People v. Salazar

15 Cal.5th 416

538 P.3d 688

315 Cal.Rptr.3d 295

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Norman Thomas SALAZAR, Defendant and Appellant.

S275788

Supreme Court of California.

November 20, 2023

Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Chung L. Mar, Steven D. Matthews and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

After Norman Salazar had been sentenced but while his appeal was still pending, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731) (Senate Bill 567). Though Salazar received a middle term sentence at the time of his original sentencing, the new statute creates a presumption that the sentencing court "shall" enter a lower term sentence when, among other things, a "psychological, physical, or childhood trauma" contributed to the offense. ( Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(6) & (A).)¹ The sentencing court may only depart from this lower term presumption if it finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that the lower term would be contrary to "the interests of justice." (Id. , subd. (b)(6).) The parties agree that this new legislation applies on appeal to Salazar's nonfinal case. (See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948.) The Attorney General further concedes that the record discloses that Salazar may have suffered a qualifying trauma, which would appear to meet the statute's threshold requirement for triggering the lower term presumption. (See People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 638–640, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 292, 466 P.3d 844 ( Frahs ).)

In People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 324 P.3d 245 ( Gutierrez ), we held that, in a case like this one, when a sentencing court was not aware of the full scope of its discretionary powers at the time the defendant was sentenced, "the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ " ( Id. at p. 1391, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 324 P.3d 245.) We granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeal erred here by finding that the record " ‘clearly indicate[s]’ " the trial court would not have imposed a lower term sentence if it had been aware of the scope of its discretion. ( Ibid . ) We find no clear indication in the record that the sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence had it been aware of " ‘the scope of its discretionary powers’ " under the current section 1170. ( Gutierrez , at p. 1391, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 324 P.3d 245.) We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the case to the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to the superior court for resentencing.

I. Background

In 2018, Salazar and M.Q. were in a dating relationship. On August 12, 2018, after their relationship had ended, M.Q. knocked on the door to Salazar's motel room around 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. M.Q. testified that Salazar pulled her inside by the shirt and punched her in the head, causing her to bleed. Within a few minutes, he put a desk in front of the door to prevent M.Q. from leaving.

Salazar accused M.Q. of being followed or bringing people with her. Even though his motorcycle was in the parking lot, Salazar repeatedly claimed M.Q. stole it and sold it to someone who replaced it with a different bike. By 7:00 p.m., Salazar had punched M.Q. five to ten times and sprayed her with pepper spray five to 10 times. Around 7:00 p.m., Salazar also threatened to kill M.Q. Later in the evening, Salazar kicked M.Q. between the thighs, knocking her to the ground. Salazar ingested five lines of methamphetamine while in the motel room.

According to M.Q., around 8:00 p.m., Salazar insisted that she accompany him in her car to purchase more drugs. Before leaving the motel room, Salazar broke M.Q.’s phone into two and took keys from her purse. From about 11:00 p.m. until about 9:00 a.m. the next morning, Salazar drove M.Q.’s car while she sat in the passenger seat. He continued to punch and spray her with pepper spray and with glass cleaner.

M.Q. testified that at about 9:00 a.m., they returned to the motel room. At about 10:00 a.m., Salazar drove M.Q.’s car to a park, with M.Q. following in his truck. Once there, he became angry that she did not park his truck correctly and bit her face, making her bleed. Salazar then drove the two of them back to the motel in his truck, leaving M.Q.’s car behind. They then returned to the park a second time with M.Q. driving the truck and Salazar driving his motorcycle. M.Q. and Salazar then both rode to the motel on Salazar's motorcycle, leaving the truck behind at the park.

The two then proceeded on Salazar's motorcycle to Chase Bank. When they arrived at the bank, Salazar said "we're going to go to the ATM to pull out the $3,000 that [M.Q.] owed him" for his motorcycle. M.Q. replied that they had to go inside because ATMs do not give out $3,000. When they went inside, M.Q. pulled her sunglasses up and asked a bank employee to call the police. Police responded and arrested Salazar.

M.Q. went to the hospital for treatment. The treating physician found that she had a fractured cheek bone, a closed head injury, swelling around her eye, and an injury consistent with a bite mark on her face.

The jury acquitted Salazar of kidnapping but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of false imprisonment by violence or menace ( §§ 236, 237, subd. (a) ). The jury also found Salazar guilty of infliction of corporal injury on a person with whom he had a current or former dating relationship ( § 273.5, subd. (a) ). The jury acquitted Salazar of attempted robbery ( §§ 664, 211 ). The jury did not reach agreement on an allegation that Salazar personally inflicted great bodily injury ( § 12022.7, subd. (e) ), and this charge was subsequently dismissed pursuant to section 1383. Salazar admitted a prior strike ( §§ 667, subds. (c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1) ).

At Salazar's sentencing hearing in November 2020, the court considered a probation report, a defense sentencing memorandum, and the prosecution's statement in aggravation. The defense sentencing memorandum reported that Salazar's father was an alcoholic and strictly disciplined him. According to Salazar, he first tried alcohol, smoked marijuana, and snorted cocaine when he was 13. From the age of 13 to 20, he used psychedelic drugs such as LSD frequently, sometimes daily. Arrest records reflect that Salazar used methamphetamine.

The sentencing memorandum also indicates that Salazar was diagnosed with paranoid schizoaffective disorder, anxiety, and claustrophobia, his mother and sister were diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and his father was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. In 2011, Salazar's father passed away, and in 2013, his mother died of pancreatic cancer.

In November 2009, at the age of 36 years old, Salazar was admitted to the Ventura County Psychiatric Unit. According to the intake form, Salazar stated he had tried to kill himself, he thought his mother's boyfriend was trying to kill him, and he had a history of self-harm and suicidal ideations. In December 2009, at a subsequent adult services assessment, Salazar exhibited paranoid ideation and reported hallucinations. Salazar reported that he drank seven to eight beers daily and occasionally used cocaine.

A Ventura County Behavior Health Client Assessment Form, dated December 2011, states that prior records indicate that Salazar was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, depressed type, in May 2010 and had a history of paranoia and depression since he was 10 years old. During the December 2011 client assessment, Salazar further reported that his father was physically abusive beginning at age five. He reported visual hallucinations since childhood. The client assessment form states that Salazar has symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), including flashbacks of rapes/physical assaults when in prison, as well as symptoms of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) that "were likely related to trauma in childhood." The client assessment form concluded that Salazar meets the criteria for schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder, and dysthymic disorder.

The prosecution also filed a statement in aggravation. The statement details Salazar's prior criminal history, which includes a misdemeanor conviction for assault with a deadly weapon in 1997 ( § 245 ); a conviction for battery on a spouse in 1998 ( § 243, subd. (e) ); a misdemeanor conviction for inflicting injury on a spouse in 1998 ( § 273.5, subd. (a) ); a conviction for possessing a stolen vehicle from 2009 ( § 496d, subd. (a) ); a conviction for battery from 2009 ( § 242 ); a conviction for evading police with willful disregard for safety from 2012 (§ 2800.2, subd. (a)); and a conviction for evading police with willful disregard for safety from 2014 (§ 2800.2, subd. (a)). The prosecution's statement notes that after Salazar was arrested for the present case, six new cases had been filed against him. The statement also notes that Salazar has been committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 11 times since 2001.

At the sentencing hearing, the court denied Salazar's request to dismiss the prior strike conviction. (See People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628.) Before doing so, the court praised Salazar's courtroom conduct, stating: "You presented yourself very well. You could not have been more respectful, both to your counsel and to [the prosecutor] and to me and to the jury." The court was "hopeful that once this is done, that you can become the best...