People v. Schantz

2022 IL App (5th) 200045

219 N.E.3d 590

467 Ill.Dec. 580

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Patricia A. SCHANTZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5-20-0045

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Filed November 30, 2022

Rehearing Denied December 21, 2022

N. Scott Rosenblum and Nathan T. Swanson, of Rosenblum, Schwartz & Fry, P.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.

James A. Gomric, State's Attorney, of Belleville (Patrick Delfino, Patrick D. Daly, of Trent Marshall, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE WHARTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 On October 20, 2016, the State charged the defendant with one count of aggravated driving under the influence involving a death ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(C) (West 2014)) and one count of reckless homicide with a motor vehicle ( 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2014)). The charges stemmed from an accident that occurred on April 1, 2016, involving a fatality.

¶ 2 The defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of two blood draws taken at different times on the morning of the accident, arguing that they violated the fourth amendment guarantee against illegal searches and seizures as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const., amends. IV, XIV. The trial court denied the motion to suppress after a hearing.

¶ 3 Following a September 3, 2019, stipulated bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of both charges. She was subsequently sentenced to a term of six years of imprisonment, to be served at 85%, followed by a two-year period of mandatory supervised release. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider her sentence, which the court denied. The defendant now appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the admission of the evidence violated her fourth amendment constitutional rights.

U.S. Const., amend. IV. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 The factual background that follows in this opinion is derived from the record on appeal. Much of it comes from the testimony and arguments presented during the hearing on the motion to suppress and from the stipulation of facts and evidence filed with the court on behalf of the State and the defendant on September 3, 2019.

¶ 6 On April 1, 2016, at approximately 6:03 a.m., the defendant was driving her vehicle eastbound on Route 161 in St. Clair County. At that time, sunrise had not yet occurred, and the area remained dark. The weather was clear with no rain, snow, or fog. The defendant failed to yield to an oncoming motorcycle when she began turning north onto Shiloh Station Road. The motorcycle struck the defendant's front passenger door. Douglas Landers was the motorcycle driver.

¶ 7 Illinois State Police responded to the scene of the accident. Upon arrival, Illinois State Police trooper Darrell Scruggs found Landers's body 10 to 15 feet from the motorcycle, lying face-down on the road. Trooper Scruggs immediately exited his vehicle and approached the body. He checked for a pulse and found none. A short time later, emergency medical services arrived. Landers was taken by ambulance to an area hospital but was pronounced dead.

¶ 8 Trooper Darrell Scruggs and Sergeant Devin Watts were called to testify at the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress. Trooper Scruggs testified that when he arrived, the defendant's vehicle was parked on the right side of Shiloh Station Road. The defendant was inside the vehicle. Trooper Scruggs approached the defendant's vehicle to identify himself. He testified that the defendant's demeanor was "[r]eal shaky and nervous," and she was crying. She was also smoking a cigarette. During this initial interaction with the defendant, he did not smell alcohol. He stated that the only thing he smelled "was the actual cigarette, itself." After Trooper Scruggs returned to his squad car to begin his accident report, however, Sergeant Watts informed him that in his initial contact with the defendant, he detected a strong odor of alcohol. The defendant had no notable injuries and declined medical attention. At the scene, Sergeant Watts told the defendant that he smelled alcohol and believed that she had been drinking. The defendant advised him that she had consumed "a few" drinks and had slept for a few hours at a friend's house in the Shiloh/Belleville area "to make sure she was okay to be driving."

¶ 9 Trooper Scruggs determined that because of the nature of the accident and the strong smell of alcohol, the defendant needed to undergo field sobriety tests. The defendant failed to properly perform these tests. The officers found that her speech was "thick-tongued," "slow," and "drawn out." Further, the officers noted that her eyes were "glossy and a little bloodshot" and were noted to be "heavy and slow in response to movement." The defendant informed the officers that she saw no traffic before she made the fatal turn onto Shiloh Station Road. She stated that she felt an impact, but she did not know what she hit. The defendant submitted to a portable breath alcohol test at the officers’ request. The test registered a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.16. Trooper Scruggs placed the defendant under arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). He informed the defendant that he was going to transport her to Belleville Memorial Hospital to obtain samples of her blood and urine because Illinois State Police protocol requires a blood test if there is a possible fatality. Trooper Scruggs testified that on April 1, 2016, he believed that the Illinois law on forcible blood draws was valid.

