C.A.R. 21 proceeding is extraordinary in nature and limited in purpose and availability, we have historically cabined exercise of our original jurisdiction to such circumstances as when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, a party may suffer irreparable harm, or a petition raises an issue of first impression that has significant public importance.

People v. Cortes-Gonzalez, 2022 CO 14, ¶ 21, 506 P.3d 835, 842. In his C.A.R. 21 petition, A.S.M. argued that the circumstances here justified exercise of our original jurisdiction. As the rule to show cause we issued evinces, we agreed.

¶10 First, A.S.M. has no adequate appellate remedy. The juvenile court's alleged error implicates his right to review of the magistrate's preliminary hearing finding, and that right will be rendered moot after trial. Cf. People v. Rowell, 2019 CO 104, ¶ 11, 453 P.3d 1156, 1159 (reaching a similar conclusion with respect to the right to a preliminary hearing); People v. Tafoya, 2019 CO 13, ¶ 15, 434 P.3d 1193, 1195 (same).

¶11 Second, the juvenile court's denial of A.S.M.'s request for review, if incorrect, deprives him of a statutory right and may require him to improperly remain in custody. Cf. Rowell, ¶ 12, 453 P.3d at 1159 (noting that denial of the request for a preliminary hearing on the relevant charges, if incorrect, deprived the defendant of a statutory right and potentially required him to improperly remain in custody until trial). To the extent the juvenile court erred, no appellate relief will be able to undo the wrong inflicted on A.S.M. Thus, absent exercise of our original jurisdiction, A.S.M. may suffer irreparable harm.

¶12 Third, the question raised in A.S.M.'s petition is of significant public importance and has not yet been considered by Colorado's appellate courts: Is a juvenile entitled to have a juvenile court review a magistrate's preliminary hearing finding in a delinquency case? And, as the juvenile court acknowledged, the issue is mired in confusion.

¶13 Given these circumstances, we determined that exercising our original jurisdiction was warranted. Before explaining why we now make absolute our rule to show cause, we take a moment to articulate the standard that shepherds our review.

III. Standard of Review

¶14 Whether A.S.M. is entitled to have the juvenile court review the magistrate's probable cause finding hinges on our interpretation of section 19-2.5-609(3), section 19-1-108(5.5), and C.R.M. 7(a)(3). Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are subject to de novo review. Rowell, ¶ 14, 453 P.3d at 1159. So are questions of rule interpretation. See Northstar Project Mgmt., Inc. v. DLR Grp., Inc., 2013 CO 12, ¶ 12, 295 P.3d 956, 959 ("We interpret rules of procedure consistent with principles of statutory construction and, thus, review procedural rules de novo as well."); People v. Zhuk , 239 P.3d 437, 438-39 (Colo. 2010) (applying de novo review to construction of appellate rules).

IV. Analysis

¶15 Section 19-2.5-609, titled "Preliminary hearing-dispositional hearing," addresses preliminary hearings in delinquency proceedings. Among other things, it delineates when a juvenile or a prosecutor may demand and receive a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the delinquent act alleged was committed by the juvenile. § 19-2.5-609(1), (2)(b). It also sets forth the timeframe within which a preliminary hearing must be held if the juvenile is being detained as a result of the delinquent act alleged. § 19-2.5-609(1)(b). Further, it states that the parties have no right to demand that the...