¶ 10 The parties entered a stipulation of facts and evidence that included details about the defendant's field sobriety tests. The defendant asked Trooper Scruggs if she had to do the sobriety tests. He advised her that she could refuse to do the tests, but that law enforcement would obtain a blood sample. The defendant agreed to do the tests. The field sobriety tests were captured by a dashcam video. Before the walk-and-turn test and the one-leg-stand test, Trooper Scruggs confirmed that the defendant understood his instructions. In addition, he demonstrated how each test needed to be performed. The defendant removed her boots for these two tests. During the walk-and-turn test, the defendant was required to walk heel-to-toe for nine steps along a straight line. The defendant failed to walk heel-to-toe and stepped off the line. During the one-leg-stand test, the defendant was required to raise one foot and remain standing for 30 seconds within three attempts. The defendant raised her right foot only to place the foot down 4 seconds later, then raised her right foot again, but placed the foot down within several seconds. Finally, she raised her foot a third time and placed it down after 17 seconds. With the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Trooper Scruggs noticed that there was a lack of smooth pursuit in both eyes, distinct and continuous nystagmus at maximum deviation in both eyes, and the onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees in both eyes. While performing this test, Trooper Scruggs continued to smell the strong odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath. The defendant failed all field sobriety tests.

¶ 11 Upon arrival at Belleville Memorial Hospital, Trooper Scruggs advised "a couple nurses" that he needed a blood sample from the defendant. Trooper Scruggs testified that he realized he left his paperwork in his vehicle and instructed the nurses to wait until he returned with the paperwork. That paperwork included a copy of the "Warning to Motorist," a form containing explanations of the Miranda rights ( Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ), and a traffic crash report. Despite his request to hospital staff, when he returned to the defendant's room, a blood draw was already in progress.

¶ 12 The defendant testified that she neither consented nor objected to the hospital's blood draw. She testified that a nurse came into the room and informed her that she was there to take a blood sample. The nurse drew the blood and then left the room. Similarly, the nurse asked and obtained a urine sample from the defendant.

¶ 13 The hospital provided Trooper Scruggs with the blood and urine samples collected by its staff member, Mary Carter, at 7:50 a.m. Thereafter, Scruggs took the samples to the Illinois State Police District 11 headquarters and signed the blood and urine samples over to evidence custodian, Robert Meilink. Meilink logged the samples into evidence. Meilink then delivered the blood and urine samples to Lora Furlong, an evidence technician employed by the Illinois State Police Springfield Forensic Science Laboratory. On April 5, 2016, Furlong subdivided the April 1, 2016, 7:50 a.m. blood and urine samples into two tubes of blood (Exhibit 1A) and two tubes of urine (Exhibit 1B). Dareea Patrick Paiva, a toxicologist employed by the Illinois State Police Springfield Forensic Science Laboratory, tested the blood and urine samples (Exhibits 1A and 1B) on April 20, 2016. Using headspace gas chromatography, Paiva determined that the blood sample (Exhibit 1A) contained 0.156 g/dL ethanol. She detected no drugs in the urine sample (Exhibit 1B).

¶ 14 Following the 7:50 a.m. blood and urine collections from the defendant, at 8:13 a.m., Trooper Scruggs read the defendant the "Warning to Motorist" and her Miranda rights, both from preprinted forms. After having an opportunity to read the forms, the defendant signed them. After reading the warnings to the defendant, Scruggs asked her to voluntarily submit to a second blood draw. Trooper Scruggs testified that although he made this request, he did not obtain the sample at that time. Based on this testimony, we deduce that the defendant apparently declined.

¶ 15 Trooper Scruggs testified that he issued three uniform tickets for the defendant, charging her with operating...